

THE
JOURNAL OF
THE
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE

OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

SUMMER
NUMBER
1905

RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. XIV

Summer Number, 1945

No. 3

EDITORIAL BOARD

JOHN BAILLIE	NOLAN B. HARMON, JR., <i>Editor-in-Chief</i>	
ROBBINS WOLCOTT	LYNN HAROLD HOUGH	G. ASHTON OLDHAM
BARSTOW	JAMES R. JOY	HOWARD C. ROBBINS
SAMUEL MCCREA CAVERT	KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE	PAUL SCHERER

ADVISORY COUNCIL

John Keith Benton	John Alexander Mackay	Richard Roberts
Angus Dun	Earl Bowman Marlatt	D. Elton Trueblood
Paul Bentley Kern	Robert Hastings Nichols	Gregory Vlastos
W. E. McCulloch	Richard Campbell Raines	Leslie D. Weatherhead
Arthur Cushman	Luther D. Reed	Luther A. Weigle
McGiffert, Jr.		

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Redeeming These Times Henry P. Van Dusen	323
The Christian Churches and the Emerging Social Order in Europe, Paul Tillich	329
Christian Faith and Race Relations Vernon H. Holloway	340
Why God the Son Became a Man Harry Milton Taylor	351
How Can the Church Serve the Colleges Bishop Fred Pierce Corson	365
The Method of Religious Inquiry Douglas Clyde Macintosh	370
Speaking in the Church J. Edward Lantz	384
What War Does to Religion Anton T. Boisen	389
Saint Augustine and the Problem of Evil Nolan B. Harmon, Jr.	401
Postwar Relations With Japan—Touchstone of Our Destiny, Charles W. Iglehart	410
Isaiah: Prophet of Faith John Paterson	422
The New Pilgrim Joseph R. Sizoo	429
What is the Crux of Christian Ethics? A Reply to Professor Widgery, Charles W. Kegley	437
Anything Can Happen L. Wendell Fifield	445
Book Reviews	452

Copyright, 1945, by Whitmore and Stone. All rights reserved—no part of this magazine may be produced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

Printed in the United States of America

Published by
ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS

150 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK

Who's Who?

ANTON T. BOISEN, A.B., M.F., B.D., M.A., D.D. Chaplain, Elgin State Hospital, Elgin, Illinois.

BISHOP FRED PIERCE CORSON, D.D., Litt.D., L.H.D., LL.D. Formerly President of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

L. WENDELL FIFIELD, D.D., Litt.D. Minister, Plymouth Church of the Pilgrims, Brooklyn Heights, New York, New York.

NOLAN B. HARMON, JR., M.A., D.D. Book Editor, The Methodist Church, New York, New York.

VERNON H. HOLLOWAY, B.A., B.D. Secretary of the International and Intercultural Relations of the Council for Social Action, New York, New York.

CHARLES W. IGLEHART, Ph.D., B.D. Associate Professor of Missions, Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

CHARLES W. KEGLEY, M.A., Ph.D. Chairman, University Board of Religion, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

J. EDWARD LANTZ, B.D., M.A. Instructor of Speech, McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D., D.D., LL.D. Dwight Professor of Theology and Philosophy of Religion, Emeritus, Divinity School, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

JOHN PATERSON, Ph.D. Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

JOSEPH R. SIZOO, D.D., Litt.D. Minister of the Collegiate Church of St. Nicholas, New York, New York.

HARRY MILTON TAYLOR, Ph.D. Calvary Methodist Church, East Orange, New Jersey.

PAUL TILLICH, Ph.D., D.Theo., D.D. Professor of Philosophical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN. President-elect, Union Theological Seminary, New York, New York.

RELIGION IN LIFE is published quarterly by Abingdon-Cokesbury Press at 75 cents per copy. Annual subscription, \$2.00 per year in the United States and possessions and Mexico; Canada, postage 18 cents additional; other foreign postage, 30 cents additional. For the convenience of readers in Great Britain, subscriptions will be received by the Epworth Press, 25-35 City Road, London, E. C. 1, at the rate of nine shillings and sixpence per year.

Publication office, 810 Broadway, Nashville 2, Tennessee. Editorial and General offices, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York. Entered as Second Class Matter, January 16, 1932, at the post office in Nashville, Tennessee, under Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized March 16, 1923.

Redeeming These Times

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

"Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. . . . What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid!"—Rom. 5:20; 6:1-2.

"Look, therefore, how ye walk, not as fools but as wise, redeeming the time, because the days are evil."—Eph. 5:15-16.

I

IN THESE days, a reading of life in terms of paradox can claim no novelty. Not infrequently, the appeal to paradox is an easy evasion of difficult and clear thought; or, of the decision and action which clear thought demands. But there is a paradox which stands forth with peculiar vividness in these times; and yet is a feature not merely of days of crisis, but of human living always. It is suggested by the familiar but baffling words of Paul: "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." It is precisely where evil appears to reign that redemptive good may win its most notable triumphs. It is precisely in times of most unfavorable outward circumstance that Christian faith may work with greatest power.

I say this paradox is a feature, not of hours of crisis only, but of profound living always. Parents will use every persuasion to forewarn their children against the consequences of toying with fire. Yet the lesson is unlikely to be learned until the day comes when the little fingers reach out to touch a stove or radiator. There follow—tears and wails, blisters and bandages—and the lesson is learned for life. This is true also of the far more somber consequences of the far more risky experimentation with moral fire.

A man will do all in his power to guard his friend against misfortune. But, if he comprehends the logic of life, he knows well that only firsthand trial under adversity can put the mettle of that friend's character to its crucial test and prove its worth.

No one will desire that death shall lay its blighting hand upon those dear to his friend. Nevertheless, he knows that only when faith has passed through the valley of the shadow of harrowing loss can its hope of immortality be really secure. Whatever our preference for the "once-

born" or "twice-born" soul, only the latter is strong against any blow which fate may bring.

So, the prophets of truth will strain every resource to guard their generation against the inexorable retribution for its follies. Yet, they may sense, not only that the cataclysm they would so eagerly forfend is inescapable; but that that cataclysm, with all its bitter cost in life and fortune, is the necessary precondition to awakening and the possibility of amendment.

It is in such a setting that we must view the paradox of today. Of the *fact* of the paradox, there can be no question. A time when every counsel of Christian ethics seems to be flaunted, every dream of Christian hope for the world eclipsed, is also a time when some men—the more thoughtful, the more intelligent—are turning as at no previous time in our generation to Christian faith to ask what, if any, light it can cast for mankind's extremity.

II

It is important that we understand clearly the exact character and meaning of this paradox of today. The paradox of these times is the reversal—the overturning—of the characteristic paradox of modern life. It is a direct outcome of the disintegration of the most cherished securities of the modern period.

It is a commonplace that every human life moves within two circles or about two foci which mark for it two sharply contrasted spheres of experience. Professor Hocking has distinguished them as the realm of the Public Order and the realm of the Private Order. The former determines the external setting of each life—the particular era and locality and outward circumstances in which that life lives. These vary greatly from generation to generation, and between individuals—the realm of the Public Order. But, within the more intimate circle of the Private Order, each life traverses much the same sequence of episodes whatever its race or generation—the familiar episodes of *birth, youth, friendship, love, marriage, begetting, separation, old age, death*. To take a single illustration: We fall in love, with romance and poetry and irrepressible expectation—Isaac and Rebekah, Romeo and Juliet, Aucassin and Nicolette, Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett. The dress and times change, the inner experience how little! So it is with the even deeper experiences of our inmost, private selves. These are essentially unchanging, from generation to generation and epoch to epoch.

In the providence of nature, it is the fast-changing panorama of outward circumstance which is *intended* to give life its *novelty, adventure and advance*. It is the ever-repeated incidents of intimate experience which *should* furnish life with *stability, security and profound satisfaction*. And, it is the interplay of these two sets of factors in mutual stimulus and enrichment which makes possible the breadth and depth and height of human living at its best.

It has been the paradox of modern life that the sphere which was intended to supply *novelty, adventure and advance* has become for many the order of stability and security. What have been the real bases of security for the typical modern man? Have they not been his reliance upon the dependability of outward circumstances—regularity of external regimen—certainty of house and train and cars and cook—above all, the assurance of the unfailing receipt of salary, income, dividends? Interference with the established familiarities of the Public Order has shaken his stability by threatening his security. By the same token, the sphere which was intended to assure *continuity, stability, security* to life—the realities of the Private Order—has become for him the area of *change, uncertainty, unpredictability*. It has been said, many a modern man has felt more confident of the regularity of his dividends than of the fidelity of his wife. So, modern culture has reversed nature's providential provisions for man's varied and mutually enriching experience and has given us a generation ill-prepared for the life of faith, indifferent to faith's reading of the human pilgrimage.

III

These days have overturned all that. There is no need to argue the insecurity of temporal supports—of wealth and possessions and position. Taxes and inflation will clinch that argument. There is hardly need to inveigh against the lush luxuries of lotus-land living, and their decimating effect upon the life of the spirit. The demands of the day may well shrivel those luxuries to dust. There is no need to prove that men's only sure reliance is to be found within the realities of the inner life—the things which, though unseen, are unshakable, just because they are rooted in the reality of God. Every contemporary with eyes half open knows in his bones that that is true. Above all, it is not necessary to convince those with eyes to see that our brief span of uncertain existence here is without permanence and without meaning *unless* it be a stage upon a pilgrimage which shall stretch beyond the near horizons of this

life—into eternity. *Death* stands today always at our elbow—or at the elbow of some whom we know or love—to remind us of the true character of human existence.

In brief, these times are restoring to human life its right perspective as Christian faith has always understood it—*pilgrimage*—perpetual, eternal pilgrimage. Once again, the feet of humanity are placed in the footprints of that great company of all ages who, like Abraham, when they were called to go out into a future which was their rightful heritage, had to go forth, not knowing whither they went. Like them, many in this generation may discover that unknown future to be their true promised land.

IV

Of course, I am not suggesting that such an awakening is taking place on any wide scale—certainly not in this country, at least not yet. These times may—they may not—bring sound spiritual renewal. We look mistakenly for any such assured outcome. These times will bring, are already bringing, to those with eyes alert to comprehend their deeper significance—fundamental reordering of the basic confidences of life; birth or rebirth, of faith; yes, even spiritual triumph.

It is taking place today—this commonplace miracle—in far places scattered clean across the earth's surface:

1. It is taking place in the lives of *whole nations*.
 - a. Some of us have had the privilege of witnessing it taking place in *China* these past seven years—that vast, dumb, needy populace of almost half a billion people, where something approaching the moral renewal of a whole people can be observed as a direct fruit of the unimaginable sufferings and privations of war.
 - b. Some of us have had the privilege of witnessing its results in *Great Britain* where, returning after the great ordeal of three years ago, we found old friends—the same, and yet quite different—a whole nation, far finer, yes, and far happier than we had ever known it before.
 - c. We hear of it in *Holland* where, after decades of deepening ineffectiveness, the Christian Church is once more resuming its oldtime place as the very heart of a nation reborn in fortitude and unconquerable strength. A leader of the Dutch churches reports:

"There is once more a Church in Holland. . . . What most of us in our unbelief had considered impossible has happened. God has sent His breath on the dry bones and we have once more a Mother Church which gives guidance and consolation, and which holds up our hands in the struggle which is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers of the darkness of this world. . . .

"The barrier between the Church and the people has become transparent. . . . Not only the church-goer but many who had shown little interest in the Church listen intently and ask: 'What does the Church say?' . . . The Church continues to speak. Indeed its witness has become clearer and richer. . . . Nowhere except in the Church can one hear clear language concerning the present situation. . . .

"Many who had come to think of the Church as an antiquated institution suddenly find it a central factor in the great national struggle and begin to wonder why the Church stands when so many other bodies fall."

2. It is taking place, too, in the *lives of individuals*:

- a. It is taking place in the lives of some burdened with almost insupportable responsibilities for others. From Norway come fragmentary glimpses of that remarkable man who has suddenly become the soul of an entire nation in its indomitable defense of justice and truth, Bishop Berggrav—the man whom Quisling regards as his "greatest enemy and obstacle." A correspondent reports:

"I see Eyvind Berggrav, confined in a small remote hut. There is barbed wire outside. A band of men, armed with rifles, pistols and truncheons mount guard over the dangerous prisoner who prays for his people, and strengthens his spirit with the Word of Life."

But a more intimate and revealing portrait comes from a Norwegian who had escaped from a Nazi prison camp in Norway. Speaking of Bishop Berggrav's visits to the prison, he says:

"The Primate almost transformed these men by his influence. He fortified them with something deeper and greater than pride, scorn and hate. He gave them more courage than they possessed. The Bishop's influence went right through the prison. He made us realize that in our helpless state our spirit was our only shield and sword. And yet we never heard from him one word of hate, scorn or reproof of the Germans. He never taught us to resist or rebel; but he gave us courage and spirit. No wonder the Church of Norway and the people look up to him and follow his leadership. His spirit is so great that it will lead Norway to victory whatever the Nazis do to him."

- b. It is taking place in the lives of *refugees*, driven, destitute, from land to land and hamlet to hamlet in quest of crust and roof. One of the most brilliant of these exiles who has found sanctuary among us gives a beautiful and moving ac-

count of what it may mean for one deeply rooted in loyalty to fatherland to stand upon the border "between home and Alienland," to leave all to follow truth and honor—what it may mean in pain and separation and uncertainty, but also in insight and power and freedom and fulfillment.

"For the Christian of every faith," he says, "there seems to me at this point no doubt any more. He is to leave his own country over and over again, and to go into a land that is to be shown to him; and to trust a promise which is for him purely future."

- c. It is taking place in many a humble, unnamed, unhonored life of those who, amidst war's deprivations and perils and demands are discovering such freedom and satisfaction and fulfillment as they have never before known. A quite ordinary lad, a recent graduate from high school in one of our eastern cities, after a year of service at the front in Africa, writes:

"This year, I have been an observer of human lives and from what I've seen and experienced I am certain of man's need for God and of the importance of following the laws of His universe regarding human action. More and more I'm coming to feel the necessity of definitely letting God take control of one's life, to trust completely in Him. I've spent several months doubting and living without Him (or, perhaps, not heeding) and now I know that man alone is but a fleshly shell and that God is his strength and power—his all. . . . With God, he is sure, his strength is certain."

Here and there—souls are being made *strong* and *pure* and *whole*. Faith is burning with a clearer, stronger, whiter flame than our eyes have ever before witnessed.

V

What of ourselves? Times like these lay bare our real reliances. They reveal the stuff of which we are made. They test the temper of our faith. They divide all men sharply; there is a sifting of sheep and goats. *Either*—we revert to lower and baser confidences, *or*—we rise to higher and purer certainties than are demanded in the easy-going casualness of ordinary times. We take hold of these. Better—they take firm hold of us.

What shall we say, then? "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid." Shall we glory in war that men may be forced to face life in true perspective? God forbid! What we must say is: "Look, therefore, how *we* walk, not as unwise but as wise—*redeeming the times*, just because the days are evil."

The Christian Churches and the Emerging Social Order in Europe

PAUL TILlich

THE subject which I shall discuss demands some interpretation of the words used in its formulation. Starting with the word Europe, I shall use it to designate the continental European countries between the future boundary of Russia and the British Isles. Although Russia and Great Britain will be the decisive factors in determining the destiny of Europe, they cannot properly be called European countries. The second term that needs commentary is "social order." I take this to designate the total structure of the social life, including the political forms, international and national on the one side, and the economic order on the other side, as well as the large group of human relations which are formed by tradition, custom, education and new intellectual and spiritual experiences. While the Christian churches have only an indirect influence on the political and economic side of the social order, their indirect influence through the realm of human relations of which they are an all-penetrating element is tremendous. The same is true of the influence of the social order on the churches. Here the political and economic situation transforms the churches through their impact on the realm of human relations. The most difficult term in the title is the word "emerging." It points to something that is not yet realized, yet, nevertheless, must be realizable in order to be talked about. I cannot give political prophecies. The only thing I can do is to point to decisive structural trends which are implied in the present situation and to ask how these trends are supported or transformed by trends within the European churches and vice versa.

Anything we might say about Europe has two deficiencies. The first, due to the war situation, is the lack of sources and the propagandistic distortion of all information reaching us here; the second is the strangeness of the present European mind, not only to born Americans, but also to those born Europeans who, like myself, left Europe more than a decade ago and thus missed the most shaking and most transforming years in the last centuries of European history.

I

TRENDS TOWARD A FUTURE EUROPEAN SOCIAL ORDER AS IMPLIED
IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

The international frame. Europe, for the time being, is a dependent section of the earth. Three hundred million people living on this Asiatic peninsula are objects and not subjects of political action. Since the Nazis, starting with Germany, have conquered all of Europe, Europe has become a unity; namely, the unity of a quasi-colonial status. The proud central sphere of the earth has become a sector in which the peripheries of larger spheres overlap. The fate of every European country is decided not in Rome, Madrid or Vienna, Paris or Berlin, nor in any of the smaller centers. It is decided in the center of the Soviet Republics, many of them purely Asiatic; in the center of the British Commonwealth, some parts of which are the antipodes of Europe, and in the center of the American continent which is separated by an ocean from Europe, but whose real interest is the ocean on its other side. Whether the great powers divide the European continent among themselves, leaving the remnant of Germany as a no-man's land between them, or whether they create a European Council for all of Europe in which they are (in spite of France) the really determining force, or whether they create a world security system in which they have the decisive voice, Europe, in each of these possibilities, will be dependent on them. This side of the emerging European social order can be avoided only if a price is paid which would be too high; namely, the disunity of the world powers and the attempts of each to make as many European countries as possible its allies against the other great powers. The real solution, namely, an independent European federation, is impossible, not only because the great powers are already preventing it, but also because the nationalism of every small European nation runs higher than ever before. The emerging social order in Europe will be a dependent order—this is the first conclusion of a realistic analysis.

The economic problem. Second in importance is the economic situation in quasi-colonial Europe. It is not *first* in importance because the great powers are powerful enough to keep the European peoples at a starvation point with no fear of a successful revolution. But after this has been said it must be acknowledged that the European masses are in a revolutionary state of mind, that they do not want to return to the status quo out of which all their misery has grown, that they are distrustful of the reactionary exile governments, that even political liberation does not

mean very much to them if it is not followed by a system which gives them economic security. Russia is able to support the development of such a system. This is by far her greatest chance even in those countries which do not fall directly in her sphere of influence. The Western countries are not able to give economic security—England, at least for the time being, because of Tory leadership—America, for an indefinite time, because of big-business leadership. But England and America are powerful enough to decide the economic structure of Western and parts of Central Europe. They will suppress the revolutionary movements, carried on by the radical sections of the former resistance groups, either for the sake of kings and feudal remnants (this is the Tory pattern) or for the sake of the old capitalistic ruling class (this is the State Department pattern) or for both of them. These patterns taken together have rightly been called the Metternich solution, using as a symbol the European reaction in the post-Napoleonic period. This confused order of European economy will end when it becomes obvious that it is not the way of solving the problems of social security nor of increasing the standard of living for the masses. Then after some revolutionary attempts, the most probable solution will be a streamlined, very efficient monopoly-controlled neo-Fascism. This means that the European social order in the economic realm will emerge in three steps already visible, at least in the Anglo-Saxon dominated sections of Europe—a reactionary, a revolutionary and a neo-Fascist step.

Constitutional problems. This war is being fought in the name of democratic versus totalitarian ideals, and the emerging European social order is supposed to be a democratic one. In the name of democracy Churchill and all reactionary exiled governments are fighting against revolutionary forces. Even Russia has accepted democratic slogans. Will there be a democratic social order in the great majority of the European countries? Certainly not! You cannot establish a democracy on ruins. Democracy, as we are used to it in this country, presupposes the possibility of waste without danger. Such a possibility does not exist in most of the European countries. A check and balance system, such as we have, which makes a consistent foreign policy almost impossible, would condemn every European state to speedy annihilation. The same would be true with biennial elections, powerful lobbies and the lack of an established bureaucracy. Very few European countries could exist under such conditions. The prospects for the fulfillment of the democratic ideal are obvious to anyone who will compare the present European or Asiatic situation with the past

and present American situation. For the time being the democratic slogans are used on the Russian side as a façade for a so-called people's front in which the communists have a strong influence, and on the Anglo-Saxon side as a façade for the re-establishment of the old ruling classes. You cannot have a working democracy built on ruins and you cannot have it if the masses prefer death in a revolution to starvation and economic slavery under so-called democratic government. This is the problem of the emerging social order in Europe from the constitutional point of view.

Problems of human relations. The extent of disintegration of human relations in Europe is hardly imaginable by a born American. Instead of a methodological analysis I would like to give you examples of the European poetry since the turn of the century. The relations of parents and children, of the sexes, of friends, of the classes, of experts and laymen, of everybody to everybody, have undergone such change that a man of the later nineteenth century would hardly recognize our present world. All these relations are undergoing a radical change and a fundamental transformation. But let us not make the mistake of thinking that they are returning to the chaotic disintegration of the twenties—they are not chaotic at all. And they are not returning to the bourgeois status quo of the nineties of the last century—they are not bourgeois at all. They are going ahead to something new which could be called collectivistic and authoritarian without the primitivistic connotations of the former and the absolutistic connotations of the latter. The social order of Europe will be very dissimilar to the social order of the nineteenth century. The Nazis have done much in this respect. In destroying the authority of the parents and teachers for the sake of the Party, in subjecting the sexual life to the demands of the state, in equalizing (contrary to their archaistic theory) male and female in the service of the total war, in removing any independent economic or intellectual power, in introducing a universal technical consciousness, they have created a generation which has no approach to the individualism of the nineteenth century.

II

TRENDS IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE EMERGING SOCIAL ORDER IN EUROPE

Introduction. Before going into special problems it should be stated that the churches are in an ambiguous situation. They are a part of the social order which might emerge in Europe, and at the same time they

transcend by their Christian foundation every special social order. It is their permanent task to balance these two elements. It is their permanent failure that either they assimilate themselves completely to a special social order, or they separate themselves from it without being influenced and, consequently, are without influence of their own. In both cases they strengthen the development which would take place without them anyhow. Only if they show a unity of understanding and criticism are they able to co-operate creatively toward a new social order.

The Catholic Churches. Even with the re-establishment of the Greek Orthodox Church by Russian nationalism and international politics, the Greek Church has not yet become a serious problem in the establishment of a social order in Europe. In spite of some Orthodox Churches in the Balkans it belongs to Russia. After a period of persecution, it has become a tolerated state-dependent Church and, as under the Czar, it is unable to criticize seriously anything done by the state. It is used by the Soviet government as an important weapon in its dispute with the Vatican over Poland and the Balkans. But there is another element in the situation which is more hopeful both from the side of the Church and of the social order. The Greek Orthodox Church, which of all Christian churches was farthest removed from anything like Christian Socialism, must adapt itself to a situation in which feudalism and with it the mass illiteracy and the superstitious mysticism of the peasants have completely disappeared; it must adapt itself to a situation in which the industrial worker, the technical expert and the political bureaucrat are the determining groups; and in which horizontal progress, expressed in nonreligious, humanistic terms instead of vertical elevation of the soul has become the enthusiastic belief of the masses. If the Russian Church is able to find a way of accepting the new social order, not only in terms of co-operation on the basis of the rapidly developing Russian nationalism, but in terms of an affirmative interpretation of the new order, something new and powerful might be the outcome. Within a larger historical frame the situation can be described as follows: Russia has jumped from the stage of absolutism to the stage of social collectivism, leaving out the intervening stage of bourgeois liberalism. Also, the Russian Church, contrary to the Western churches, has never adjusted itself to the spirit of bourgeois society. The great Russian writers of the nineteenth century, religious and secular, fought against the bourgeois spirit and offered a synthesis of the Christian, Greek and Slavic mind as the salvation of the

disintegrating Western world. In this viewpoint they are not too remote from the self-interpretation and intention of the Soviets. The spiritual conquest of the West, hoped for by the Slavophiles, and the political conquest of the West, hoped for by the Soviets, may become allies in a not too distant future.

Much more important for the immediate situation is Roman Catholicism. In order to understand its relation to the emerging social order in Europe we must look at the basic belief of the Catholic Church, namely its doctrine that the spiritual function of the Church is dependent on its hierarchical and authoritarian organization which in turn is based on universal, unchangeable and infallible principles. The Catholic Church has no similarity whatsoever to a Protestant denomination or an Eastern National Church. It is an international power, playing the international political game, fighting for the preservation of every stronghold and for the conquest of new positions of power. This fight is going on everywhere in present-day Europe. It is, in the first place, a fight against the Russian influence in Eastern Europe. In the second place, it is a fight against the pro-Russian communist movements on the whole continent, and in the third place, it is a fight against the protectorate of Protestant England over the Catholic borderlands of the Mediterranean, from Spain to Syria. This creates a very ambiguous attitude on the part of the Vatican toward the three world powers. The attitude toward Russia is openly hostile in spite of some Russian concessions in Poland where the Roman Church alone is allowed to remain the owner of large estates. The hostility is visible in continuing mutual press attacks, and in anti-Russian declarations by the Pope and episcopate in their radical rejection of the European revolution. There is much at stake for the Pope in Eastern Europe, in Poland and Eastern Germany, in Yugoslavia and Hungary, and even in Austria. In its defense against Russia and against the popular movements which are friendly to Russia all over Europe, the Vatican can count on Great Britain as an ally. But around the Mediterranean it wants the independence of the Catholic countries from England, the predominance of France in Asia Minor, and the restitution of the Catholic peoples and influence. Although the United States, according to figures is a Protestant country, the Vatican rightly considers her as the leading Catholic power in the world. The Pope, in his Christmas message, acknowledged this situation publicly and accepted even the democratic ideology, in spite of the feudal and royalistic inclination of the Catholic policy, in order to

remove hindrances which might interfere with the full co-operation with the strongest of the world powers. The reason for this surprising situation is to be found not only in the structure of American Catholicism and its powerful position in local and national politics, but also in the fact that there is a common interest of the Vatican and the United States with respect to Europe. Neither the Vatican nor the United States wants a division of Europe between Russia and England. Although both wish for a dissolution of Protestant Prussia, neither wants a partition of Germany—not even for the sake of a Catholic union between Austria and Bavaria, nor do they want communistic movements by which the Russian influence would be strengthened. So the White House-Vatican alliance may become a very important factor in the emerging order of Europe.

What does this mean in terms of the social and cultural aspects of the European order? In the countries in which the control by the United States is militarily or politically decisive, the social order becomes conservative. The people with whom the American military administration deal (as it already has dealt) are conservatives and, when possible, Catholic. This is not a probability, but a reality. There will be no revolution in these countries. The Catholic Church would be finished as a world power if the European revolutionary potential became actual and destroyed her economic, social and spiritual foundation. The Spanish civil war was a tremendous shock for Rome; hence her unambiguous condemnation of Spain's legally established government, hence the determination of American Catholicism to support the Fascist intervention for the Spanish reaction, hence the fear that in Spain or anywhere else in Europe similar events may happen, hence the preparation for the day in which America will have retired from Europe after having established strong national governments which are able to keep down the revolutionary forces and to give the Catholic Church more influence than she ever had in the period of Liberalism.

What are the chances of such a policy? They are good from the spiritual point of view, poor from the economic point of view. The condition that gave rise to the Nazis was the disintegration of liberal autonomy in Europe. It was the spread of a feeling of meaninglessness, of an experience of frustration, of cynicism and despair. The people between the World Wars were looking for leadership, authority, sacred symbols, a spiritual center. After the disappointment produced by the catastrophe of Fascism and Nazism, this feeling will become even stronger.

The Catholic Church believes that this is her great chance, and there is much evidence that she is right. She knows that in a more collectivistic form of society (and there is no doubt that this will be the future, at least of Europe) the chances of an authoritarian system are greater than those of a social order which is built on cultural or religious autonomy such as Humanism and Protestantism.

But against this favorable situation in the spiritual realm stands an unfavorable economic and social condition. Conservative solutions, status quo tendencies, have no chance in the long run. They cannot solve the real problem of providing security and a rising standard of living for the European masses. Either the pressure of the masses will eliminate the conservative, including the Catholic authorities, or the masses under the cover of democratic procedures and without much regard for the aspirations of the Roman Church will be pressed into a modernized, streamlined form of Fascism—the dream of American managerial capitalism. Here are the limits of the influence of Catholicism on the emerging social order in Europe.

The Protestant churches. It is comparatively easy to describe the relation of the Catholic Church to the emerging social order in Europe, because this church has a clearly defined center of action, clearly defined principles and a clearly defined ultimate political purpose. The only difficulty is to discover behind the diplomatic screen the way in which these principles are applied to a concrete situation.

This is quite different in Protestantism. There is no center of action and there is a complete lack of principles and purposes in the political realm. In Europe this is even more evident than in America. The predominance of the Lutheran type of Protestantism on the Continent has prevented the use of a political theology able to influence directly the emerging social order in Europe. Lutheranism has many shades in Central and Northern Europe, at least as many as it has in this country. But it has some definite characteristics common to all its different forms. It has no principle by which to judge the state except when the state interferes in purely spiritual matters. Therefore Lutheranism was able to accept Hitler as long as he did not try to determine the life of the Church. Therefore it will be able—though reluctantly—to accept the Russian occupation of Eastern Germany as long as the Russians let the Church alone in its religious activities. Therefore it will welcome any kind of conservative policy performed by the occupying Allies in the west and

south. But, and this is the other consequence, it will not fight for any special social structure. It will not go even as far as the Pope did when he employed democratic terminology.

Economically and politically the Lutheran churches will suffer tremendously, much more than the Catholic Church, under the collapse of Germany as a whole and the big landowners especially. Though the connection between the Church and the ruling feudal classes was not as narrow as it was in Russia, and though, consequently, the enmity against the so-called Junkers will not hit the Church as hard as the revolution hit the Russian Church, there will be a difficult situation wherever the Church was largely dependent on feudal lords. On the other hand, it might be that the ten years of suppression by Hitler and the horrible catastrophe of his system will make the Lutheran churches more free from the state and from the old ruling classes than they ever have been. History has transformed nations and churches. It is one of the few political hopes left to us, that this will be true of the German people, politically and religiously.

It is fortunate that in Western Germany the Protestant church is shaped by Calvin more than by Luther, and that in Southwestern Germany the influence of Zwingli has survived. This means that democratic principles, not only for the state, but also for the Church, will find in these sections more receptiveness than in the east.

But, we are often asked, will the German churches have any noticeable influence on the rising social order? Has the anti-Nazi fight and the heroism of the leaders of the Confessing Church movement changed the large-scale indifference of the German people toward the Church? It is hard to give an answer at the present moment. The most probable one is identical with the answer of an east London minister to the same question: The people respect the Church more than before, but they do not attend it more. The fact that the Confessing Church has expressed itself in traditional orthodox terms has made it probably unapproachable on the part of most of the people. But experience alone can give a final answer.

The western and northern churches will support democratic trends, including strong elements of socialism, but excluding anything of a communistic character. More radical trends may prevail in the youth movements of French, Dutch and Norwegian Protestantism. Indications from France point in this direction, but all this is in a daily flux.

Finally, what about the British and American Protestant churches? We must begin with the statement that they are not European according to the definition we gave in the beginning. Nevertheless, as churches of the victorious countries they may have a great influence on the emerging social order in Europe. This influence will not be a very direct one. The idea of a mission of Anglo-Saxon Christianity to the heathen in Germany is as mistaken as the idea of sending Allied teachers into the German schools. A "victor-conquered" relation between highly developed nations is neither a missionary nor an educational situation. If there is to be a direct influence at all, it will come from the personal experiences of those Christian ministers and laymen who lived as exiles in Great Britain or America, and who will bring a much-needed understanding of the Anglo-Saxon practical idealism to the Continent; or it will come from the attitude of Christians among the occupying forces toward the conquered people.

But much more important is the indirect influence of the Anglo-Saxon churches on the emerging social order in Europe, namely their influence on the policy of their own countries. The influence of the churches on public opinion in the Anglo-Saxon countries is incomparably greater than in any European country. Statements such as the one issued by the Federal Council Committee on *A Just and Durable Peace* would not be possible and, if possible, not effective in Europe. In this country and similarly in Great Britain they have an importance which a European mind can hardly realize. In which direction will this influence go? There are two dangerous ways, especially for the American churches. The one is that their idealism becomes impracticable. Ideals of world security may be put against the concrete security which is demanded by Russia and England. The result would be the disappointed retirement of the American churches, and perhaps of all America, from the European scene, thus bringing about what the European people are afraid will happen and what every Christian should be afraid will happen. The other dangerous possibility is that the American churches, because of their social structure, will not have the spiritual power to resist the status quo or neo-Fascist tendencies in this country and will not try to prevent a solution which is decidedly anti-Russian. Such a solution would lead speedily to war between the remaining competitors for world power. If, instead of the two wrong ways, the American churches would support the masses of the European people against the dividers of Europe from the east and from the west, and against the monopolistic rulers from this country, organized Christianity

could make an invaluable contribution to the emerging social order of Europe. But is there a chance that this will happen, or are we going to see the third act of the great tragedy of world transformation?

The last statement I want to make refers to the Church of England. It has proved to be more understanding with respect to the needs of the European peoples than any other church. This was so under the leadership of Archbishop Temple. Will it be so under the new leadership? Or will the imperialistic interests of Great Britain prevail in the Anglican Church policy toward the Continent? Many people who are in despair about America, Russia and official Great Britain have set their hope on the leftist groups in England, and especially on the social-minded groups in the Church of England. If these groups could sweep the Church of England and if the Church of England could sweep the English people, the shape of the emerging social order in Europe would be much different. But is there such a chance? Must we feel like a great and pious English patriot who said to me bitterly: "The Archbishop must die and the Prime Minister remains." Is this an indication of the tragic trend of the coming events? Or is it even more than this? Is it an indication that the influence of the Church on the social order is always indirect, through transforming individuals and pronouncing the ultimate meaning of life beyond politics? And that a direct political influence, as it can be performed by the Roman Church, and is occasionally possible for Protestant churches, is ultimately a defeat for the Christian Church?

The new social order in Europe will emerge out of catastrophes the end of which has not yet been reached. We do not know what it will be. But we know it will be infinitely less than the Kingdom of God, though through the age-old influence of Christianity, a little bit better than the demonic kingdom.

Editor's Note: This article was delivered on the Frederick J. Kingsbury Lectureship at the Berkeley Divinity School, New Haven, Connecticut.

Christian Faith and Race Relations

VERNON H. HOLLOWAY

A DIFFICULT problem confronts the Christian conscience in the sphere of American race relationships, particularly with regard to the status of the Negro. It is not surprising that within the last three decades there has been a great development of sociological studies of American Negroes and minority peoples. Social friction involving these groups has challenged the liberal conscience and also provided an interesting laboratory for the social scientist. Insofar as they express the hope of remedial action, many of these studies betray an illusion that has characterized much of our liberal religious and social thought. Careful examination of the literature in this field reveals many volumes in which the authors suggest, usually in their introductions, that more *knowledge* about the Negro and other groups, and about the errors of racial prejudice, will serve to change our behavior and to solve this problem. This is an interesting contradiction in the viewpoints of sociologists themselves, insofar as the more careful and mature work in this field discloses the persistence of racial prejudices in our society and the extreme difficulty of overcoming such factors through reason, education or humanitarianism.

An excellent study concerning discrimination and the segregation of Negroes in our professedly democratic society is Charles S. Johnson's *Patterns of Negro Segregation*¹ which presents a mass of data showing the effects of our race relations upon both Negro and white. The author is properly cautious in suggesting what the future of American race relations may be. He discounts what some people expect in the way of progress through "enlightenment," and points to the larger role played by economic and industrial changes, urbanization, and the inefficiency of segregation.

If we question the optimism which some have entertained, and note the more reliable knowledge about social behavior and racial prejudice, we realize that we confront one of the most difficult, serious, and embarrassing problems that prevail in our society. The adjectives "Christian" and "democratic" can be used only as half-truths with regard to our nation,

¹ Harper and Brothers, New York, 1943.

and it certainly is problematic whether we can predict more instead of less justice in the postwar treatment of America's Negro citizens.²

FACTORS WHICH MAY PRODUCE ANOTHER CRISIS

If we entertain Christian and democratic standards, we need to take seriously such verifiable knowledge as the following:

1. It was the postwar period of 1919-21 that produced a series of American race riots.
2. With the advent of Negroes into defense work, tension between whites and Negroes has increased in many communities.
3. When the war is brought to an end, the emergency sanctions of "national defense" and "man-power shortage," which enable the Federal Government to press for equal hiring of Negroes in industry, will cease to exist, and unemployment conditions will increase the competition for available jobs.
4. In border and Northern states, where Negroes have been less restricted in exercising the rights of citizenship, the more liberal tradition has suffered setbacks with the influx of Southern whites and Negroes into industry and the urban centers.
5. The interplay of politics with the self-interest of dominant or power-seeking groups has continued rather than diminished, even under the wartime demand for national unity. For example, there is the coalition of congressmen from poll-tax states with northern Republicans in recent activities of Congress.
6. There is increasing resentment in both North and South to the growth of organized Negro pressure groups.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL ACTION

There is great need to realize that the knowledge available from the social sciences is essentially *instrumental* in its nature. Its existence and availability contain no guarantee that it will be used in the service of Christian or democratic goals. Such knowledge is to be cherished for intelligent action with regard to the choice of means, once we are agreed about necessary or desirable ends. But the goals and standards entertained within our society are divergent and contradictory, and the im-

²The predicament of Japanese in this country, especially in the West, is probably no less acute, but this paper seeks to deal primarily with the issues centering about the treatment of our thirteen million Negroes.

peratives which we feel to be "Christian" and "democratic" are denied by some, receive only lip service from many, and are conceived ambiguously by the vast majority of people.

Without adequate understanding of the total (which includes the ultimate) nature of man and of environment to which he must respond, we lack both the discipline and the direction which are necessary in the selection and pursuit of goals. In what may be an impending crisis in our race relationships, a vitally important but neglected factor is the religious one: what is, and what should be, our conviction about the meaning of life, about the nature and destiny of man? It is in terms of our *faith*, our convictions about the world and man, that the mainsprings of our thought and conduct are determined.

Such questions, and the answers to them, transcend the fields and methods of science and bring to the fore the importance of the religious or ultimate framework within which all questions of conduct must be placed.

The rules and customs which govern interracial contacts are symbols of white people's estimates of the relative social status of the races in our society. In their meaning as symbols, for whites, and in their consequences for Negro life, these attitudes and practices are a denial of the essential humanity of the Negro. Thus does the religious question of the doctrine of man intersect the questions regarding race relations. Therefore in our concern about the social situation, it is imperative that we realize the full dimension in which the problem exists, and the different approaches to the subject matter, all of which are relevant.

THE CRITIQUE OF RACIALISM FROM THREE VIEWPOINTS

Racial prejudice, discrimination and segregation are to be criticized from three different approaches. The *social sciences* can demonstrate the errors in judgments of fact with regard to notions of racial "superiority" and "inferiority." "White supremacy," for example, can no longer be justified on grounds of innate mental or other deficiencies among the other races. Now we know that historically conditioned racial prejudice, the "visibility" of nonwhite persons, and their present inferior social status are the chief factors in the psychology of race relations. Race is of consequence only because of what men think and feel about it and not because of anything that race is of itself.

The political theory of *democracy* provides no justification for social

discrimination along racial lines. Racialism is proper from the viewpoint of Fascism, but presents a dangerous contradiction in a democracy, where all persons are affirmed to be equal in their rights.

Christian doctrine, where it is true to biblical faith, affirms the unity of mankind through the creation, and has no racial interpretation of the *Imago Dei*. If science teaches that all men are of one blood, Christianity goes further and states that God has made them so. Through creation, sin, and the redemptive mission of Christ, all races are fundamentally one regardless of biological differences (if there were such) in their present capacities or any divergence in the early evolutionary origin of the races. Whether *homo sapiens* had a single or a plural source in the evolutionary stream has no significance for the Christian doctrine of man.³

OUR OBLIGATION TO COMBINE THESE APPROACHES

If we earnestly seek to love God with all our heart, soul and mind, and to love our neighbor in relation to God, we must prepare our minds as well as our hearts for Christian witness in the difficult sphere of race relationships. Faith, knowledge and social action are interwoven, yet in some respects they must not be confused.

For intelligent and faithful Christian conduct, it is extremely important to employ our minds and avail ourselves of the scientific knowledge that has been developed about race and society. Love, repentance and the sense of moral responsibility are handicapped by ignorance of facts and causal relationships. Our love of God and our neighbor is not deep and genuine if we are unwilling to learn important and available truths about man and society.

One of the dangers, however, that beset contemporary white churchmen is our inability to develop an adequate religious consciousness of racial injustice. Is it simply because we who are white are members of the dominant group and thereby can realize only with difficulty the consequences of this system for Negroes and other races? Or are we not in a predicament that is partially conditioned by shortcomings in our own "liberal" tradition? Have we not assumed too readily that our society was gradually but inevitably progressing along various lines, including the achievement of interracial justice?

We probably are on the threshold of a period in which severe setbacks

³In the light of more recent anthropological knowledge, it is highly improbable that any of the human varieties are derived from different subhuman ancestral species. In addition, racial classifications are admittedly tentative, abstract, and somewhat artificial.

will be suffered. Yet much of our social ethics literature has oversimplified the interracial scene, presuming that there would be steady improvement if we discharged our obligation to "educate" and to develop a wider spread of mutual understanding and good will. But the average clergyman needs only to question his own church members, when concrete issues concerning Negro status arise in the local community, to discover how little is being achieved and how precarious the future appears to be.

Is it not symbolic that in this country, where Negroes have an inferior status which they do not have in England or in Europe, that the many books written about Negroes and race relations reveal but little interest in an approach to the problem from the independent standpoint of Christian faith and doctrine? Hundreds of volumes of a sociological nature have been written, providing a noteworthy body of descriptive and historical knowledge. So far as this student has been able to ascertain, only three books have been published during the twentieth century whose primary interest in racial conflict is from the standpoint of the Christian community and its faith. Two of these were published in the 1920's, of which one is by a British writer.⁴ These two works reflect the experience and the interests of the international missionary movement rather than a primary concern for American domestic problems. The other volume is of more recent date.⁵

Insofar as the above provides any kind of index of attitudes in the United States, it suggests that we have been content to deal with racial problems primarily on a "horizontal" plane. It has been largely presupposed that more factual knowledge about race and society would suffice for purposes of social action. But the objective knowledge of the social sciences carries with it no imperative for social action, no demand of the *ought-to-be*, and many who were the recipients of this knowledge lacked any compelling reason for casting aside the self-interest embodied in "white supremacy."

The most comprehensive study of Negro and white relationships in America is Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and American Democracy*.⁶ Written by a Swedish sociologist, the report is based upon several years' research, including the help of a staff of American social scientists, financed by the Carnegie Corporation

⁴ Oldham, J. H., *Christianity and the Race Problem*. Doran, 1924; Speer, Robert E., *Race and Race Relations*. Revell, 1929.

⁵ LaFarge, John, *Interracial Justice*. (Roman Catholic) America Press, 1937; revised edition, 1943.

⁶ Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944. 2 Vols., 1,483 pp.

of New York. This work should be placed on the "must" reading list of every person seriously interested in race relations. Here are well-documented findings with significant suggestions for social policies.

As to a "solution" of the problem, Myrdal is a long-run optimist. Some of his conclusions, however, are open to question. While we hope that he may be justified in his optimism, some will question the grounds on which his hopes and predictions are based. He firmly believes that the "American Creed" can be relied upon to diminish and finally to erase the caste system which victimizes the Negro. But the "American Creed" which attracts Myrdal, and to which he gives great weight in estimating the future, leans toward the secularized version of the American Dream. He feels that "people want to be rational, honest and well-informed,"⁷ that "research and education are bolstering the American Creed in its influence toward greater equalitarianism."⁸ In the light of classical Christian insights into human nature and society, we wonder whether Myrdal is speaking "scientifically" about America's present and future democratic spirit, or is projecting certain impressions and beliefs that may not be warranted by the facts. The question is: Can any of our basic problems (the conflicts of races, classes and nations) be adequately solved by education without conversion, by democratic aspirations and governmental efforts without Christian faith and discipline?

Charles S. Johnson, in his recent study of segregation, suggests the possibility of progress along the lines of our official American political theory: the integration of diverse racial types in our society without penalties for their physical racial differences. But he is careful not to predict that this will be the actual outcome. He raises the significant question: *Does the United States wish to entertain democratic or Christian goals?* This is a question of present facts and of future decisions, and it is at this point that serious questions arise for American churchmen.

THE NEED FOR SELF-CRITICISM BY WHITE CHRISTIANS

In view of the present situation and its historical past, we who speak of "Christian social action" need to re-examine our positions. Good work has been done, to be sure, by way of education directed against racial prejudice, and through our church-supported schools and home missionary projects. But there is a large body of public opinion that supports

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

the status quo and which may become reactionary. This opinion invades the churches as social groups almost as it prevails in our society. In this predicament some seek desperately for a Church with a healing message for the world, but we find that "the world" prevails in the churches. Our institutional power, prestige and wealth are involved in the social changes that are necessary for the advancement of Negro and other disinherited groups. There has not been enough moral independence in our religious groups to produce any widespread conversion of white desires for privilege and supremacy.

The churches have been unable, on the whole, to see and to feel the injustice of our racial practices in their full dimension with their denial of the essential humanity of the Negro and their betrayal of our professed love of God rather than self. It is only when the "vertical" relationship of God to man illumines the social scene that we can comprehend our sins and injustices to others. It is not enough for us to "educate" people with facts, and appeal to them to be of good will. Any utopian, any well-meaning pagan can do that. We who are white need to realize our sin against God and His creation in our treatment of other people who, like us, are made in His image. We need to be able to repent for the pride, egoism and self-interest that inhere in the habit-systems of our predominantly white society, and to seek in humility a renewal of our racial relationships.

An unskilled Negro laborer is quoted by Johnson as follows: "A man has to be less than a man to get along most of the time."⁹ This statement serves to illustrate our guilt. Racial discrimination is essentially a method of symbolizing the inferior status which Negroes receive in our estimation. Here is where the "vertical" reference of Christian faith, the reference to God and to the divine image in man, cuts across and illumines the facts of racial prejudice and injustice. Our attitudes and practices are essentially a denial that the Negro is fully *man*, fully human in his essential nature. His nature as man has been denied and frustrated by the sinfulness of white people. We have refused to grant him the conditions which are necessary for historical self-fulfillment. He has not been free to determine for himself his vocation or his dwelling place. He has not been free to participate in meaningful, creative social tasks to the extent that whites have been. He has been driven to develop and maintain his social functions within the context of conditions with

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

whose logic and nature he does not agree. His self-fulfillment or creative self-determination has been blocked by a social structure which, through its intention and its consequences, renders him unable to be *himself*.

REPENTANCE AND SOCIAL RESPONSE

The churches of America dare not trust themselves to play a messianic role in the deliverance of Negroes, Japanese and other minority groups from oppression. The divisions caused by the sin of racialism have left their mark upon the churches. Yet the imperative of the Christian faith, the restlessness and misery of the disinherited groups, and the signs of impending conflict make quiescence impossible. No panaceas are available as we face America's "dilemma." Following an interracial meeting last summer, the writer was informed by an eminent anthropologist that a long-run view of race relations in our culture suggests the probability that there is no "solution," at least with respect to discrimination against Negroes, until a sufficient period of years has permitted biological changes to produce a racially homogeneous American population. In other words, white prejudice may not cease until evolution does away with Negro visibility.¹⁰

It is not the purpose of this article to set forth a counsel of despair. The anthropologist cited above may be correct, but this judgment does not imply that prejudice and conflict cannot be mitigated. It is our job as churchmen to realize what is the prevailing situation and to prepare for the task that lies ahead. We are challenged to bear witness to the God of Jesus Christ more fully and more effectively than we have hitherto, and to take more seriously than ever the facts and the implications of our race problem.

As a rule, ministers and laymen need to know more about the facts. Self-education and education of the community are a part of our responsibility. But our motivation for the discernment of social facts, and the framework within which the data of race prejudice receive significance, must be radically Christian in their nature. Education in its more formal sense, as the conveying of knowledge, is only an indirect

¹⁰ This cynical comment upon human nature may be justified, but many "ifs" are involved in this calculation of evolution. If the effect of climate upon heredity will alter Negroid pigmentation, the prediction has at least limited plausibility. But insofar as a future racially homogeneous population depends upon further blending of Negroes and whites through intermarriage, social factors are operating to check this. There is not only the traditional taboo on intermarriage, but there is a noticeable tendency among Negroes for darker males to prefer lighter wives (since the mulatto usually receives higher social status). This indicates further mixing of darker and lighter genes among Negroes but *not* an increase of interracial marriage or sex relations.

means for the functions of the Christian Church. Our most direct and essential action, within the Church, is religious behavior oriented toward God. Our primary obligation is reappropriation of the gospel, an appeal to the right of Jesus Christ to illumine this scene and to provide the standard for our consciences. Only as we realize that the cross of Christ stands in the present situation and that we are among the guilty, will we be able to function as *Christians* in our churchmanship and in our citizenship. Futility will continue to stalk many of our efforts for the improvement of race relations unless we understand them in their total context and adjust ourselves to God, the Judge and Redeemer of mankind, as we seek to reorient ourselves to the social situation.

CHURCHMEN AND SOCIAL ACTION

The writer is serving on a race relations committee of a local Ministers' League. Our committee is conducting a survey of interracial tensions and discrimination against Negroes in the local community. The Ministers' League is concerned to know what its members and their churches can do to discharge their Christian obligation more fully. We face a difficult and complex situation. We shall find it particularly difficult to take a responsible attitude toward the political realities which undergird the structure of race relations. There is little doubt, for example, that an appeal to the Board of Education to hire some Negro teachers would precipitate no little controversy. It is quite possible that if such an appeal met with success, segregation would follow in the schools affected.

This illustrates the difficulties under which Christian and democratic motives must operate when we seek to implement them in social action. What we, in this ministers' group, shall decide to do remains to be determined. This much, however, is certain: only by digging into such problems can we clergymen learn how to act, or even what to preach, about making power a servant of justice.

The hope with which we act must be sobered by the reminder that we are bound to encounter deeply embedded feelings and customs, and that the outcome of our efforts will be greatly affected by impersonal social trends: economic developments, state and federal legislation, Supreme Court decisions, and even international politics.

All of us suffer from confusion and ambiguity in Christian circles concerning the meaning and application of Christian social ethics. This

confusion exists in the realm of our faith and doctrine and in our uncertainty about the obligations of the churches to social and political controversies. We are forced to clarify our faith and to reinterpret its implications, especially for group relationships, institutional changes and social conflicts.

Forthright action on our part in pressing for greater freedom and equality for Negroes, no doubt will meet with criticism from social conservatives, including members of our churches, whose religious attitudes function as an "ideology" to screen and sanction their interest in the status quo. We may be accused of "mixing religion with politics" and "stirring up nasty controversies." There also are radical social groups whose faith and interest in social reforms blind their eyes to the need for an independent Church. Some of them may condemn us because we do not identify Christianity with a crusade for party or pressure-group policies.

The Church certainly should be transcendent and universal rather than partisan, but it should recognize the ways in which it is involved in the social struggles of the time. American Protestantism has been much confused about its mission to men en masse and their involvement in struggles and balances of power. It is not sufficient for Protestantism to emphasize responsibility for men as individuals rather than as groups, or to profess neutrality wherever groups contend for power. Church pronouncements on social issues are therefore futile unless they are specific rather than vague. They are fatuous unless they encourage people to support moral and political pressures which operate in the actual determination of public policy.

There is a great need at this point for intermediary organizations which ministers and laymen may use for the sake of implementing their social ideals. The social action committees and organizations of the various denominations and interdenominational councils should thus be employed. Where a Ministers' League or Council of Churches exists in the local community, it (or one of its committees) may well take aggressive action without necessarily invoking the name of the Church. Such a group should be able to hear complaints, focus public opinion upon needs where they exist, and bring pressures to bear upon employers, public officials and other agencies.

Efforts such as outlined above are highly important, but they must be matched by other endeavors to deal with racialism within our own

religious institutions. As churchmen we occupy no superior position from which to criticize other groups. Our churches reflect the racial divisions of society more fully than these separations are to be found in other institutional areas. A primary responsibility is to overcome the segregation or social distance which is manifest within our own churches. Interracial congregations are difficult to achieve, but they are a possibility in some local situations. Pulpit exchanges and co-operation with the Federal Council of Churches' Interracial Sunday are among the minimum requirements which we must meet. Let it be said that we note with hearty approval the announcement of plans under way for a national study conference, sponsored by the Federal Council, to deal with racial and minority peoples and the responsibility of the churches. The churches must clarify their minds and study both basic assumptions and concrete practices. It will be difficult to establish national church policies where sectional differences prevail, but ultimate aims for the churches need to be stated even though they must be attended by regional treatments of the proximate goals.

Our Christian response to the problem of racialism in our democracy and in our churches must be a religious-social response: God-centered and socially directed. If we are sufficiently aware of our own need for divine forgiveness, the religious aspect of our response will foster our awareness of the Negro's essential humanity, his equality with us before God, even in a period during which he is as yet socially unequal (because of our sin), and during which many generations of whites will not be without prejudice. The social aspect of our response, if sincere and intelligent, will at least help to modify the social structure of race relations. The future of these relationships is pregnant with difficulties, and the various strategies which the future will demand are not easily determined, but we can be sure that repentance and faith in the ranks of churchmen (both clerical and lay) lie at the heart of our own task, and provide the basis of Christian action.

Why God the Son Became a Man

HARRY MILTON TAYLOR

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE was one of America's greatest philosophers. His insight was never more penetrating than in his protest against attempts to explain the saving work of Christ by resort to mechanical analogies and abstract principles. Hence his sharp rejection of "atonement which does not atone, substitution which does not substitute, and satisfaction which does not satisfy."

Bowne's criticism grew out of his persuasion that truth is always true to life, and that while religion transcends morality it is never less than moral. With Lotze, he saw the entire subhuman creation, where the will of the Creator is expressed mechanically, as subordinate and instrumental to the human, where the will of the Creator is expressed to and through other wills. Religion belongs to the community of responsible persons, divine and human. What is implied by the notion of responsibility may be seen in the radical contrast between a "good" fire hydrant and a "good" character. The innocence of the babe and the holiness of the saint are entirely different. The first can be given, established by fiat, called into being solely through divine will. The second, however contingent it may be upon divine initiative and grace, must be received, appropriated through consent and effort, attained with the co-operation of human will.

In the order of natural goodness, God reckons with no factor of response. In the order of moral goodness, response is decisive. The basic religious question, therefore, is never how God can be good in and through men, but how men can be moved and aided to become good in and through God. A moral automaton is a conceptual contradiction; the two terms can be joined verbally, but never existentially. To create beings capable of moral worth, God had to create beings distinct from Himself, individuals possessed of powers of self-direction. What such persons do with their freedom and intelligence, however insufficient or circumscribed these may be, is the ultimate concern of their Creator.

Obedience and love, upon which the truly good life depends, cannot be produced through coercion. They cannot be superimposed upon anyone. Someone else cannot be obedient or loving for me and in me. If they

are mine, they are *mine*. The Augustinian *tour de force* which would save some impotent sinners by having God love Himself in and through them, is as absurd philosophically and religiously as it is unfair ethically.

To understand the atoning work of Christ, we must recognize and respect the moral purpose of God and the consequent moral conditions within which the growth, defection, and redemption of persons must be secured. The type of view which conceives of Christ as a leaven leavening the lump of humankind through the irrespective and automatic power of grace alone, violates these moral conditions, for it treats man as passive and inconsequential. By grace are we saved *through faith*. The Modern who speaks of the blood of Christ as a plasma which can be transfused *ex opere operato* into the spiritually dying, ignores the sanctity and significance of persons. Indeed, most of the traditional interpretations of the atonement commit the fallacy of the abstract and impersonal. It is consummate folly to suppose that salvation can be injected into the human soul by some hypodermic method, however sacrosanct.

It was the shocked reaction from such folly that led thinkers like Abelard to conceive of the work of Christ in terms of moral influence. It is to be regretted that moral influence theories have generally been combined with invidious heresies. But surely, the moral influence principle can be dissociated from its corrupt associations. And surely there is no one who, upon sober reflection, will dismiss that principle as mere, unevangelical humanism. No Christian would wish to minimize the force of Christ's teaching and example, the redemptive attractiveness, the transforming appeal of His divine living out of a human life. What we ought seriously to ask concerning the moral influence idea, is not whether it is right so far as it goes, but whether it goes far enough. Its fault, as traditionally stated, is that it is incomplete, partial.

This is the claim urged by Gustaf Aulén in his small but important work, *Christus Victor*. Aulén contends that both the mechanical (objectivist) and the moral (subjectivist) types of view are partial and off-center, and therefore heretical. He believes Irenaeus and Luther to be exponents of the orthodox or classical or truly Christian position: Christ is the Divine Hero who entered the arena of history where good and evil war; a new and perfect David, who won a decisive battle against sin, death and the Devil. However the war may go in other battles, the victory of Christ has determined its eventual outcome: defeat and destruction for the wicked; triumph and life for the righteous.

This so-called "Dramatic View" is attractive. It speaks the language of life. It elevates the issue to the realm of the moral and the personal. It seeks to dramatize and to safeguard both the divine and the human elements in the complex whose ground and dominant force was the work performed by the Messiah on behalf of moral beings incapable of saving themselves. *He* won the decisive battle. But *they* must fight beside Him if they are to win through Him.

Such a view is far less pernicious, far more open to honest understanding and acceptance, than the totalitarian, blood-and-race theories which make rigid metaphysics out of Paul's statement, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Wesley somewhere protests: "*may* all be made alive." How much pious deviousness and sanctified ambiguity this text has occasioned. What a wealth of exegetical finesse has been lavished upon it. How keen have been the Procrustean knives. It remained for Schleiermacher, with most poetic justice, to carry the Pauline thesis (in its Calvinized form) to its insipid and unchristian conclusion. In his *Christliche Glaube*, Schleiermacher painstakingly uncovers and faces up to its universalism. In the footnotes: Calvinistic orthodoxy; in the text: modern theological liberalism.

What contrives so strange an alliance? The tyranny of the pagan notion of the omnipotence of God. Had Calvin and Schleiermacher been content to ascribe adequacy and sovereignty to the Divine, the work of Christ need not have been reduced to a behind-the-scenes transaction making no actual difference to the faith of moral and mortal beings. Alas, original sin appears on one side of the equation; but happily, sufficient grace appears on the other side; and the essential problem of God's proposal and man's disposal, of His holy will and our everyday wickedness, remains unchanged. Infinity is added in the numerator to nullify infinity in the denominator; but the urgency and significance and beatitude of the work of Christ is love's supreme labor lost so far as human living and grasp and response are concerned.

Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise if God be literally omnipotent. I here use the term, not as a token of humility and reverence, but as a strict concept, as Aristotle used it in connection with his Absolute, as Augustine and Thomas, suffering gladly the Aristotelian infection, used it: to describe a Being absolutely unconditioned who can do anything.

Of such a Being we can with equal truth say that He, or It, can both be and not be in the same way and at the same time; that He, or It,

is and is not wholly above good and evil; that He, or It, can grant freedom and power to other persons without in the slightest limiting His own freedom and power. Should someone protest that such things are inconceivable, his attention should be drawn to the sins of logicism and the imperfection of the human mind; he should be taught about the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity. Should he still protest that the God who has given us the power to think in straight lines does not Himself deal in contradictions, he must be instructed in the use of the word "paradox." And he should find, if he uses the word long and solemnly enough, that not only is nothing impossible for God, but that nothing is impossible for the human mind either. Should he persist in rebellion, he must be introduced to Spinoza's "big, black chamber": he must be warned, under penalty of blasphemy, that all ultimate thoughts about the Omnipotent must be kept in complete and sacred darkness, within the sanctuary of divine mysteries into which not even the Light that lighteth every man coming into the world has shined.

I do not meet anything remotely resembling an Unmoved Mover in God's revelation to mankind as it is contained in Scripture. I meet a moving Person who creates a man, commands him not to eat the fruit of a tree, only to have that mere man disobey His "omnipotent" will. I meet a God who chooses a race to keep a covenant which He prescribes. And the whole of Scripture testifies, against a background of magnificent exceptions, to the rebellion of that race. I meet a God who pursues rebels in a manner most unbecoming to an Oriental potentate, using every conceivable strategy to *win* their obedience. He changes His judgments, forgives, pleads, sacrifices, to *persuade* them to do His will. I meet a God who, at the climax of an adventure of suffering love and sacrificial humiliation, laid down His life to achieve an End which all other means employed by Him had failed to secure.

Hence, if I have seemed to have been severe, even belligerent, in repudiating the concept of omnipotence, perhaps I may be forgiven, when it is seen that if I must accept the claim that God is all-powerful, then must I also in plain honesty reject the witness of the Bible, admit that its drama of revelation and redemption is double-talk of dubious theatrical value, and confess the agony of my Lord and Saviour to be a work of supererogation as hideously fictitious as it is irrelevant.

No doubt there are some who would remind me, at this juncture, that omnipotence does not actually mean omnipotence, that it is simply a

grand old word which we retain with an accommodated meaning. Of course, I prefer to have persons say clearly what they mean, especially where salvation is at stake. But my opposition is not to a word. It is to those, of whom Barth is by no means the solitary champion, who literally believe that God can do anything—even to the knowing of the future choices of free beings. I oppose the neo-Gnosticisms and the neo-Stoicisms which have spoken with such commendable vigor on behalf of the Church in our time. I stand with my six-year-old who, when I read to him, "With God all things are possible," cried out vehemently, "No! Only good things!"

All this is to say that I believe that the work of Christ was *work*, the most arduous, the most important, the most sublime work in all time and eternity. It is to say that what Christ *accomplished* makes a radical difference in the life of God and in the lives of all men everywhere and in every time.

The words "everywhere and in every time" should be underscored. The Madras Conference came to an impasse when representative younger churchmen said without irreverence but with finality: "If Christ be not necessary for salvation, we do not need Him. If our fathers are to be lost because of historical and geographical accidents which deprived them of knowledge of Jesus, even though they served God as best they knew, we want nothing to do with such a God." Here is a fundamental issue: Is it true, and is it just, to claim that "No man cometh unto the Father but by me"?

The answer is that it is precisely true and perfectly just. The answer is the Christian doctrine of the atonement: that the work of God the Son was to make, as a man, "a full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice for the sins of the whole world." He did that without which no man can be raised to eternal life, and through which every man who has ever lived may live eternally.

As one seeks to understand this majestic claim, with its universal finality and graciousness, with its unconditioned requirement and conditional opportunity, proceeding from the premise of a Saviour who is sovereign and adequate and necessary but not irresistible, we should recognize that the task of transforming merely good persons into perfect persons, of re-creating sinners into saints, is far more difficult than the chronologically prior task of creating moral beings. Something there is in common between the tragic bafflement which bursts from the lips of Lady Macbeth

as she stares at the indelible stains inside her little white hands, and the poignant sternness which echoes from the heart of God in the words, "You must be born again." These words bespeak an inexorable human requirement; but they also bespeak an inescapable Divine burden. We must go the way of the cross; but first God suffers upon the cross. The question, "Can a man re-enter his mother's womb?" is by no means trivial or beside the point. It exposes the whole mystery of the vital relation between continuity in personal experience and the individuality of the person. Easy it is to wash blood from the hands in comparison with washing murder from the heart. From the time of the Greek tragedians to Josiah Royce, thoughtful men have been troubled over the finality of a moral act. The question is not one of forgiveness. Hosea could forgive Gomer, restore her to his fireside; but he could not make her chaste—as though she had never been a harlot. To make *over* a sinner into a saint, without destroying his personal identity, without violating his moral selfhood, is a more difficult task than to make a person capable of being good or bad. It is harder to redeem than to create.

Hence, we may say, without impiety or arrogance, and with full awareness of the inadequacy of words and formal concepts, that God the Son became a man *to acquire added power* to enable Him to perfect merely good men, to transform sinners into saints. By power we mean not something formal and abstract, but something actual and effectual, not what the Constitution says the President shall be able to do, but what he actually does and can do. We infer that the work of Christ results in a "plus" not only for mankind, but also for God.

I am not unaware that this implies that before God the Son became a man, there was a deficiency of that "plus" in God. Hence, I hasten to say that all that became actual in Christ was potential in God from the beginning. And while I would insist that there is a real difference between the potential and the actual, I only do so in the light of what I think Paul intended with his notion of predestination. The purpose of redemption was sealed in the creation. Adequate plans were made for coping with sin and imperfection. The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world. This does not mean that the success of the work of Christ was *guaranteed* from the outset, lest His risk and sacrifice be reduced to mechanical insignificance, to a magnificent and moving hypocrisy. From the beginning God confronted genuine and awful hazards. Yet so adequate, so sovereign, so surpassingly great is He, so consummate

in worth was His purpose in creation, that He dared undertake an adventure on behalf of persons whose eventual destiny He could not from the first predict. We never apprehend the majesty of God until we understand His voluntary surrender of Himself and others to a *future*.

Is this not a stigma upon the perfection of God? By no means. For perfection is not contingent upon immutability, nor is it impaired by growth in experience. The pagan mind, from Aristotle to Spinoza, will argue that if God were to change, He would necessarily have to change for the better, and that this would imply that He had been less than perfect before the change. Hence, your Spinoza will not hear of a God whose heart can be *moved* by a widow in her bereavement. Paul well knew why the cross was a stumbling block to the Jews and foolishness to the Greeks. Theirs was a static and impersonal concept of perfection. But for Paul, and for all Christians, the cross is the supreme evidence of the glory of God. And the understanding of this glory brings with it a revolutionary concept of perfection, a perfection which lives and suffers, which adapts itself successfully to changing situations, which moves ever into new fields of worthy enterprise. Again we confront the difference between a "good" fire hydrant and a "good" person, between a lump and a life.

When the times were propitious—how long and with what profit we might linger with these words—the climactic tactic of the divine redemptive strategy was effected: God the Son, leaving the hitherto unbroken oneness of the Divine Family, became a man to assume the limits and labors of humanity.

Why? To acquire sufficient redemptive power. But how would His becoming a man achieve this? To answer this question, let us ask how any person grows in spiritual power.

Does someone remind me that to apply "merely personal" standards to the divine is to be anthropomorphic? If one is not overawed by the term "anthropomorphic," he realizes that if man *was* made in the divine image, then that image is the best clue we have to the nature of the Original. I abhor Barth's suggestion that we were not made *in the* image of God, but *to* image God. Man is not a mirror! He is either better or worse, and in an entirely different sense. As a son or a rebel, he belongs to the order of personality, having been so created by God to be like God in this.

How do all persons increase in spiritual power? The answer meets

us everywhere in life: we grow in power through victory in moral struggle.

God the Son became a man, that by His mastery in and over all that is essentially human He could win sufficient power to raise merely good men to perfection, to transform sinners into saints.

The basic problem of the atonement is not one of pardon or ransom or reconciliation, but of forgiving and freeing and reconciling in such wise as to secure persons fit for the Kingdom. Its work is therefore not contingent merely upon the fiat or desire of God, nor yet merely upon the motives and deeds of men, but upon such a joining of the energies of the Divine and the human as will produce new and perfect creatures.

Taking faith, in its New Testament sense, to mean man's use of all his powers to know and to do and to be that which is well-pleasing to God, and taking grace to mean God's use of all His powers to aid man to realize the same, I repeat, by grace are we saved *through faith*.

Once the premise of the increase of divine power for the salvation of men is allowed, the incidents of the life of Jesus reflect richer meaning. His mature dedication of Himself in baptism and His deepening and definition of resolve in the wilderness were followed immediately by the upsurge of power which brought the supernatural for the first time wholly and directly within the realm of historical phenomena.

Each labor of love was not only an event for men, but also an achievement for God. Lest anyone think of Christ's labors as less than a divine achievement, let us remember that in the human Jesus were all the sensibilities of the divine Son. Consequently, a human temptation was for Him something incalculably more meaningful and severe than it could possibly have been had He been merely a son of David. The supernatural power of our Lord must always be equated with His supernatural sensitivity. A sensitive man may indeed suffer from and solve, vicariously, the criminal and the problematical in the social order—to a degree. But only the perfect mind and heart and conscience of the living God could experience as man the whole of the human dilemma and defection and opportunity in its unity and diversity, in its individuality and universality. Only God could, in a single life as man, come adequately to grips with the all-inclusive human problem which Plato characterized as the problem of the one in the many. Only He could fathom our essential poverty and exhaust our essential richness. Being capable of sensing all the implications of His experience as man, He was

able to be perfectly human. Since He confronted successfully all that is intrinsic to our weakness and wickedness, we may say literally that He bore all our sins, reckoned with all that any man may be called upon to face, mastered the human situation from Eden to the New Jerusalem.

His triumph over death was the climax of His quest for power. We are prone to think of the resurrection as a gift of the Father to an inert Son. Now clearly, the other Persons of the Godhead contributed to this critical and matchless victory. The Father died many times in the one death of His Son. The Son's deepest agony was His intimate awareness of the suffering of His Father. The wearer of the gold star contributes to the winning of the war! The resurrection is the result of the total impact of the Divine through the human energies of the Son against the last barrier separating mortality from immortality. The first awakening from the slumber of death contains far more causal drama than a revivifying kiss. It is not enough to say, "It pleased the Father. . . ." Christ burst the bonds and bounds of mortality. Death could not hold Him. The "something new" which had come into human life at one end, produced "something new" at the other end.

This victory over death was followed immediately by further increase of divine power, a power which struck like lightning into an upper room, transforming beaten and bewildered disciples into something else entirely new in history—the Christian Church.

It should be asked whether, in using this concept of power, I am not falling into the very fallacy which the concept seeks to avoid. I think not. The definition of any key concept comes from living experience. The biologist will tell you this about "life," the mathematician about "number," the physicist about "energy." Logical forms are subordinate and instrumental to life. It is a simple and everyday fact of experience that I become more *able* as a mathematician as I solve more and more mathematical problems. When I speak of power, I do not speak after the analogy of charging a storage battery. I speak of *personal* power, such as comes to a minister who succeeds year after year in the Lord's work.

Christ brought into the Divine something which enlarged the Divine perfection: God's new experience of being human successfully. No longer did God know only *about* man. God knew *as* man. And this is something which could not have happened (except for an omnipotent deity!) in any other way than it did. Since God the Son became a man, an entirely new rendering of "He knoweth our frame" has become possible.

This is the one side of the atonement, the objective: the insistence that God did something, that something happened to Him and for Him.

Now we must ask, remembering all that has been said about the necessity of Christ's atoning work being moral and spiritual rather than magical and mechanical: what difference did His increase in power make to men, how does it affect men so as to make the radical difference claimed? How are we to conceive of the working of this power if it is not, after all, a waving of a wand? We can understand Jesus forgiving sins, for such was always His prerogative. We can understand His raising Lazarus from the tomb, for had He not raised him from dust in the first place? But the raising of moral imperfection to perfection, the rebirth of a sinful soul into sinlessness, these things belong to another order—where divine freedom and power touch human freedom and power. Had the waving of a wand been sufficient, would we not all have been perfected long since and without all the wasteful and agonistic and perilous interim business of living?

The answer here must follow the general principles of moral influence. What these theories all insist upon is *the attractive sufficiency of a sufficient love*. What cannot be coerced may be won. On the sub-human level, there is the power of the trip hammer and there is the power of the magnet. On the spiritual level, there is the same kind of distinction. The Christian claim is that only the magnetic, wooing power of the love of God in Christ Jesus will suffice to draw men up into the everlasting fellowship of the Divine Family.

We become like our loves. The miser is like his love of gold. Christ doubtless had this in mind when He summarized the Law as a requirement to love. The Law was decreed to aid in the growth of proper souls. It cannot be abrogated because it defines the necessary propriety of the soul. Yet it can be reduced, on the inside (so to speak), to insistence upon the right kind of love—love of God, for we are to be God's children; love of our fellows, for we are to belong to a fellowship. Whatever can *educe* such a love from us—Kant was accurate in suggesting that love may be required but it cannot be coerced—whatever can *educe* such love from us will save us, for it will make of us persons who are like such love. Since we are dynamic spirits, not material lumps, we can be remade and perfected after the pattern and through the power of the love of God in Christ Jesus.

The new and sufficient power of God in Christ is a new and sufficient loveliness. There is "something" about the sacrifice of an unselfish

mother, we say, that "gets you." Christ is the ultimate in this "gets-you" power. Adam disobeyed the Master in Eden. But would he have disobeyed Him in Gethsemane? We do not know the answer, but the question is more important than the answer, for it defines the issue in terms of a voluntary relation among persons, human and divine; it suggests that the only force which will suffice from the divine side is one which respects man while it wins his respect.

My father is an Evangelical minister who never earned a large salary. Yet he helped four sons through college. He loved books and travel and fine clothes. But he invested these loves in our education. After several years on my first charge, where I earned as much as he had most of his life, and yet where I could hardly subsist, I returned one day to my father's house—ready to quit. During a long afternoon's conversation, I happened to think of his years of sacrifice, and in self-pity I asked him, "Dad, why did you do it?" His answer, "Why, son, I wanted you to be worth something!" Then I knew what it was to love a father. And then I knew that I would be worth something *for his sake* if it killed me.

Ah, yes! Our Heavenly Father wants us to be worth something. And so He sells all that He has to purchase treasure for us. So His love pursues us, like the love of a king who suffers as a servant for his subjects, like a sovereign Creator who condescends to lie in a cradle and dies upon a cross for the salvation of His creatures. So great a love will kindle a corresponding love *if anything will*.

Any good person exerts some influence for good. But only one Person is sufficiently good to exert enough influence to lift men from imperfection and sin into perfection and holiness. Christ acts upon other persons for their reform and growth as any person acts upon others, as teacher, inspirer, example and friend. But the power of His activity exceeds that of any other person. In Him alone, wisdom and justice and love meet with such recreative force as to provide a sufficient dynamic for human reform and growth. He is necessary. And He is able.

The evidence of this new and sufficient power is a matter of history. Peter became a new Peter. Dispirited disciples became the Church of the Spirit. Civilization was begun anew. Anyone familiar with the literature of the two centuries before Christ is aware that Christmas was born into a dead culture. What followed from and after Christ caused historians to admit of a new era. B. C. and A. D.—those four letters spell a cosmic difference within the universe of human affairs.

There was power in His blood, wonder-working power. Power

which moved the hearts of martyrs to song. Power which converted Saint Francis from the love of one world to the love of another. Power which led to a revolution of such magnitude in individuals and institutions, in principles and practices, that we can only be fair to it if we describe it as the coming of the Kingdom of God upon earth. "If ye love me, keep my commandments." Read what that love accomplished in the stirring account given by Brace in his *Gesta Christi*. Behold the ever-deepening and ever-widening miracle of Christ in culture and civilization: the liberation of womanhood, the building of hospitals, schools, the modern science which sprang from medieval faith. *There is power in the blood.*

But that power is not irresistible. No worthy love is irresistible. True love preserves and exalts the dignity of the person loving and the person loved. If perfect love were irresistible, the response to it would be that of a thing, not a person. Love has to do with the community of free persons sharing mutual responsibilities. We have all seen what *things* some persons become in the self-abandonment of an infatuation. Indeed, only when the love of a man and wife emerges from the blind stage does the family truly begin. Only when a man is able to say "no" does his "yes" take on personal significance.

The power of God's love in Christ is the strongest appeal that can be made to moral persons in their responsible freedom. When we truly love Christ, the heart does not paralyze the will or obfuscate the mind. He touches our feelings with the strongest possible attraction. But He also appeals to our minds with highest truth. And He challenges our wills with greatest worth. And ever and ever He insists, lest He betrays us into inhuman ecstasy or unmoral adoration, lest His love should depersonalize us, "Take up my cross!"

Here indeed is sufficient love, that it should be able to persuade a man to take up His cross, willingly, eagerly. Yet that is precisely what happens. By loving Him, we become like Him who suffered death upon the cross for our redemption. Become like Him because we love Him, we too sacrifice ourselves for Him and others, and so through Him we, too, find life beyond death, community beyond self.

One major question remains: What of those who have never come *directly* under the influence of His transforming Presence? First, allow me to suggest that some of us may be prone to exaggerate the difference in quality of soul between those who are outside of and those who are

within the Christian tradition. I am always very conscious of the implications of our Lord's assertion, "Before Abraham was, I am." Christ never divided men into "before me and after me." He always and only distinguished between those "for me and against me." *Hebrews* does not mislead us. "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son." The Eternal Word has ever appealed to, and met with response from, men in time. This is not to say that the Incarnation made no difference in history. What has been said about a new beginning in Christian culture and community is true. The Church is the foreshadowing, the actual beginning within the temporal of the eternal fellowship. Yet to this, a crowning truth should be added.

No one of us arrives, while in the flesh, at that perfection toward which we are pressing. Our carnality at its sacramental best, and our total social relations in their highest conceivable purity, involve limitations from which we must be freed before our final and sufficient transformation through the work of Christ can be effected. Some day we shall see Him with eyes from which all earthiness has been cleansed, we shall hear His voice with ears which have been silenced to all clamor of worldliness, we shall sense His spirit with feelings from which all the conflicts of the glandular and the medulla oblongata have been erased. Then, and not until then, will the full power of His love meet with the kind of unobstructed response from the faithful which will result in the completed miracle of regeneration. When the physical and temporal media, which serve partially to reveal and relate, partially to obscure and dissociate, are transcended, then and only then will the full understanding and harmony which are essential to our perfection become possible.

With this in mind, let us ask finally: What of the faithful forefathers of the younger churchmen of Madras? What, to crystallize the problem, of Plato?

I speak of Plato, for he is dear to me. Have you felt, as I have, in studying the *Dialogues*, that he lifted his eyes, now and again, to peer with wistful longing into the future, listening almost prayerfully for a necessary and adequate *Logos* which he could not quite hear? Do you remember his confession, that if he could find a man who would understand the one in the many, he would follow him to the ends of the earth? Do you recall the moving passage in which he contended, or prophesied, that if there should come into the world a perfectly just man, that man

would be repudiated as wholly unjust, and suffer death at the hands of unjust men upon a cross? Can you forget Plato's insistence that perfect love can only come into being through devotion to, and the creative uplift of, a perfectly lovely object?

I hope to be there, not too distantly in the crowd, when Plato comes before the Throne of Judgment. I want to watch his face as he considers the sympathy and justice, the understanding and righteousness, which characterize decision after decision. I want to see his eyes when he first sees the nail-prints in the hands of the Judge, when he first beholds that unutterable Loveliness which he had dimly discerned and for which he had passionately yearned. I think I know what will happen. The robe of the philosopher will be discarded; the prince of the human mind will prostrate himself before Jesus, crying, "My Lord, and my God!"

So will we all one day stand clear of the accidents and impediments of space and time. So will we all see face to face what we now see through a glass darkly. So will we all come into the completely revealing presence of God the Son, for the first time knowing Him as we are known by Him. That experience will be eternally decisive. The power that is fully uncovered to us then, will move us either to sonship . . . or to self-destruction.

The soul that has insisted upon being its own god, that has fashioned its paradise of lust, that has persisted in loving the unlovely and opposing the good, will shrink from the awful condemnation and repulsion of that Presence, from the negation of himself which emanates from the perfection of manhood in God the Son, pleading: "I cannot tolerate this. Permit me to go." And he will not be able to tolerate that association. And he will mercifully be permitted to go.

But the soul that has hungered and thirsted after righteousness, that has walked in the Light of the Word—whether that Light has shone through some rift in the veil of mortality, or whether it has gleamed from the eyes of Jesus—that has fallen again and again only to repent each time and to renew the struggle to know and to serve the only true God, that person will run into His presence with joy, drawn by the affirmation of the best in himself which radiates from the perfection of manhood in God the Son, crying exultantly: "At last I have found Thee! Entreat me not to leave Thee!"

How Can the Church Serve the Colleges

BISHOP FRED PIERCE CORSON

THE subject, "How Can the Church Serve the Colleges," like the Yale Lectures on Preaching, is perennial. It has been discussed so often and so well that little that is original remains to be said upon it. Its significance, however, both to the Church and to the college is so great that its continued discussion can be justified if for no other reason than to emphasize the basic truths already formulated and to remind ourselves of their current application. Education is always in transition and this fact has provided some possibility of freshness in the presentation of this theme. Certainly the situation which confronts higher education in America today calls for a very serious consideration of the relationship of the Church and the college.

Felix Morley, in an address before the Middle States Association, ventured the prediction that colleges after the war would be agencies of the state to a greater degree than ever before. The total effect of the G. I. Bill upon colleges in this direction is yet to be determined but it must not be minimized nor discounted, and the recommendation to Congress for a direct government subsidy to colleges as a "relief" measure cannot be disassociated from the consideration of government control, direct or indirect, which such subsidies would develop. If universal service becomes the law its provisions will most definitely advance nationalization and secularization of higher education. Please note that while public opinion is being aroused for this measure on the current fear of another war and by the ostensible need for military training, one dominant school of political thought intimates the real necessity of such service to be for social and political indoctrination. Nationalization is moving into the field of higher education. The state will assume a greater share in providing it for American youth. The inevitable influence of and control by the state upon the educational life will be at its best on the basis of the lowest common denominator of secularism and scientific humanism and at its worst on the basis of indoctrination for a particular social and political point of view.

The Church college, if it survives as such, may well find itself in

competition with the state, sharing the state's bounty only as it meets the state's requirements. Therefore, the Church even more urgently than the college needs to face the facts of higher education in the light of these current trends. Does the Church for its survival and its work need colleges free to be Christian in their philosophy and conduct? What will be required to maintain such colleges not only financially but also from the standpoint of public approbation and patronage? What, in the realm of practical politics, will be required to guarantee them a place to serve and grow in a state-conceived plan of higher education? For not only freedom for existence but freedom of activity must be assured. Does the Church really have a conviction on the matter sufficient to maintain these colleges and, if so, what, by way of cultivation, will be required to arouse church members to give the necessary support? Dealing with questions such as these is where, in my judgment, the Church must begin if it really intends to serve the colleges. Perhaps the Church needs a commission to make a study of such questions and prepare a program in the light of the results. A report, similar to the one made by the Commission on Objectives created by the Board of Education of The Methodist Church in 1941, but prepared from the Church point of view rather than the college point of view, would be very helpful at this particular stage of the changes in higher education. When the colleges make such studies their findings do not get into wide enough circulation. Neither the leadership nor the laity to any large extent come into possession of such information, nor are they gripped by the form of its presentation.

The Church today is not church-related college conscious. In spots it may be, but in its total interest it is not. The average church member does not particularly want his son or daughter to go to a church-related college. In fact, he doesn't know what a church-related college really is. Most likely he thinks it is a place to train preachers and missionaries. Church-related colleges have been neglected so shamefully by the Church and kicked around so much by the so-called educational Brahmins that there is small wonder that they have an inferiority complex.

The Protestant church, by which I mean the rank and file of its members and leaders, does not have a well-defined philosophy of higher education. This was not true in the period when most of the church-related colleges were founded. Then the Church was conscious that it must train preachers and missionaries. It felt an obligation to provide education for poor boys and girls. It wanted its sons and daughters taught by

Christian teachers in a Christian atmosphere with religion as the unifying principle in the curriculum. But styles in education changed and technical proficiency replaced other considerations as standards of excellence. The time came when one did not ask a prospective teacher about his beliefs concerning human destiny nor about his own practices as expressions of his belief regarding human conduct. One asked, has he a Ph.D. and has he "published"—believing these to be the *ne plus ultra* in requirements for college teaching.

The church-related college got little support from the folk back home in maintaining its old standards of educational excellence and realized that to get the best prepared students, grants from the foundations, and position in the higher educational circles, it must become worldly. So generally the church-related college moved to the middle ground of secular humanism which strives to retain Christian values without maintaining a strong Christian faith. A totality of studies supplying a unifying principle gave way to a multitude of studies with no vital relationship to each other. Larger incomes rather than richer personalities became the purpose of a college education. And the church-related college seeking the independence to which, because of its educational maturing, it believed itself entitled, found that it had been largely cut off from real fellowship in the Church family.

Now the Church as well as the college must face the necessity of taking a stand. Do we need church-related colleges in the coming educational scheme? Do we want them to the point of making them possible in the coming days of increasing competition? Can we unite on a philosophy of education for them which will provide both program and atmosphere and which will make them different and distinctive?

The Catholic church has done this and its answer to the trend toward state participation in higher education and the educational necessities of the postwar world is a program for the expansion of all types of Catholic education—both secondary and college. It has also been wise enough to make this support of Catholic education a movement of the masses and not of the few.

The sects are now doing it. The number of new institutions of learning in which technical and secular knowledge are being taught from what is conceived to be a Christian point of view and experience is increasing and these institutions are showing unpredicted vitality.

The established Protestant groups who once possessed a well-defined

attitude toward higher education but who have found their convictions wavering and their support diminishing, should be considering anew both their responsibility toward the total education of youth and their need for some part in it.

The revival of interest in religious education is an evidence that a need for a religious approach to secular education is now felt. But we must not expect the provision of religion as a subject in the school curriculum to safeguard all the values we strive for. If the atmosphere of the school and the attitude of its teaching are not a reflection of what the subjects in religion seek to accomplish, then the effect of this religious impact upon the personality of the student will be disappointing.

Furthermore, the Protestant church may well consider how long it can retain its virility if the personality developing institutions to which we commit our youth with such trust are predominantly secular or humanistic in their philosophy of life. We may make sincere attempts to break into the circle of influence with our extracurricular religious activities, but the educational mills will continue to turn out in greater and greater numbers efficient and civilized pagans.

Lifting these questions in popular forms so that the rank and file of our church people will understand them will result in real help to the colleges desiring to achieve this particular educational objective. The Church will become conscious of its need for its colleges. It will come to a clearer understanding of Christian educational values and standards. It will achieve a wider recognition of their desirability for its best as well as its financially poorest young people and, seeing its own part more clearly, it will be less likely to criticize the colleges for not, alone and unaided, keeping their original educational faith.

I am told that the tobacco interests took five years for carefully and subtly planned education before they sprang their "smokes-for-women" appeal. That, they tell me, is why it could not be stopped. Without some similar preparation we cannot expect the Church to render its largest possible service to its colleges.

If I were planning such a campaign to educate the Church to serve its colleges, I would develop it with certain specific objectives in mind. First, I would have the Church define in the language of the layman just what a church-related college really is, emphasizing and explaining its character and its purpose, the factors which make it a blood-brother in the family of religious institutions rather than the technical and legal

relationships which qualify a college to be called church-related. To such a statement I would give wide and repeated publicity. I would determine what would be needed from the Church for the financial support of these colleges in order that the quality of their educational offerings might rank with the best and that they could take the students who ought to have a chance as well as the students who could pay for it.

I would build upon the established precedent of church support for this larger appeal for current funds. I would utilize existing organizations, both lay and clerical, to make available needed permanent funds.

I would seek to make church people, from the cradle to the grave, conscious of the church-related colleges. Such a relationship would give our colleges sufficient student enrollments and provide a constituency for public opinion which could be utilized in protecting the interests of these institutions from encroachment by the state and in creating an attitude of approbation for these institutions so that they would enjoy a respected position in the public mind.

I would promote a movement of "student follow up" by the churches themselves, building on the beginning of a movement which the recent General Conference of The Methodist Church inaugurated, but widening it to include not only those students who have committed themselves to Christian service but to all prospective college students.

In co-operation with the colleges I would endeavor to create a body of intelligent sentiment which would stand for both academic freedom and Christian truth.

And I would, if I could, bring the parents and the religious leaders closer to the campus so that they would have some real understanding of student life and be a help to college personnel endeavoring to guide students in their development toward the right goals in life.

I have had the opportunity to consider the place and character of the church-related college work from the standpoint of the college and the standpoint of the Church, and I am convinced that something significant must be done by the Church for its colleges. Otherwise, with the new factors looming in higher education, our church-related colleges will be compelled to join the lock step of the imminent nationalistic trend. If this should happen, the Protestant church must expect to lose strength through unreplenished leadership and it will have one less reason for community support in that it will have one less service to offer the community within the field of the community's tangible and conscious need.

The Method of Religious Inquiry

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

THEORETICALLY there are three principal approaches to the religious problem, each of them highly recommended by its partisans. These are, first, dogmatic traditionalism, commonly laying claim to the support of miraculous revelation; second, a rather one-sided rationalism, proceeding in a resolutely a priori fashion or else limiting any use made of empirical data to nonreligious experience or a nonreligious interpretation of experiences; and finally, a religious empiricism, which may also be developed so one-sidedly as to exclude the possibility of arriving at any results rationally established as objective religious knowledge. It may be that after a critical examination of these three alternative procedures we shall find ourselves considering a fourth conceivable method whereby the one-sided religious empiricism and the one-sided rationalism might be mutually corrected and supplemented, and whereby conceivably also certain significant elements of traditional doctrine might be vindicated as satisfactorily supported by facts of experience and considerations of reason.

Let us first turn then to an examination of the claims of tradition and traditionalism. Here we are immediately confronted with the fact that religious traditions are many and to a great extent mutually conflicting. Obviously not all traditional teaching can be accepted by any one individual. How, then, should the selection of a traditional authority and doctrinal content be determined? By what happens to have been our particular tradition? Or by the individual's own independent judgment? If in the former way, personal responsibility for one's religious position is ignobly and perhaps dangerously repudiated. If, on the contrary, the individual can be allowed to choose his religious authority, what reasons can he give for his choice? And if he can find independent reasons for choosing one religious authority in preference to others, what is to hinder his finding independent reasons for accepting some religious doctrines as truer or more surely true than others? If by ourselves and apart from authoritative guidance we are helpless in religious matters, must we not be helpless to choose between rival claims to religious authority?

If it be maintained that at least the most crucially important religious

truth comes only by supernatural revelation, that its true and only adequate criterion is miracle, a further question is immediately suggested, namely, What is the criterion of miracle? How shall we know that any alleged miraculous event did actually happen, or if it did, that it was really miraculous in the sense of being contrary to what science has discovered or can yet discover to be the dependable, conditioned course of events? And further, how can we be sure that the event in question, whether essentially predictable in the light of its conditions or not, was divinely caused in order to authenticate some supposed religious revelation as being indubitably divine and true?

If it be suggested that only that alleged revelation is to be taken as authentically divine, and only that traditional religious teaching as true which has the greatest true value for human life, once more a further question arises with reference to the recommended criterion. Is true value recognizable through the independent judgment of the individual, or is it something which can be known, if at all, only under the guidance of traditional authority and as the result of miraculous revelation? There are those who are claiming today that man's moral and spiritual nature, and indeed his whole capacity for appreciating valid values has been so corrupted and destroyed by sin that no judgment he can make as to the validity of values is to be trusted. If this be so, then natural sinful man cannot be trusted to choose his religious authority on the ground of its spiritual value. If, however, he can discern true values sufficiently to be able to choose the best among all proffered religious authorities, must he not have sufficient insight into true values to be able to pass some intelligent and valid judgments with reference to the religious content itself?

We seem to be led thus to the conclusion that unless we are to be absolutely passive, inert and irresponsible with reference to our religious position, we cannot consistently take the attitude of dogmatic traditionalism, either with or without the support of miraculous supernaturalism. It may be fortunate for us that we have been brought up under the influence of one religious tradition rather than another; but, even if there be a religious tradition which is both essentially true and very important, and even if that essentially valid religious tradition may happen to be our own, how, if we recognize the common human right and responsibility of thinking honestly for ourselves, can we refuse to test our traditional religious beliefs by whatever promising method or methods, other than

the mere appeal to external authority and stories of miracle, may seem to be available in this our day and generation? What I propose to do here is to examine, of necessity very briefly, proposed ways of testing traditional religious teaching and principles of theological construction or reconstruction, and ultimately to suggest a method or combination of methods which, as it seems to me, can be defended as critically justifiable, and which may be expected to vindicate a place for whatever is valid and most essential in traditional religious teaching and belief. At the same time it ought not to surprise us if the most defensible procedure should be found to involve both subtraction from and addition to any traditional body of doctrine in which we may be or have been interested. The treasury of truth contains, no doubt, "things new and old."

If man as a religious individual is to gain maturity and outgrow the dependent traditionalism of childhood, a natural suggestion is that he should make good his escape from subjection to external authority by the exercise of his own reasoning powers. In the past this has frequently taken the form of an attempt to demonstrate the existence of God by arguing from supposedly self-evident knowledge or at most from facts of non-religious experience. This rationalistic method, it should be noted, is not above suspicion, inasmuch as historically, while expressive of a continuing religious interest, it has commonly been symptomatic of a decline of the religious certitude which normally accompanies depth of religious experience.

The procedure most characteristic of religious rationalism is that found in the famous ontological argument—the attempt to demonstrate that the perfect being must necessarily be the most real being. There is reason to suspect that a procedure so abstract will turn out to have been fundamentally mistaken. If we mean by absolute perfection a static condition of being unsurpassable, either by any other conceivable being or conceivably by the subject itself, it follows that the combination of all conceivable absolute perfections in one spiritual being is, under existing conditions impossible; the notion is self-refuting, because self-contradictory. As Charles Hartshorne¹ has convincingly shown, a being of absolute unsurpassable goodness and love could not be indifferent to the condition in which at any time the beloved is; a God of absolutely perfect love toward sinful, suffering humanity cannot be also at the present time a

¹ Compare *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*. (Chicago, 1941), pp. 11-14, 331 and Chapter 3.

God of absolute, unsurpassable satisfaction and blessedness. His blessedness may indeed be, as to its *rightness*, unsurpassable by the satisfaction or blessedness of any other conceivable being; but whatever may be the kind and degree of the blessedness of a God of perfect love in view of man as he is, it would surely be greater and somewhat different if man were to become more nearly what he might and ought to be. A God of absolutely perfect character, thought of as in concrete experiential and cognitive relationship with mankind, cannot consistently be regarded as absolutely perfect in satisfaction and blessedness; in this respect He may be thought of as unsurpassable by any other conceivable being, but not as unsurpassable by Himself under a conceivable change in human conditions. In other words, to use Hartshorne's terminology, a God absolutely perfect in moral character and love toward mankind cannot be more than relatively perfect in satisfaction; His blessedness might conceivably be increased.

Instead of beginning with the abstract definition of God as the sum of all absolute perfections, religious reasoning would do well to start with the religious intuition of a being perfectly suited to the real religious needs of men. Reasonably interpreted this means a being absolutely perfect (unsurpassable even by Himself) in moral character and love toward men, but only relatively perfect (not conceivably surpassable by any other being, though conceivably surpassable by Himself) in certain aesthetic phases of spiritual experience, such as satisfaction, joy, blessedness. The idea of a being of such combined absolute and relative perfection has not been and, we may believe, cannot be shown to be self-contradictory, so that it would seem that such a being may possibly exist. But this is not to prove a priori that such a being *must* exist. An all-inclusive totality of present being must now exist; but why call perfect, either absolutely or relatively, such an aggregate of the good, the bad and the indifferent? As Kant maintained, the ontological argument, at least in its original a priori form, is incurably fallacious. If taken as analytic, it involves a begging of the question; if as synthetic, it is a case of *non sequitur*.

It is claimed by some that it is only when it is combined with the cosmological argument that the ontological argument becomes fully demonstrative. Every contingent being and every event, it is assumed, must have had an adequate cause prior to and outside of itself; and since there cannot have been, up to the present, an absolutely infinite sum of different events, or successive causes and effects, there must have been an original, adequate, creative First Cause. All else may have been contingent, but

this First Cause is a necessary being, and this necessary being is no mere idea of a necessary being; it necessarily exists. So runs the familiar argument.

But is all causation necessarily antecedent to its effect, and by a being or event other than the being or event in question? If man really is, within whatever limits, a responsible creative cause of his own conduct and character, he must be, in the same degree, a creative, self-caused cause at the time of his decision and action. Only so can the dilemma of the irresponsibility of complete predeterminism and irresponsibility of mere indeterminism and causelessness be logically avoided. If then man is a morally responsible agent, creative self-causation at the time is a fact. May not what is true, within narrow limits, in the case of man, have been from the beginning a possibility for God? Even if God *may* be, so far as we can say, an uncaused, necessary Being and Cause, is it not also possible for thought that He may be, as Whitehead seems to hold, a creatively self-caused Cause, and so presumably in some sense contingent—at least so far as to be not demonstrable by a priori reasoning, but knowable only through experience?

The typically Hegelian, allegedly more or less empirical form of the ontological argument, assuming (or concluding, by arguing from the “ego-centric predicament”) that all reality is consciously experiential, maintains that, if knowledge is possible and thinking worth while, this all-inclusive experiential reality must also be thoroughly rational, and that the absolutely rational experiential totality must be real. But, we may ask, must anything, in order to be knowable, be *remainderlessly* rational? In concrete reality is there not always a residue of existent content which defies complete reduction to rational form? We need not fly from extreme rationalism to extreme irrationalism; reality may be truly knowable without ceasing to be ultimately mysterious. Being can be known, but being and knowing are not to be totally identified.

But the rational-empirical (logical-psychological) idealism characteristic of so much philosophical theism is not beyond criticism. It includes—necessarily, if it is to reach its “higher synthesis”—along with its more realistic thesis, a really unnecessary subjective idealism. The result is a position which is not only not proved to be true, but which can be shown to reduce to absurdity. Either the all-inclusive experiential totality is a single experience or a plurality of experiences. If it be a plurality, and if, as idealism maintains, the objective content depends for its being

upon its being experienced and known, there must be as many suns and moons and worlds, as many universes, as there are subjects aware of such objects, each subject knowing only his own and being able to act only within his own private universe. If on the other hand the all-inclusive consciousness be one and single, there is but one universe, but it also follows that there exists but one subject, a single Absolute Mind, the sole being who is aware of or active within the one universal object.

Furthermore, a single all-inclusive conscious experience could not be perfectly rational, for a perfectly rational all-inclusive experience would be omniscient, and an omniscient Mind could not have our experiences of either error or ignorance, as we have those experiences. The Absolute Mind, supposedly all-inclusive and perfectly rational, cannot be *both* perfectly rational and all-inclusive; consequently, it cannot *be*. Let us suppose, then, with Bradley, that the absolute totality of reality is a single all-inclusive Experience, or Mind, but that all our experiences of error and ignorance, and presumably also of truth and knowledge, are "transmuted" in the Absolute Experience, which would thus have to be thought of as being not rational, but "super-rational"—whatever that may mean. But this view also collapses in self-contradiction; if what is included in the Absolute is not my experience of truth or error, of ignorance or knowledge, *as I have it*, but something else, a transmuted something, then since it is not my experience which is included in the Absolute, the supposedly all-inclusive Experience is not really all-inclusive at all. It turns out then that the idealistic argument, which was supposed to save religion by identifying its "all-inclusive Absolute Consciousness, or Mind," with God, is not even able to save itself.

The further *descensus Averni* of religious rationalism is soon told. (What we mean here by religious rationalism, be it recalled, includes not only an attempted a priorism, but also a nonreligious, or secular, empiricism.) The next stage in the disintegration of absolute idealism, after Bradley's rejection of the criterion of rationality, is the rejection of the notion that the all-inclusive reality which is "experience" is a *single* experience, the conscious content of a single mind. The result is typically seen in the "immediate empiricism" of John Dewey and others, according to which "experience" is not necessarily, but only occasionally, the experience of any conscious, experiencing subject. Here the original psychological idealism is disguised by being applied not only to the object of consciousness but to the conscious subject as well; the subject is held to exist only when

there is explicit consciousness of it as at once subject and object of consciousness. The view is incompatible with the fact that we often consciously recall, *as having been our experience in the past*, an experience which was not at the time accompanied by explicit consciousness of the experiencing self as a distinct object of awareness. But notwithstanding this discrepancy, this radical or immediate empiricism, according to which all reality is what it is experienced as, and which tends (especially when religious concepts are under discussion) to take reality as being *nothing but* what it is humanly experienced as, is made the basis of the so-called religious humanism, or "religion without God," with its initial resolute attempt to hold on to the social ethics and optimistic meliorism of traditional ethical theism, but which tends almost inevitably, especially in the second and third generations of such humanism, to find itself oscillating between a depressing pessimism and a devastating cynicism as to the more spiritual values.

On the more theoretical side the latest development of this immediate empiricism which, with its instrumental pragmatism, seems to have fallen heir to all that remains of the former supposed wealth of the now bankrupt absolute idealism, is the mere "operationalism," or "logical positivism," which professes to find all metaphysical propositions (except its own nihilistic metaphysics) not only unverifiable but unbelievable, and not only unbelievable but "meaningless." But, apart from other considerations, if all metaphysics is meaningless, the same thing is true of the implicit negative metaphysics of operationalism itself. As an ultimate philosophy of reality, logical positivism is self-refuting, and even the science which it originally made almost an object of worship turns out to be, as even positivists must confess, a bitterly disappointing "false Messiah."

We now turn, in our search for a satisfactory method of religious inquiry, to religious empiricism, by which I mean empiricism in religion itself, the appeal to religious experience as a source of religious insight, the use of approved empirical method in the investigation of religiously significant (i. e., more explicitly, divine) reality.

Under the general head of religious empiricism, religious mysticism, as experience and method, calls for consideration. All that can be undertaken here, however, is a brief and what will seem to be, by reason of its brevity, a rather dogmatic expression of attitude. Mystical intuition of God is commonly highly assured subjectively, but it is mainly, if not entirely, of the imaginal, not of the perceptual type. Its psychological certitude does not necessarily attain to logical certainty. While its as-

surance of the reality, accessibility and absolute sufficiency of God may be accepted as true from an objective, critical point of view, for the reason that these assurances stand the test of practical religious experience, it is not at all uncommon for the mystic to be almost as fully assured, subjectively, of the unreality of time, space, the material world, the finite self, and all evil, as he is of the reality of God; and these negative certitudes will certainly not stand the test of either practical experience in general or practical religious experience in particular. It is not assurance of the reality of God which suggests self-hypnosis as an explanation of the certitude of the mystic; rather is it the mystic's conviction of the sole reality of God.

Sometimes an attempt is made to impart objectivity to the otherwise subjective certitude of the mystic by combining it with what is claimed to be a rational philosophy of reality. Here absolute idealism is the favorite resource, because of the many rather remarkable resemblances between the world-view of extreme idealism and that of the extreme mystic. As a result of the synthesis mysticism is presented as rationally interpreted and vindicated in absolute idealism, and absolute idealism as empirically verified in religious mysticism. (Cf. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*.) But it must not be forgotten that absolute idealism has been found to be self-refuting, and that mutual support can obtain between doctrines both of which are erroneous, as well as between propositions which are separately defensible as true and which only require each to be supplemented and corroborated by the other. When the synthesis between the deliverances of religion and philosophy is made sufficiently critical and discriminating, the reality, accessibility, and adequacy of God may be found to be confirmed, but hardly the sole reality of God. (Cf. *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*, 1940.)

Another type of religious empiricism, and one which has a good deal in common with a moderate mysticism, in that it gives more or less dogmatic expression to religious feeling and intuition, is to be found in the so-called "theology of the religious (or Christian) consciousness." This differs from typical religious mysticism, however, in that the experience it expresses is no mere occasional ecstatic, quasi-hypnotic seizure, discontinuous with the normal practical consciousness, but rather an intuitive religious conviction which has emerged and become habitual as a result of reflective contemplation of the meaning of life and, especially, of one's relationship to the ultimate reality and power upon which one feels and

recognizes that he is ultimately dependent. This religious intuition and feeling of dependence takes on a variety of forms, determined largely by the different ways in which the object of ultimate dependence is interpreted. Furthermore, the religious consciousness and the faith-propositions which express it may be a purely individual affair; but there is a strong tendency for those who feel and think alike religiously to form a religious fellowship in which the principal common features of the members' religious experience and faith are set up as normative for the individual entering into the fellowship. Such communities of faith have generally come into being under the dominant influence of strongly individual personalities of deep religious experience and conviction, and the historic result is to be seen in the numerous religious communions of the past and present, each with its characteristic emphases and its own dogmatic faith and theology. What gave Schleiermacher his pre-eminence and made him the "father of modern theology" was chiefly his recognition of this subjective psychological basis of the doctrines of religion, and his frank acceptance of the essential subjectivity of all theological systems, including his own. His "science of the Christian faith" was objective only as psychology, not as theology; as a system of beliefs about God it was rightly termed "dogmatics." The faith it sought to guide and express was indeed theocentric and theological; but insofar as it was knowledge, a science at once historically and psychologically descriptive and normative, it was frankly anthropocentric and anthropological.

The subjectivity of Schleiermacher's empirical theology was relieved somewhat by the normative principle that the faith or religious consciousness given appropriate expression in the theology must be the faith shared in common by the members of a vitally religious community. But in view of the multitude of different religious fellowships with their conflicting dogmatic theologies, the need of an empirical theology of greater objectivity has been felt with increasing keenness in the past hundred years. Ritschl made some progress toward the desired objectivity by reintroducing the ethical norm and by a renewed emphasis upon the theologically normative value of the life and character of the historic Founder of Christianity and of the faith He inspired in His early followers. He emphatically rejected, however, any attempt to gain greater objectivity for his faith and theology by metaphysical speculation. His youthful experience with Hegelianism made him ever afterward suspicious of any such attempt. His theology, albeit more objective than Schleiermacher's, remained

essentially subjective, dogmatic. Insofar as it could claim to be science, descriptive or normative, it was anthropocentric rather than theocentric, a specialized branch of the history or psychology of religion, and so of anthropology in a broad sense of the word; a part of the science of man, not theology in the strict sense of a science of the being and nature of God. The normative character of the theology, due to the theologian's taking his stand within the contemporary Christian community whose faith he sought helpfully to express, did not essentially alter the fact that as science it was anthropology; as theology, dogmatic.

Further steps toward greater objectivity were taken by Ernst Troeltsch, among others. In Troeltsch's case the aim was to make theology at once more broadly empirical and more rational. Theological construction was to be preceded by a comprehensive philosophy of the history of religion; this was with a view to correcting the narrowness of the Ritschlian theology with its exclusive appeal to Christian history alone for its norms. (Troeltsch himself, however, in his own *Glaubenslehre* makes little if any use of ideas derived from historic religions outside of the Hebrew-Christian tradition.) Religious epistemology also received some attention from Troeltsch, but he failed to escape from the Kantian dualism with its consequent metaphysical agnosticism. More important, perhaps, for the gaining of objectivity, was Troeltsch's insistence upon the right and duty of developing the dogmatics of religious faith into a metaphysically defensible theology, a more rationally philosophical system than the Ritschlian, as well as one more broadly based upon our scientific knowledge of man and of the world. In the end, however, Troeltsch had to confess to a lurking metaphysical agnosticism and the consequent remaining subjectivity of his theology as a whole.

The method of religious inquiry to be recommended here may be characterized as at once a non-agnostic religious realism and a rational religious empiricism, assuming the essential naturalness not only of general revelation, but of special revelation also. From this point of view, within the category of natural revelation five different meanings or areas may be distinguished, and these may be represented diagrammatically by means of five concentric circles. The largest or outermost circle will then represent the most general application of general revelation, namely, the manifestation of any reality or discovery of any truth in and through experience and reflection. The next circle will represent what we may call special general revelation, the manifestation and discovery of absolutely valid

(i. e., qualitatively divine) values. The third circle will represent special revelation in its most general form, namely, the discovery of qualitatively divine reality in and through any specifically religious experience. The fourth circle will represent special special revelation, the manifestation and discovery of divine reality in and through a special type of religious experience, regarded as being, in its essential characteristics, religion at its best. For instance, many would claim to find the proper application of this category in connection with the religious experience characteristic of "evangelical Christianity." Finally, the innermost of the five circles may be taken as representing the manifestation and discovery of the divine quality of life, character, and influence in and through a historic religious exemplar of supreme and normative value for testing the genuineness and extent of all other claims of special religious revelation and general revelation of the divine. This normative special religious revelation of the divine we may call special special special revelation. From the characteristically Christian point of view this normative revelation exists for us potentially in the religious experience of the historic Jesus and in its effects in His life and saving influence on others. In all these different areas, from the most general to the most special, the revelation, it may be reasonably claimed, I think, is quite natural and nonmiraculous, even when it depends upon special religious conditions; it expresses an established, dependable order of reality to which man may freely adjust himself. At the same time, as in all natural experiential revelation of reality in general there is necessarily the initiative of the stimulus from the reality to be revealed as well as the active attention of the mind; so, too, in all divine revelation, it may be held, there is a divine initiative, an initiative on the part of the divinely functioning reality to be experienced and revealed, as well as the human appreciative and apperceptive response.

If the religious epistemology implicit in this procedure should be attacked from the point of view of either the subjective psychologism of mere humanism, or a religiously agnostic dualism or an extreme mystical dogmatism, one might, before going on with the indicated task of formulating a constructive empirical theology on the basis of natural religious revelation, turn aside temporarily to undertake a critical review of the various theories of knowledge in general and of religious knowledge in particular, and to vindicate the reasonableness of a critically monistic and realistic theory of general and religious knowledge. With this bare men-

tion of the place of epistemology in religious apologetics, let me turn at once to a brief statement of what, as it seems to me, is the proper course to be taken by theological construction.

The content of theology from the point of view taken here, should be developed and presented in three successive stages or divisions, namely, empirical theology, normative theology, and metaphysical theology. In empirical theology will be included a series of empirical theological laws, stating in generalized form what a divinely functioning reality can be depended upon for in human life and experience, on condition of man's maintaining what has been found to be the right, or dependably efficacious, religious adjustment. A considerable number of such generalizations, or empirical theological laws, were formulated more than twenty years ago in my book, *Theology as an Empirical Science*, and more recently, in a somewhat more critical and revised form, in *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*. The empirical religious facts on which these generalizations are based—by induction from particulars and by verification of working hypotheses—would also make possible a corresponding set of laws of a normative psychology of religion, formulated in terms simply of religious experiences possible and humanly desirable; but these same facts, formulated in terms of the participating divinely functioning reality, or factor, give rise to what we have called empirical theology, on the common realistic and scientific principle that we can find out what any reality is, to some extent, by observing what, under given conditions, it can be depended upon to do.

But a constructive theology, insofar as it remains strictly empirical and scientific, turns out to be very incomplete and at many points inadequate to meet fully our human religious need. The needed supplementation of empirical religious knowledge naturally tends, however, to occur. It may come to the individual as traditional teaching, but it is also possible and indeed not uncommon for it to arise spontaneously as an intuition in the mind of a person of religious experience and empirical religious knowledge. It not infrequently emerges as the comprehensive intuition that the God we need actually exists—a God great enough and good enough for our absolute worship and trust, a reality in which are united supreme value and supreme power. This characteristic intuition of religion, however, it may have arisen, becomes ethically religious faith when it is accepted by the will as a guide in practical life. And when the doctrinal content of this intuition and faith is logically deduced and

systematically formulated with the aid of appropriate norms, the result is what may be called normative theology. From the point of view of either a scientifically empirical or a philosophical approach this normative theology will appear to be quite dogmatic, and even at its best it does differ from a scientific empirical theology, as a vital, inspiring, subjectively assured and presumably permissible belief differs from what has been adequately verified in experience as knowledge; but it would seem that its deficiency with respect to objective certainty may be measurably remedied by means of methods to be employed in the third stage of theological construction, that is, in metaphysical theology.

By valid metaphysical theology I do not mean any purely a priori philosophical attempt to deduce the existence of God from universally self-evident propositions, or even the attempt to build up a demonstratively certain and religiously significant view of reality without any dependence either upon religious experience and empirical religious knowledge or upon religious intuition and practically tested faith. What is referred to is rather the procedure of examining, revising if necessary, and supplementing the main conclusions of empirical and normative theology in the light of the general results of science and with due regard to the implications of critically established values, together with the philosophical theology resulting from a resolute application of logical principles in the construction of a rational synthesis of all our religious knowledge and reasonable religious belief about reality with the rest of our pertinent established knowledge and reasonable belief. The subjects covered will concern the being and metaphysical nature of God, the metaphysical relation of God to the world and to man, and as a final problem, the ultimate significance, from a positively religious point of view, of the facts of evil.

The procedure thus recommended in empirical, normative and metaphysical theology does not differ in principle from the advice which might be given to any unphilosophical doubter or other common inquirer who may be seeking religious truth or the way to religious assurance. It is an obvious and very proper question whether all the elaborate technical philosophical and theological methodology described or referred to in the foregoing must needs be imposed upon all, as essential for plain men and women, or for the religiously awakened adolescent, not to speak of the religious life of the child. The answer, of course, must be in the negative. For the unsophisticated the way to God and to validly satis-

fyng religious experience is at least as simple as ever and is indeed very much what it always has been—when it has been disentangled or kept free from misleading dogmatisms. Man's part is to begin and continue to act as fully as is honestly possible, as if God were. Thinking of God as the God we need to help us do what we ought to do for the greatest good of mankind, the Higher Power we need to do for us all what is ultimately imperative but beyond what we can accomplish for ourselves, a God great enough and good enough to warrant and call for our absolute devotion and trustful self-surrender, let us act, as far as we sincerely can, as if we *know* such a God to be a reality. If we persevere in this course, in due time adequate religious assurance will come. As in the case of one walking by the light of a lantern, if we take the steps we see lit up before us and keep on doing so, religious experience and some religious knowledge will come to us, and eventually a flood of religious intuition and reassurance will displace our former more or less tentative faith. Fortunate indeed are those who have had from the beginning the guidance of religious tradition at its best. They should not be estopped from the honest use of critical and constructive reason, but what is even more fundamental and important is that they should continue, as may be made possible for them, to keep on fulfilling the practical conditions of a growing religious experience and reasonable faith. This is the basic and true method of religious inquiry.

Speaking in the Church

J. EDWARD LANTZ

"**I**N THE church I would rather speak five words with my understanding—so as to instruct others also—than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue." These words are found in the fourteenth chapter of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, a chapter devoted entirely to clarifying the purpose and manner of speaking in the Church.

In the thirteenth chapter Paul sets forth his great discourse on love, and in the beginning of the fourteenth he says, according to Weymouth:

Be eager in your pursuit of this Love and be earnestly ambitious for spiritual gifts, but let it be chiefly so in order that you may prophesy. For he who speaks in an unknown tongue is not speaking to men, but to God; for no one understands him. . . . But he who prophesies speaks to men words of edification, encouragement and comfort.

Paul does not deny the gift of tongues; neither does he discount the contribution of the Spirit; but he does imply that the chief reason for speaking in the Church is to edify, encourage and comfort people.

Today some members of the clergy believe that the Spirit of God leads them to say the right thing at the right time without much effort or preparation on their part, and that preaching is more a matter of trust in and obedience to the Holy Spirit than of preparation and study on their part. Of course, this attitude is not new in the Christian tradition. Saint Augustine found it prevalent in his day and referred to it in his *Christian Doctrine*. Said he, in referring to people opposed to rules for interpreting the Scripture:

There is a . . . class of objectors who . . . will cry out that such rules are not necessary for anyone, but that everything rightly done toward clearing up the obscurities of the Scripture could be better done by the unassisted Grace of God.

Augustine meets this argument by asking such an objector two questions:

But reading and understanding as he does, without the aid of any human interpreter, why does he himself undertake to interpret to others? Why does he not rather send them to God, that they may learn of the inward teaching of the spirit without the help of man?

Please do not misunderstand me; as ministers of the gospel, we do need the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but we need also the ability

to stimulate other people in such a way that they will glorify God and enjoy Him forever.

The question is, then, how can we develop that ability. How can we learn to speak that others can understand us? If God gives us His Spirit, does He not also endow us with the ability to be understood? No, I think not, at least not in the same way. The difference lies in the nature of communication. God may speak to us directly, to our conscience, mind or heart; but for us to speak to other people we must use language, and a mastery of language is not given us in the same way that the Spirit of God is. Language is an invention of man; it is not a direct gift of God. Its symbols must be learned, its mastery acquired. Paul admits there are many languages in the world, but that no language is a means of understanding unless its meaning is clear to both the speaker and the listener.

Language is used primarily in two ways, in speaking and in writing. In speaking at least two parties are involved, the speaker and one or more listeners. Likewise in writing at least two parties, the writer and one or more readers. Speaking and listening, writing and reading are the four ways in which our language enables us to understand each other. Speaking, listening, writing and reading are the four main avenues of communication. They are the four most important means a minister has of edifying, encouraging and comforting his people.

At Stephens College, Missouri, these four communicative skills are placed at the center of the educational program. By the use of clever cartoons the entering students are impressed with the importance of reading to understand the writer, and of writing to convey a definite message to the reader. To effect this understanding, the professors do not assign the writing of abstract themes intended for no reader save some poor professor and posterity; rather they instruct the students to write notes to each other on assigned topics—an act that needs very little encouragement! Later in the course they are instructed to write letters to their friends, keeping in mind their welfare, and to use those words, phrases and appeals that carry most meaning to them. This is common ordinary good sense applied to education.

The written language requires a bond of unity between the writer and the reader for communication. There is no such thing as effective writing apart from conveying a definite message to a particular reader or group of readers. And there is no such thing as effective reading except

as the reader understands and comprehends the intended message of the writer. This seems like a very naïve truth, and yet it makes my heart miss a beat to think of the scores of themes and sermons I have had to write intended for no particular reader or group of readers! Reading and writing should not, and indeed cannot, be learned as separate skills. They are twins of the written language and must be learned in proper relationship to each other.

The same relationship exists between speaking and listening—the two arms of the spoken language. There is no such thing as effective speaking apart from sympathetic listening. Only children talk to themselves normally, and they do so for the development of their voice and diction. Saint Paul associates speaking in tongues with childish speaking, speaking which may edify oneself but certainly not the body of believers. No, the mature use of speech is not primarily for self-expression nor for personality development. Speech for self-expression is childish, immature and egocentric. It is not concerned about its effect upon the listeners, and hence disregards the Golden Rule. Neither is speech primarily for personality development. That it is a powerful aid to such development cannot be ignored, but that is not its chief function. Mature speaking is directed toward listeners and uses those words, arguments and illustrations which edify, encourage and console them. The famous Jeremy Taylor used to preach once a year over the heads of his congregation just to remind them that he knew more than they did, but he considered one sermon a year enough of that kind of preaching.

It is my conviction that a listening congregation can help to develop an effective preacher as readily as an effective preacher can help to develop a responsive congregation. Dr. Frank Laubach hit upon a profound secret in asking his auditors to pray for him while he preaches, simply because they have to listen to his sermon to know if their prayers are answered! Attentive listening requires concentration as surely as live speaking requires animation. That is the reason outstanding counselors stress active listening; yet active listening is only half of the communicative cycle; it avails little without understandable speaking. Speaking and listening are twins of the communicative process—twins in preaching, in counseling, and in conversing—whether face to face, by telephone or by radio. In all these situations there must be a speaker and at least one listener co-operating simultaneously before there can be transfer of thought or feeling, and before understanding can be established between persons.

Supposing now that you resolve to be a more accurate writer and a

more careful reader, a more effective speaker and a more sympathetic listener; will you then be assured of the spiritual gift of prophecy, the great gift of being able to edify, encourage and comfort your people? Yes, and no. Yes, in that your spiritual gifts will be greatly enlarged and your service more satisfying. No, in that you can never expect to be one-hundred-per-cent successful.

According to Horace Bushnell in his *Dissertation on Language*, the reason no minister, nor any other person, can ever be understood completely by all other people lies in the limitation of language itself. Bushnell claimed "that every language contains two distinct departments—the physical department—that which provides names for things; and the intellectual department—that which provides names for thought and spirit."

The first department has to do with concrete words—words that name "all physical objects and demonstrations, including, of course, the names of actions," words designating objects or states that can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched or felt. These depend upon bodily sensations for their meaning and include such words as sky, loud, fragrant, salty, pencil and warm. While these do not have precisely the same denotation for every person, they do depend upon similar physical sensations and hence give rise to little misunderstanding.

Abstract words, however, belonging to the intellectual department, are different. They do not depend upon bodily sensations for their meaning. They include such words as God, love, kindness, tolerance, loyalty and immortality. The objects or states they represent cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, touched or felt; and yet they are part and parcel of religion. They characterize creeds and dogmas, Scripture and sermons. In the words of Bushnell:

They do not literally convey or pass over a thought out of one mind into another, as we commonly speak of doing. They are only hints, or images, held up before the mind of another, to put him on generating or reproducing the same thought, which he can do only as he has the same personal contents, or the generative power out of which to bring the thought required. Hence, there will be different measures of understanding or misunderstanding, according to the capacity or incapacity, the ingenuousness or moral obliquity, of the receiving party, even if the communicating party offers only truth in the best and freshest forms of expression the language provides.

According to this theory, language is limited as a means of communicating religious truth accurately and adequately. Consequently, every minister must expect some misunderstandings.

The story is told of a Sunday-school teacher who asked her students to think of God loving them the same as their parents love them. While she was drawing this analogy one lad in the class turned sickly pale and appeared horror-stricken. After class the teacher questioned the boy and learned that his father was a reprobate and drunkard, had never manifested love nor kindness toward him, but only reprimands and beatings. No wonder the lad misunderstood what the teacher meant by the love of God; yet what words, illustrations or analogies could she use to communicate her meaning to a boy unwanted and unloved by his parents? Indeed, at this point language is limited in communicating religious truth.

Yet, in spite of this limitation, if we as ministers write and speak desiring to be understood by our readers and listeners, and if we read and listen trying to understand other writers and speakers, we shall do much toward fulfilling our intended function in the Church. We shall help people to understand each other better. We shall foster, in the words of Bushnell, "a more comprehensive, friendly and fraternal state . . . between different families of Christians." We shall be workmen "that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." We shall bind our parishioners together in the local church, foster a spirit of brotherhood among different races and classes of people in our land, and strengthen the ecumenical ties of Christians around the world.

Brethren, he who speaks in an unknown tongue speaks not to men, but to God. No one understands him. Let us therefore speak "to men words of edification, encouragement and comfort." Let each of us, as a minister of Christ, say with Paul: ". . . in the church I would rather speak five words with my understanding—so as to instruct others also—than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue."

What War Does to Religion

ANTON T. BOISEN

WHY is war seldom associated with important religious movements? Is not war a social crisis? And do not crisis periods, both individual and social, tend to be associated with religious quickening?

In a study of the Holiness sects which appeared in *Social Action* for March, 1939, it was shown that the recent economic depression was not marked, as many supposed it would have been, by any demonstrable increase in mental illness. Neither was there any considerable social agitation. On the other hand, it was attended by a remarkable growth of those sects which represent radical mysticism. This fact was explained by the consideration that economic distress tends to relieve the sense of isolation and guilt, which is the major evil in mental illness, and to increase the sense of fellowship. In periods of economic depression people suffer together through no fault of their own. They are thus led to think and feel together intensely about the things that matter most. This means that conditions are favorable for the development of religious experience. The appearance of mystical sects among those classes upon whom the strains fall most heavily is then a manifestation of nature's power to heal, and such sects represent the creative stage of organized religion.

What happened in the 1930's seems to have been in line with the experience of the past. Other religious movements have also been associated with periods of economic stress. The revivalism in the Middle West in the early nineteenth century originated among poverty-stricken people. The Wesleyan movement arose among the working people of England in a period of economic dislocation. We may also recall the Anabaptist movement among the submerged classes of Reformation Europe. Christianity itself arose among the underprivileged classes of a subject people.

The principle that crisis periods are likely to be associated with religious quickening can be readily substantiated in the normal development of individuals. Coming of age, getting married, birth of children, bereavement and death are experiences which few can escape who live out

a well-rounded life, and those experiences are often of decisive importance in the development of the religious life. The man who habitually goes his way somewhat carelessly, occupied with his daily work, with the sports page or the stock market reports, with the movie offerings, doing little serious thinking, may at such times feel himself face to face with the ultimate issues of life. His eyes may be opened to unsuspected possibilities and he may be led to accept for himself a role which completely changes his course in life.

Further evidence of the religious significance of these crises in normal personal development may be found in the extent to which they are associated with religious ceremonies. Civil weddings and "mortuary chapels" may be increasing in number in America, but weddings and funerals are still prevailing functions of the Church. And not only in America but also in non-Christian lands religious ceremonies are found in connection with marriage, birth of children, burial of the dead and coming of age.

It is, of course, not to be assumed that crisis periods are always attended by religious quickening—far from it. Many persons pass unthinkingly through periods which are really of decisive importance. Others come to grief. One very large group of cases found in every mental hospital is given the name "*dementia praecox*," because the type of reaction which it represents seemed to be associated with adolescence. Serious disturbances are likewise associated with the birth of children, and such disturbances are not limited to mothers. The onset of old age is another critical period in which a new level of development must be achieved. Any mental hospital can furnish numberless instances of malignant reactions in the face of these turning points of life; also of desperate attempts at reorganization which are more or less successful.

These considerations furnish the starting point for the question before us. What does war do to religion? War also is a crisis experience, a social crisis of greatest magnitude. In war, also, people suffer together through no particular fault of their own—so far at least as they are individually concerned. In war, also, people think and feel together intensely and the sense of fellowship is greatly increased. May we not, therefore, expect that religious quickening should mark the periods of war, just as it so frequently appears in times of economic distress and in the crisis experiences of personal development?

A consideration of the facts indicates that war does produce some

effects as regards religion which are of real value. In the first place it forces men out of old ruts and compels them to give up stereotyped ways of thinking and acting. After this war is over, the world is not going to return to what it was in 1938. For one thing, in all probability, a new China will emerge. After sleeping peacefully for many centuries, Chinese civilization with its unchanging ways will have been forced through the toil and agony of these terrible years to adopt the ways of modern machine civilization. Our own isolationism will also have been broken up. We will be forced to recognize that we cannot live unto ourselves alone. We will be forced to revise our economic theories. Perhaps our educational and religious setup will have to be recast. All this may be for the better. Like the acute types of mental illness, war makes for change either for the better or for the worse.

Furthermore, in time of war the sense of fellowship is greatly increased. It is increased to the point where the individual is carried along on a great tidal wave of emotion. He feels himself part of something bigger than himself and he is keyed up to the point where he is able to perform deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice such as are seldom seen in time of peace. In time of war it is expected of the individual that he must be ready to give up his life and all that he has for the sake of his group. This devotion to the uttermost is of the very essence of religion. Its spirit is beautifully expressed in the prayer of Ignatius Loyola:

"Teach us, Lord, to serve Thee in the spirit of the soldier, to give and not to count the cost, to fight and not to heed the wounds, to toil and not to seek for rest, to labor and not to ask for any reward save that of knowing that we do Thy will."

War does thus increase the sense of fellowship, it brings forth heroic devotion, and it compels men to do fresh and earnest thinking; but there would be few who would claim that the last war was attended by any great religious quickening. There have been plenty of wars fought in the name of religion, but it is by no means easy to find any important religious movement which has resulted from war.

How are we to explain this failure of the earnest thinking and of the heightened sense of fellowship which war produces to carry over into constructive religious movements?

First of all it must be recognized that the sense of fellowship which war engenders is limited to ourselves and our allies. For the enemy there is hatred. The army chaplain in the last war who proclaimed in

my hearing that he was glad that there was nothing in his religion which forbade him to hate the Boches was voicing a general attitude. So also was the commanding general who called me on the green carpet for venturing to teach German forestry in the little school which we had started in the Rhineland. I could teach our men as much French forestry as I wanted, but no German forestry!

Such instances may be extreme, but war does cultivate an unreasoning hatred of the enemy which brings with it an inevitable loss of perspective and a faulty diagnosis. The thinking is done in terms of black and white. Everything is blamed on the enemy. Little account is taken of the real evils, of the complex forces, common to us all, which are actually responsible for this terrible holocaust; and we lose sight of our true objectives.

This means that while war may be a social crisis, the prevailing reaction pattern is of the malignant rather than of the benign type. That pattern and its consequences may be exemplified in the case of an Armenian minister which come under my observation some years ago. This man was born in Asia Minor of a long line of village priests. At the age of twelve he saw both his parents massacred. However, he was enabled to go to college. After his graduation he took a church and married a beautiful but illiterate woman. Then he came to America, leaving his wife and two children in the old country. After three years he was able to save enough money to send for his family. When they arrived in company with an uncle of his, it was at once apparent that something was wrong. Three months later the wife gave birth to a child by this uncle.

Here was stark domestic tragedy. What is a man to do in such a situation? Some men take to drink. Others get a gun and shoot the offending persons. We recall a great Hebrew prophet who, faced with a similar problem, succeeded in redeeming his wife and in the process made the discovery of God's love for His erring people. The Armenian, however, followed a different course. He did what seemed outwardly correct. He gave his wife a divorce. He also gave up his church and with it his religion, and he embarked upon a new vocation. Although fairly successful, he became more and more morose until finally he attempted to kill his oldest daughter. Then he landed in the hospital.

When we saw him, he was a fine-looking man, neat in appearance, coherent in his speech, but utterly impervious to any attempts to help him. The more we did for him the more he demanded; and bitterness

pervaded all his life. In the entire hospital there was probably not a more dangerous patient.

Such a person is deserving of sympathy. The experience of seeing his parents massacred, the tragedy which later befell him enable us to understand his reaction. But that reaction was nonetheless malignant. It is important to recognize that the same tragedy which wrecked his life might have glorified it, if he had met it in the spirit of Hosea. Crisis-experiences may either make or break men. Such experiences bring with them creative possibilities or possibilities for utter destruction. It is particularly to be noted that religious concern and religious quickening are found in conjunction with constructive reactions, and not with the malignant reactions of drifting and concealment. It is important, from the standpoint of our problem, to recognize that the bitterness which took possession of this man's heart drove out his religion. Hatred and bitterness are fighting attitudes which serve to maintain the integrity of the personality or of the group, but they block the solution of the real problems and the attainment of the broader perspectives and the enduring relationships with which true religion is concerned.

A second consideration is the fact that war involves a false alignment which is neatly expressed in some remarks by a Negro preacher which I picked up in a Pentecostal mission more than twenty years ago. After some derogatory words concerning education and educated people he continued as follows:

"What did we see in the last war? Priests and ministers on both sides standing up and asking God to kill the other side. And they was educated men! German priests and ministers asking God to kill Englishmen and Frenchmen and Americans; and French and English and American priests and ministers asking God to kill Germans. What was God to do? And they was educated men!

"You see the trouble is today that every dog is after his own tail. The Irish is stuck on hisself. The white man he look out for hisself and the black man for hisself. And the Japanese, he stick out his chest and look out for hisself. Education does not keep people from being fools."

This Negro preacher's indictment is well-taken. Not only is the spirit and the philosophy of life in which the Christian believes well represented among those against whom we are fighting, but the spirit and the philosophy of life against which we are supposed to be fighting is abundantly represented among our own people. Here, for example, is a distinguished scholar who is convinced that there is only one solution open to us when we have won the war—the complete destruction of the

German people. He proposes to destroy them by enslaving them and sterilizing them. It seems clear that between such an attitude and that of the Nazis there is little to choose. The policy which he advocates is their policy and the spirit which he expresses is their spirit. He himself is thus a representative of the real enemy, and he is far more dangerous to our future welfare because he is one of us and because he is giving authoritative expression to an attitude and a philosophy of life which will continue to sow the dragon's teeth. Christian is thus arrayed against Christian and the intense feeling and the earnest thinking which war produces are not likely to center in principles and interests which are in keeping with the spirit of enlightened religion.

A third consideration is the alteration in ethical standards which war brings with it. The differing standards of war and peace, of army and civil life, together with their religious significance are dramatized in the experience of one of my patients.

This man, at the time I dealt with him, was twenty-eight years of age. He had been raised in Georgia, the son of a Baptist minister. As a boy he had been well-meaning and conscientious, but he had had serious difficulty in learning to manage the troublesome sex drive. At the age of sixteen he left home and went to work in a mill village. After two years he enlisted in the army and with the uniform he adopted the army code. In accordance with that code he found a solution for his unsolved sex conflict. He had recourse to prostitutes, being careful always to report and get his prophylactic treatment afterwards. Most of his mates were doing the same thing, so he felt comfortable about it.

After nine years in the army, during which period he rose to the rank of sergeant, he married and returned to civil life. In due course a child arrived. According to his account, there seemed to be something unusual associated with the birth of his child. As soon as he got the news, his mind began running and jumping. A million things were passing through his head. He was under a spell of fear. He felt that he had a lot of responsibility, but he wasn't thinking so much about the baby. He was thinking about human nature and its mechanisms. He was trying to understand what was the cause of all emotion, and he wrote an article expounding his theory of the human emotions. He sent it to a local newspaper and he took great pride in the fact that it was published.

The disturbance which brought him to the hospital did not follow immediately. It came a little later when things went wrong with his

business, but it was essentially a continuation of the emotional turmoil which seized upon him when he got word of the birth of his baby. In that disturbance he had a vision in which it seemed to him that he could see back to the beginning of all creation. It came to him that from the beginning there have been two rulers over the peoples of the earth, God and Satan. One was just as powerful as the other, and between the two there has been a constant battle for supremacy. It came to him that there was no earthly reason why such a conflict should be kept up. He was sure that the Lord did not intend that people should be forever fighting each other. Then it came to him that he had a great mission in life. It was to be his task to go and see Satan and persuade him to come and meet God and then to bring all his following into the light. This was to be the beginning of the millennium.

The meaning of this preposterous idea may become clear if we bear in mind that this man's inner conflict had become a conflict between two sets of standards and that the disturbance came at the time his first child was born. He had, as he put it, two consciences. As a boy he had accepted the standards of his parents and of their church, but he had not been able to bring himself into conformity with the way of life which was thus required. With his enlistment in the army he had accepted its easier standards of sex morality. Supported now by the group and its standards he was able to give expression to the forbidden tendencies and to be quite frank and untroubled about it. He seemed to have made a real adjustment. But with his marriage, and then with the birth of the child, the situation changed. He had now a new role in life. He was no longer just a soldier. He was now a father and the responsibilities of parenthood identified him once more with his own father. He began, therefore, to think of his father's God, the symbol of that which was supreme in his system of loyalties, whose authority he had never questioned but from which he had run away. It is clear that measured by the standards of his father and of his father's God he would be weighed and found wanting.

This patient had identified himself with the army group and he believed in this group. Their standards were easier standards. They represented for him a concession to his own weaknesses. This being the case, it is obvious that Satan was for him the symbol of the army and its code of sex morality. But his mates were after all good fellows. Hence he would try to bring about an understanding between the symbolic representatives of the two groups with which he had been identified.

The point to be stressed is that this man's primary loyalty had been to his parents and to other early guides upon whom he had been dependent for love and for protection and whose generalized impression had given him his idea of God. Failing to measure up to the standards taken over from these early guides, he had made a temporary adjustment by identifying himself with a group in whose motivations race perpetuation was of secondary importance. The conflict was precipitated by the experience of fatherhood which brought the motive of race perpetuation to the fore and therefore required reconciliation with that in his social experience which for him represented the universal and abiding.

War thus brings with it an alteration of ethical standards through an alteration of the goals which are in the forefront of attention. In time of peace our standards are determined by the need of family integrity and by the requirements of living and working together in friendly relationships. The emphasis then is upon the virtues of honesty, truthfulness, kindness, sobriety, self-control, chastity. In time of war the paramount objective is that of defeating the enemy by inflicting upon him as much damage as possible while at the same time maintaining our own strength. The emphasis is therefore upon the virtues of courage, obedience, self-sacrifice and efficiency, while the virtues of civil life take a back seat. War means always the cheapening of human life and free rein to the cruel and vengeful tendencies.

Here, for example, is an incident which came under my own observation. The scene is close to the Toul sector. One brigade of the First Division has just returned from its first trip to the front. A little group is gathered in the Y. hut, and Sergeant Niemann, himself of German blood, is telling about their memorable experience. Mrs. F., the charming Y. hostess, is drawing him out. In racy and picturesque language he tells how those "blamed frogs" led them to the front-line trenches and left them before they knew which end they were standing on; how one of the army mules insisted on braying just at a most inopportune moment, and how, in the resulting excitement, someone kicked over the bean pot from which they were expecting to be fed. He comes then to the first German prisoner. A nice-looking fellow he was, but he couldn't speak English. Our sergeant, however, was equal to the occasion. He was able to serve as interpreter and they got some real dope out of him. Then they tickled him with the bayonet until he died. Mrs. F.'s comment was, "You did exactly right." The same lady, when the boys went to the

front, gave them always as her parting injunction, "Be sure you kill a Boche for me."

Or consider again a story which went the rounds of the Forty-second Division about a group of twenty-four German prisoners taken by the "Alabams." They were sent to the rear but only four reached their destination. The guards had drawn cards to decide which prisoner they would shoot next.

Such stories could be multiplied. I do not say that they are true. Many of our boys liked to pose as hard-boiled heroes. Nonetheless they reflected a widespread attitude, a bloodthirstiness which was perhaps more pronounced among the women—at least to hear them talk—and among the people back home than among the fighting men. Human life is cheap in wartime.

What happened to our standards of truthfulness is not pleasant to remember. In the regiment with which I was associated it was the custom for the captains to regale their men at review with the latest batch of atrocity stories, most of them manufactured out of whole cloth by some Allied agency. The purpose was to teach the men to hate the enemy. Propaganda in wartime is developed into a fine art. It is recognized as an instrument of warfare. I recall a conversation at Brest, where we were waiting to go home. The question under consideration was what happened to our President's Fourteen Points. There was general agreement that they had been ignored in the Treaty of Versailles. The question at issue was whether there had ever been any intention of observing them. Some of our officers, among them an American colonel, a West Pointer, maintained that they were merely propaganda designed to weaken the German morale. Propaganda is used not merely to deceive the enemy and to win over neutrals. It is used most of all as a means of control over our own people. It is used to deceive ourselves.

The conclusion is that war brings with it inevitably a limited outlook. The deepened sense of fellowship which it engenders is confined to the "in-group." The serious thinking is directed to immediate objectives and is distorted by powerful emotions. There is a marked tendency to think in terms of black and white, to magnify the motives in the eyes of the enemy and to ignore the beams which obscure our own vision. War breeds hatred, and hatred bars the door to love and truth. For this reason the social crisis which comes with war increases the spirit of patriotism but it does not give rise to any vital religious movements.

One great exception must be made, however, an exception which helps to clarify the principle which is involved. This is to be found in the development of the Hebrew-Christian religion. In the beginning the Hebrew religion was a tribal religion and Jahweh, the Hebrew god, was a war god. He was referred to as the "Lord of Hosts." He was supposed to have chosen the Hebrews from among all the peoples of the world to be his people and to have made with them a covenant. According to that covenant they were to have no other gods but him and they were to obey his commandments. If they did this, all would be well with them. If they were recreant, they would perish.

But the Hebrews met with national reverses. They were defeated in war. Their leaders were taken captive. The burning question therefore arose, What is the reason for these misfortunes? Is our faith all a mistake? Or is Jahweh angry with us? It was this question which was laid upon the hearts of the great prophets. In seeking the answer they were led down into the depths of despair and anguish. They seem to have passed through states which were not unlike the psychoses which we see today in some of our hospital patients. They felt themselves face to face with an approaching day of doom and felt themselves commissioned as spokesmen of the Lord. The answer which they found was: "It is because of our sins that Jahweh has forsaken us. The Assyrians and the Babylonians are merely instruments in his hands. But Jahweh is a god of love as well as of justice. If therefore we repent and turn from our evil ways a remnant will be saved."

A question may be raised regarding this conclusion of the prophets. The Hebrews were a small nation and they had powerful and warlike neighbors. It seems hardly probable that even perfect obedience to the commandments of Jahweh could have saved them from becoming the victims of the neighboring war lords. It was, however, a far more wholesome reaction than that of despair or bitterness. As a rule the patient who blames himself has a good chance to recover. The patient who blames others, who, like our Armenian minister, dwells on his grievances, who finds alibis for his shortcomings, who explains his misfortunes in terms of the unfairness of other men, is the one who is not likely to get well. So also with nations. Insofar as the difficulty is outside of ourselves, there is little we can do about it. If it is within us, we can. The great Hebrew prophets thus performed an important service in directing attention to the evils within their own gates and in seeking to correct those evils.

In Second Isaiah a far more penetrating answer is found. It is not, says that prophet, just because of our sins that we are being punished. There is a deeper meaning in it all. Our suffering is for the healing of the nations. Israel is the righteous servant of the Lord and upon Him is laid the iniquity of all. Through His suffering all shall be healed. We must therefore patiently endure this suffering in order that the promise may be fulfilled that in Abraham all the nations of the world shall be blessed.

The sense of special mission and of separateness was thus forged by the great prophets in the furnace of affliction. It was fixed by Ezra and by Nehemiah and the priestly group through ritualistic regulations which set the Jews apart from other people. A racial consciousness was thus developed which has enabled them to maintain their own cultural integrity through more than two thousand years, even though they have had no home of their own but have been scattered throughout the Western world among other peoples and other cultures.

Through Jesus of Nazareth this profound insight of Second Isaiah was carried forward to its tremendous climax. He also, like the great prophets before Him, was concerned about the destiny of His people and the suffering and humiliation to which they were being subjected. And He also, like Second Isaiah, interpreted this suffering in terms of a divine, redemptive purpose. According to this view Jesus must have come to the conclusion that the long-cherished hope of "a place in the sun" must be given up. The recognition of this necessity may well have been for Him as the experience of death. He may indeed have descended into hell. But out of it He came with a new hope and a new message. Through Him and through His sacrificial death the religion of the Hebrew prophets became world-wide in its scope.

The task was completed by the Apostle Paul. It was his great achievement to free the religion of Jesus from the ritualistic fetters which would have kept it a small sect within the Jewish religion, while at the same time the Old Testament was retained as fundamental in the Christian teaching. It is perhaps not without significance that this man through whom Christianity was made a world-wide religion was a representative of the enemies of Jesus. He may be regarded as the answer to the prayer on the cross.

If the objection should be raised that it was not out of a war situation that the Hebrew-Christian religion developed, but out of defeat, it may be pointed out that the tendency to hate and blame the enemy

is greater among a defeated people than among those who are victorious. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that a defeated and humiliated people should cling so tenaciously to the faith in their divine destiny and that they should at the same time refuse to blame their enemies for their sufferings, but should instead search their own hearts and seek to correct their own shortcomings. This is something which has happened all too seldom in history. We seem, therefore, justified in concluding that the Hebrew-Christian religion, as represented by the great prophets, has something to teach us in the matter of dealing with the problem of war, not merely in defeat but also in victory.

It would be going too far to say that the law which, as exemplified in the development of the Hebrew prophetic religion, is that of nonresistance to evil. Experience tells us that force is sometimes necessary for the wrongdoer's own good. But we may learn the peril both to the individual and to the group of hating our enemies, of blaming our difficulties upon them and of failing to recognize the evils which we alone can correct. We may also learn of the religious quickening which comes in any shared strain or suffering when there is freedom from the spirit of hatred and from blind self-deception.

Saint Augustine and the Problem of Evil

NOLAN B. HARMON, JR.

PHILOSOPHICALLY the Christian Church has always rebelled at the thought that God may be the author of evil. We believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, creator of all things, visible and invisible, but not creator of evil. God is good and God is perfect and from Him as cause can come nothing which is not good—for this thesis the Church always has been and always will be ready to stake her very existence. And yet evil is here. Of that there can be no doubt, and to explain its existence within a universe controlled by a good God is a problem which has engaged some of the mightiest minds among the sons of the Church. But among all the champions who have arisen to defend her doctrines and philosophy, rarely has the Church ever contained a more powerful intellect than that of Aurelius Augustinus, Bishop of Hippo—long known to history as Saint Augustine.

The fourth century was a transition period in the history of both the State and the Church. The Roman Empire was far along in its decline, and already its gates had been crashed by the inroads of the northern barbarians. Emperor after emperor had worn the purple until it had come about that the throne once held by the great Julius and Augustus had passed into the hands of a motley succession of half-wits, mountebanks, giants, debauchees and criminals. At length Diocletian had come and reorganized the empire, resting it again upon the old foundation upon which it always stood most sure—its military strength. A few soldier emperors followed him and for a time the world was saved.

But it was the preservation of an empty shell. Disintegration was taking place within. The old Roman who had kept the bridge against the fabulous thirty thousand had long been dead, and the blood of a Regulus flowed but thinly through the fast-hardening arteries of expiring Rome. Manners had become corrupted, morals were in a bad state, while ever and anon the great hordes beyond the Oder or the Vistula or the Rhine set themselves in motion toward the lands in the south, stirred by a primal impulse which even their own leaders could not have fathomed. The clock had struck twelve for the empire of the Caesars.

The Church, too, was in transition. In the East, Greek thought had worn itself out in the mighty christological controversy, coming to definite utterance at last in the resounding symbol of Nicaea, which, like the roll of a war drum, finally issued from the councils of the Church. In the West the Bishop of Rome was fighting his way toward primacy *inter pares*. The Latin mind preferred to deal with concrete things—bishoprics, orders, discipline, laws—rather than to become excited over metaphysical distinctions such as had stirred the East. A rapidly crystallizing form of government had come about within the Church, and the various parts of that organization became at last as closely articulated as were the maniples of a Roman legion. But for its apologist, its warrior, its metaphysician, its organizer and its spokesman, the Western Church was awaiting the maturity of a little Numidian boy who, in the years following 354 A. D., was growing into a happy pagan boyhood in North Africa.

Augustine was early discovered to have a mind of unusual strength. His father, Patricius, was a happy-go-lucky, middle-class pagan of small householder rank. His mother, Monica, deserves to be placed among the great mothers of men. Augustine's life cannot be followed within the brief limits of this paper, but suffice it to say that there is scarcely an ancient biography for which materials are more plentiful, and very few quite so interesting. He early fell into sin and learned of evil from his own experience and, in spite of the tears of Monica, seemed destined to be always a teacher of pagan rhetoric rather than a Christian. The man, however, had one saving trait, a trait which we like to feel is at the heart of our modern science—an undeviating loyalty to truth, whenever it became clear. Coupled with this, there was in Augustine a certain sense or intuition which ever seemed to point him in the direction from which he might expect ultimate verity. It came about that he tried for a time Manichaeism, with its strange mingling of sense and nonsense, Parsee and near-Christian teachings. Then he tried to lose himself in neo-Platonism. But in neither of these did he find satisfaction. Finally he turned to the Christian writings and saw in them much that was admirable. In fact, Augustine wanted very much to become a Christian, but discovered at length that surrender to Christ was not merely a matter of the intellect or the adoption of a new philosophy, but the giving in of a will and the giving over of sin. And his sin had grown very dear to the young teacher of rhetoric.

The conversion of Augustine is classic in Christian history, culminating as it did in the beginning of an unparalleled career as theologian, philosopher and church statesman.

It will not be necessary for us to go further with the personal history of the man, but to take him as we find him later as Bishop of Hippo in North Africa. There eventually Augustine set about writing what proved to be the first Christian philosophy of history—the *De Civitate Dei* or "City of God." Its immediate purpose was to answer those who held that Rome, which has just fallen before Alaric, had done so because Christianity had driven out the old Roman gods, who were therefore angry. Augustine began the work as a tract for the times, but after a few chapters it begins to widen out into that immortal antithesis between the earthly and heavenly cities which has become one of the great works of all literature. In the *De Civitate*, which treats of everything in the heavens above and the earth beneath and the waters under the earth, we find, among the multitudinous other matters there touched on, a theory of evil set forth which avoids some of the difficulties of this vexed question. We are not confined solely to the *City of God* for Augustine's views along this line, for in the *Confessiones* also the problem of evil is discussed in many places. These two books are among the later works of Augustine's life and represent the matured thought of this most powerful thinker. In these volumes is what has become known as the *privation* theory of evil—an attempt to save the goodness of the Creator by a negation of sin. It is perhaps as strong an effort as monistic philosophy may put forth.

There will be, of course, no problem of evil if we limit the power or the goodness of God. It is a simple matter philosophically to save the omnipotence of God by limiting His goodness, or to save His goodness by limiting His power. This latter course has been adopted many times, as the heart of humanity will not hear to the former. But orthodox Christians will admit neither, and Augustine as one foremost among them, makes this very plain. "*Magnus es tu, Domine,*" he begins that wonderful prayer, the *Confessiones*, "and greatly to be praised." His fundamental proposition concerning the creation of the world was that "a good God made it good." One of the most exquisite passages in all literature is his description in the *De Civitate* of the handiwork of the Creator. The "dead language" in which Augustine wrote seems to be-

come alive as he describes here the works of God even down to the finest "pin-feather" of the bird—all is good (*De Civ.*, v. 11). "God's work was good, for it pleased him," he said, naïvely quoting Genesis.

God was not only great and good to Augustine, but also unchangeable (*incommutable*). This attribute of God, which the Christian bishop constantly stresses, was a close approximation to the idea of Deity as found in the writings of Plotinus. In fact, Augustine throughout life was profoundly influenced by Plotinus, as he had been for a time a believer in his system—commonly called neo-Platonism. The influence on Augustine of Plotinus, the "last great mystic" as he has been called, is nowhere better shown than in this very question of evil which we discuss. Therefore before going further it may be interesting to outline briefly the cosmic scheme of Plotinus, in order to see the roots of the privation theory in neo-Platonism.

For Plotinus there was the "Absolute" corresponding to all that the Christian posits into the Being of God. Everything else was separate from the Absolute, therefore had in itself the possibility, if not the nature, of evil. Creation had come from the Absolute, taught Plotinus, by a series of emanations. In Augustine, however, we find no idea of emanations, for he held the orthodox view that God created the world out of nothing. Nevertheless for both Augustine and Plotinus, evil was not to be found in the Absolute, the Very God—therefore must be looked for in the things-separate-from-God.

Augustine constantly stresses the notion of God as the *Incommutable Bonum* and creatures and creation as able to change (*mutabilia*), just as Plotinus had "inferior orders." For neither of them could evil exist with God; of necessity then it existed among mutable creatures.

However, creation itself with Augustine was not evil but good. This sentence, however, can scarcely be uttered but the mind asks the invariable question: Whence then came evil? Each time Augustine praises creation as good his own mind leads him at once to this question. "The cause of the good creation does not suit the Manichees," he tells us (*De Civ.*, xxii. 21), "because of evil, fire, frost, wild beasts, etc., which do not suit but injure this thin-blooded and frail mortality of our flesh." The Manichees, it may be said, were after his conversion Augustine's arch-enemies, and he vigorously assails their teaching that evil is inherent in matter. If this were so, then God would have created evil. Augustine denies this *in toto*. No thing was evil in itself—there was no

mala substantia. All things were good because, forsooth, the handiwork of a good God.

This—that all things are good—was rather a long step as well as a sweeping statement for ancient man. Even today in all our enlightenment we look askance at a blood-stained knife, when it is declared to be an instrument of murder, and we feel that it is an accursed thing. Those who have been brought up to see a “serpent” in strong drink cannot look at liquor, but they somehow feel that *per se* there is death in it. But the Bishop of Hippo would get behind all this. In the knife there is no evil—that would be found in the heart of the murderer. In the chemistry of the fermented drink there would be only the natural interplay of God’s good law—evil would be in the desire of the drunkard. The logic of Augustine’s position will be manifest. Granted that a good God made all creatures and they act only in conformity with His will, we dare not say that they are evil. “Even poisons which are destructive when used injudiciously become wholesome and medicinal when used in conformity with their qualities and design; just as on the other hand those things which give us pleasure, such as food and drink and the light of the sun, are found to be hurtful when immoderately or unseasonably used” (*De Civ.*, xxii. 21).

The logic of his monistic philosophy thus forced the great Church Father to remove the so-called *malum* (evil) from all *things*—it remains not in this division of the *mutabilia*. Thence we come to man. Pushing, as Augustine needs must, the proposition that all created things are good, we are faced with what we term the “flesh.” Many Christian writers and the practical thought of the Church have always held the desires of the flesh as a source of evil. Flesh lusting against spirit and spirit against flesh—so a conflict. But even here Saint Augustine steadily maintains his ground. The flesh, too, was good—as any other creation of God. Had he held otherwise, that evil was inherent in the flesh, it is clear that he would thus have admitted that some of the handiwork of God is bad—created so. “There is no need, therefore,” we are informed, “to accuse the nature of the flesh; for in his own kind and degree the flesh is good. But to desert the Creator Good and live according to the created good, is not good” (*De Civ.*, xiv. 5). He makes out a strong case on this. Two men see the same object. One is tempted, the other is not. The evil, therefore, cannot be put in the flesh of the one who would sin, for so also was the other one a fleshly creature. “Lust is

not the fault of beauteous bodies which were made thus beautiful by the Creator, but of the evil desire of the mind." Past the flesh, therefore, Augustine pushes evil—into the mind, for it may be said at once that this was his *locus mali*. Up to this, we think, he has no trouble in holding his position, even when dealing with the "flesh," which with the "world" and "devil" has been the great triumvirate of evil for the practical thought of Christianity. He will nevertheless have trouble—any philosopher will—upon interpolating evil in a definite place in the chain of creation. As has been hinted above, Augustine places evil in man's will, the *voluntas homini*, and to this point a metaphysical probe may now be brought.

Having located the *locus mali* in man's will, the privation theory may be better approached. We had best go back with Augustine and begin as he did with the goodness of God. "To adhere to God is good"—this was axiomatic with Augustine, and on this as a postulate the whole privation theory is built. The Christian bishop quotes the prophet: "To adhere to God is good." *Non adhaerere Deo* was evil (*De Civ.*, xii. 1). Evil, therefore would be found in not adhering to God. It was a "falling away" (*defectio*) from God. As with Plotinus, the perfect state would be union with the Absolute. For man to turn by his own will away from God was to become by virtue of that separation imperfect, therefore a blot on creation and a sinner. This is the fulcrum on which swings this negative theory of evil.

Privatio is the Latin word which Saint Augustine uses to describe this whole idea of falling away from God. As this is the key word, and as it has given its name to Saint Augustine's teaching on this profound question, it deserves to be described as well as the concept it conveys. *Privatio*, or privation, represented to Saint Augustine that cutting down of the real nature of man when alienation from God occurred. Privation itself, it may be stated, technically speaking, is the withdrawal of the essence of a thing—not its food, but its *self*. It is a "becoming less" of the being of a thing and is hard to illustrate in the corporeal world, as Augustine himself found when he began to explain it. "The causes of such failings are such so that if anyone wishes to see darkness or hear silence, although both of these are known to us, yet neither this one except through the eyes, nor that one except through the ear, not indeed in view but in deprivation of view." Further, he states that the eye does not see darkness except "where it begins not to see." This then was his explanation of privation: Something we detect by a positive lack.

The eye was made for light, not darkness; the ear for sound, not silence; the soul for God—and to fall away from him was an upset of the ordered course of the universe, and wrong for that reason. In other words, the soul was made for God, and not to cleave to Him was to be deprived of being perfect and filling out the intended measure.

We have much the same thought when we say concerning someone that he is "not much of a man." To remark that a certain individual is a "nobody" or "near nothing" is a common form of disparagement, and implies that human beings ought to fill out a prescribed sphere and to be "something" if not "somebody." This will illustrate Augustine's idea precisely. The sinner was separate from God and hence incomplete. Living in *privatione*, he could not be the full man that he should be. The farther he "fell" into sin, the more incomplete he became until a state of great privation was reached. Literally such a one approached non-being (*tendit non esse*). But Augustine did not believe that complete nonbeing was ever reached—annihilation. There was even in the most depraved, the "nearest nothing" person, a tiny portion of that original God-given essence which might yet grow and fill out again the full measure of man.

Saint Augustine's teaching regarding the falling away of the soul may be illustrated in another way. The actual word used to describe the fact of falling was *defectio*. Failure, defect, failing, want—these are the nearest meanings we can get for this word. It has the idea of a certain lack about it, but not the active concept of a "defect" as we think of such. Something missing that should be there—this is the thought. Now the Latin name for the eclipse of the sun was *defectio solis*, as there was also *defectio lunae*. This gives a chance to draw a parallel. An eclipse is a shutting off of the light of the sun or moon. Notice, however, that an eclipse is not a change in the nature of such light as escapes to the earth. A single ray would in itself be perfect. The eclipse is not a gathering gloom over the whole face of the sun, but simply a shutting off of the full expanse. The little light that might pass in an almost total eclipse is in its being as perfect as when it came from the whole incandescent ball—there is simply not as much of it. If one ray alone be left to pass, it will still be perfect sunshine. Thus we have our parallel. The *defectio hominis* is a shutting off or a cutting down of the real nature of man, a privation of self, a "becoming less" of something that God made perfect and complete, and so wrong because not perfect. But with Augus-

tine, as stated, the complete state of nothingness was never reached. With him, to use the simile of the heavenly bodies, the eclipse could never be total. Man "tended not to be," but never *was not*. "Long as the lamp holds out to burn," the Bishop of Hippo believed that the vilest sinner might return. The eclipse passes and so may the *defectio hominis* and man's full nature be again. Redemption with Saint Augustine was to adhere to God. This done, man again restores himself, or is restored to his place divinely appointed and so right. Whatever we may vote regarding the privation theory of sin, the adhering-to-God theory of righteousness is not wrong.

Thus evil with the great Church Father was a negation. Philosophically he put the emphasis not on the *defect*, but on the *perfect*. There were "corruptions of the good" (*corruptiones boni* and *privationes boni*), but the accent falls on the "good." Like charity, Augustine cared not to "figure on" evil. There was no such thing—positively. Silence, no sound; darkness, no light; sin, no God—all these are negatives known only by the absence of the positive. *They are not*.

But, however Augustine viewed evil as a negation philosophically, we may smile to see how he treated it as a fact practically. Theoretically Augustine might regard sinners as poor imperfect creatures, but actually his treatment of them was by no means lukewarm. When the Bishop of Hippo was in action, from both his preserved speeches and his writings, we find that he, as all other Christians have done, faced evil as an active and not a passive force. In his writings the antithesis between good and evil is strongly drawn. The philosopher in his study, musing on the negative value of evil and the privation of the good, was an entirely different man from the hard-headed preacher out in the open up against principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in high places. None was harder on the sinner than this same Saint Augustine. The devil was abroad and must be fought hammer and tongs. God and heaven against devil and hell—in this melee the author of the privation theory stood forth like a bastion tower in an enemy's country. He who had been a slave to lust during his early years preached that sin was sin and asked no pardon for saying it. Thus does practice with theory.

In closing, a comment or two on the privation theory may be in order. Privation itself, withdrawal of the essence, is still itself an upset of the moral order—God's order—and the question remains, Whence this disturbance of the moral order? Again we ask: Whence? Certain

thinkers and all who are engaged in practical affairs simply find evil here and deal with it as a force. The Christian's endeavor has been to exclude it from divine causation. Locate it where they will, however, in the world, flesh or devil, a monistic philosophy must hold all these created by God. For human reason there is no solution that is able fully to satisfy.

Augustine clings firmly to the proposition that sin is an act of the will—a *defectio*. Conscience seems to bear this out, certifying to the will of man that in sin it is the blameworthy agent. Sin is not the absence of good acts, but the result of a will that is caught in bondage and perverted by its own selfishness. Evil has the quality of an invasive presence, truly demoniac in nature, something that would not be at all, but which undeniably is. It is not passive and inchoate but dynamic, proving capable of becoming organized into channels of sheer perversion and destruction. Sinners, unfortunately, are not poor attenuated wraiths; they are often powerful, attractive, brilliant persons. No one who deals with reality can be blind to the positive nature of sin and evil. Back we come to the original: Whence? In the test tube of the philosopher as he holds it up against the fierce light that comes from the wisdom of the ages, there remains the insoluble residuum. One thing is agreed: Saint Augustine spake truly for the Christian in that wonderful line in the *Confessiones*—"Thou hast made us for Thyself, and restless is our heart until it shall have found rest in Thee."

Postwar Relations With Japan— Touchstone of Our Destiny

CHARLES W. IGLEHART

THE edifice of future American-Japanese relations is as yet un-built, and even unplanned. Any discussion of it now would have to be largely conjecture. But the foundations upon which it is to rest are known, and these will be the chief object of our study.

Four hundred and fifty years ago daring navigators from the West first really discovered the Eastern world. The contact was casual. The East had no idea that it had been discovered. It was living its ample and complex life at the measured tempo suited to ancient folk. Seemingly structureless and sluggish, it was nevertheless possessed of profound human wisdom and unused strength. Its people were preoccupied with the meaning of life rather than with its manipulation. Attention was spent largely upon the traditions of the ancestors and upon the concerns of the family or neighborhood. Dynasties came and went, but the currents of life, rising from the two culture-founts—India and China—were running in much the same banks from century to century.

The West, now thoroughly aroused from the sleep of the Middle Ages, came in vibrant with a new energy. From the first the ship captains had an eye to barter, and they brought back with them treasures that dazzled the eyes of Europe. As life moved into the seventeenth century this trade in luxuries took root in the economic life of the Western nations. By the eighteenth century the Industrial Revolution was in full swing. Factories and mills ate up the materials and saturated the markets at home. If people were to eat and work, ships had to ply back and forth from the harbors of the East. The West was finding its life line stretching into the Pacific.

The nineteenth century went farther and faster. The agents and factors of the Western trading companies were now becoming governors and rulers of whole peoples. The arteries of commerce were becoming massive trunk lines of goods essential to the very existence of the nations of the West. These nations were growing great and aggressive. They needed heavy industry, not only for their livelihood but for war.

This intercourse, though it had become inextricably interwoven, was,

however, largely one way in its drive. The East was still passive and essentially unchanged in its life. The so-called colonies of the Western empires were not colonies of Westerners, but of far-off, unknown peoples held under control in order that they might yield a stable supply of goods. Personal relations were comparatively few. It was largely a commerce in things. Yet ties could not remain impersonal, and with the twentieth century the two worlds began to run back and forth in a new interplay of life that involved the peoples of both.

THE PLACE OF JAPAN AND AMERICA IN THEIR TWO WORLDS

Japan never had an important role in the life of Asia. Living on its rim in her rocky archipelago she was content to catch some of the streams of culture that flowed from the abundant continent. She reshaped these elements into a worthy civilization of her own, but she neither was asked nor felt called upon to make any great contribution to the life of Asia. When the Western wave struck, she closed her doors in fear and for two and a half centuries in seclusion observed the tide as it passed her by. These were days of intense change, however, for under the feudal regime of the Tokugawas she was herself moving toward national unity and entering the first stages of her renaissance. Cities were growing, money economy was developing, her present political philosophy was being shaped. She was about ready to burst her cocoon and come out into modern life.

America, too, in her relation to Europe had many parallels to Japan. Of it, she was not wholly in it. While her Western kinsmen were staking out their claims in Asia, and while Japan was in hiding, she was busy coming to birth and laying the foundations of her present national life. Like Japan she came upon the scene late. Like Japan she brought a viewpoint which was congenial to change. Japan and America by location, by history, and by temperament and national genius were destined to belong to both worlds—the West and the East.

AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE MODERN PERIOD

It was the middle of last century when our country made its real debut on the Pacific stage. Earlier our clipper ships had plied the China trade. But the decisive action was the sending of Commodore Perry in 1852-53 to Japan to draw her out into commerce with the world. Reluctantly she yielded to our firm but not unkindly pressure,

and once launched she moved swiftly along the currents of the modern West. Nor were the changes in her life at all superficial. Her motives, of course, were conservative. Never intending to lose her Asiatic heritage, she had to do these things or go under the yoke of the West as her neighbors had done. Nevertheless, from the start the Japanese leaders seemed to have the capacity to see the meaning of the Western way of life, and they learned its skills and techniques at top speed. America was her sponsor and mentor through those early stages. There was no competition and no strain. We offered our guidance and it was gratefully accepted. The first half of our century of acquaintance was one of the few honeymoons of modern history.

A change came at the turn of the century. Five years before this, Japan had fought a war with China—the first serious conflict between them in two thousand years. That year her soldiers marched with Western troops into Peking to raise the Boxer siege, and she participated in the punitive measures taken against China. Four years later she was to fight again on the plains of Korea and Manchuria to establish her claims on the continent of Asia. What had happened to Japan?

She was reproducing precisely the historic cycle of development so familiar in the Occident when an agricultural people begins to turn to industry. No modern "great nation" has deviated from this cycle: modernization, industrialization, urbanization, outreach of trade, competition, strong nationalization, power struggle, fear, defense, mobilization—WAR. The twenty-five millions of Japanese population rise to fifty millions, and today to seventy millions. Yet the tiny island base does not expand. Half the people move to the cities and factory life. They must be fed and so must the mills. The basic materials for modern living are not to be found at home. Trade is drawn overseas as though sucked into a vacuum, while access to natural resources abroad becomes a matter of life or death. But trade with every subject nation of Asia is the private preserve of its particular Western ruling power, and trade elsewhere throughout the world is met by entrenched strength of one or another of these same old powers of the West. Tariff barriers and discriminatory agreements create a stifling condition of economic life that is akin to war. And soon shooting war ensues. The first modern nation of Asia has taken this tragic path.

Japan set out to make of the portions of Asia nearest to her shores a preserve of her own. The half-settled prairies of Manchuria

with the approach through Korea were to be the producing area, while 400 millions of China would be the ever-adequate market. All Japan's wars have been fought in this same territory, and to the same purpose.

With the turn of the century America, too, had lurched out upon her curve of empire, almost without knowing it. The war with Spain had brought us into the Caribbean and far across the Pacific, into the Philippines. Hawaii had become ours, and also other stepping stones. So our outlook and our interests were expanding just at the time that those of Japan were doing the same. We gave our blessing to Japan's war with Russia in 1904, but from that time our mood changed.

During the World War Japan made her Twenty-one Demands upon China, and we took a firm stand of protest. China has all along been the stone upon which Japanese-American relations have broken. Our Open-door Policy was at first a measure for holding open a door for American trade and investment. Later it became a creed of protection of China's nationhood and sovereignty chiefly against Japan's expansion.

Before the World War was over we sent an expedition into Siberia to checkmate Japan's moves there by inter-Allied action. But the watershed of our relations was the Washington Conference of 1921-22. The line-up of that historic event was virtually what we have today in the present war. America had the central place of initiative, while Great Britain terminated her Anglo-Japanese Alliance and joined with us. France was a junior partner, as were the other European colonial powers—Portugal, Italy, Holland and Belgium. Germany was not there, having been eliminated from Asia in the World War. Russia was on the side lines, uninvited but closely watching. Japan stood alone. Under the condemnation of the powers for her aggressions in China, she accepted the verdict and withdrew from Shantung.

But in the presence of the new Anglo-American power formation she found herself in fear for her life. The naval building formula of 5-5-3 which we hailed as a just measure for maintaining the peace seemed to her to be a clear handicap of 10-3 against the day of possible conflict. The next year she was weakened by the great earthquake, and the following year our Asiatic Exclusion Act shut her people out of the new world.

The tensions were just as great in the field of trade competition. Japan had mastered the area of textile manufacturing and was already building her own ships and developing her banking and exchange system throughout Asia and even over the entire world. Centuries of disciplined

thrift in poverty and the unusual capacity for organization that marks the Japanese people came to her help in challenging the vested economic and shipping interests of the Western powers, particularly of America. For some time a natural complement of needs and supplies had worked to bring prosperity to both our countries, in the cotton-silk exchange and the trade of our machinery for her light commodities. But as we entered the thirties the world depression was coming on and markets were dwindling. Competition became more and more severe. We threw up our tariff wall in the Smoot-Hawley Act, and this, together with the Ottawa Convention for the British Empire, sent Japan reeling back upon Asia.

Expansion on the mainland again came to the fore in the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Again we protested and stated our policy toward China, a policy now implemented by the Nine-Power Treaty following the Washington Conference. The Lytton Commission in 1932 confirmed the condemnation of Japan's course. Whereupon Japan determined to "go it alone."

When Japan withdrew from her international commitments and relationships she also released all the other powers. So naval building ran amok; Pearl Harbor, Corregidor and Singapore grew like young giants, and islands that might be strategic in war were got into shape. Japan was now seized by a mood of desperation. Leaders and people alike knew her danger and the entire nation began to go through swift changes of social and political organization, as it turned itself into an armed camp. Industry was warped around the defense effort; education was thoroughly overhauled; business and labor were brought under state control; goods were rationed or denied the public. State loyalty and emperor veneration were brought to bear upon every citizen. These changes were not effected without violence; and assassinations and near revolution were always threatening.

In 1937 the penetration of Manchuria widened to involvement with China in full war. Mr. Hull in protest again set forth the American position in detail. The President made a speech suggesting quarantining the aggressor nations. Still trade with Japan was important to us, and to her it was so essential that to place an embargo on it might precipitate war. So a strange paradox marked Japanese-American relations for several years. We shipped China supplies sufficient to enable her to resist Japan; we shipped Japan supplies sufficient to enable her to keep fighting China, and also to lay up a stock pile for fighting us. Yet our will was set firmly against Japan at every step of her expansion.

In the summer of 1939 we announced the intention of terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the one basis of dealing with Japan. This was done because it was now plain that Japan was on a course leading to Indo-China, to Malaya, to Pacific domination; and straight in her course lay the Philippine Islands. Every move made by Japan's army, navy or diplomats was now met by a new economic restraint or a counter-move of help to China on our part. Japan would say that every move of hers was occasioned by one of ours. At any rate, a virtual state of war had long been arrived at when on December 7, 1941, Japan's lightning stroke on Pearl Harbor precipitated the storm into the deluge of actual combat.

JAPAN AND AMERICA IN THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

What is the war itself doing and what will it probably do to each of the two nations? The immense amplification of our industry in war will certainly express itself by expansion onto the Pacific stage. And has not the tonnage of our shipping manifolded five times in this war effort—till we have half the ships of the world? Many of these ships will be in the Pacific. Most of all, our air fleets will make a network of commercial and transport bonds with every corner of the Eastern world. Will this mean empire? Certainly in the past trade contacts have always led on to deeper integration of life along their channels, and as between stronger and weaker parties to the transactions the stronger has usually established some degree of control or supervision over the less advanced. There are still wide economic differences between American life and that of the neighboring peoples of the East, which will invite us along the road to empire.

Japan is being changed by the war, too. There are privations and hardships. But no matter how completely she may be defeated the leaders and the armies and the merchants and the common people of this tiny island outpost are tasting the incredible experience of counting in Asia, even to the point of supplanting the Western rulers. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Japanese in attempting an order for all the Pacific—a new order better than the old. *We* know that it is just the same old order of power and control and war. But the *Japanese* believe it is a *crusade*. This gives them the drive to suffer and die rather than yield. They are gaining acquaintance, administrative experience, and a knowledge of languages and customs and peoples hitherto almost as unknown to them as they have been unknown to us. But with this

difference. To the Japanese they are kinsmen. It may be that notwithstanding all the repressions and crudities of Japanese military rule and economic exploitation during war a certain degree of community is now in process with her and other peoples of the Pacific. The war is interweaving America into Asia. It is also interweaving Japan into Asia. And it is drawing America and Japan into relationship as not all the decades of peace have availed to do.

THE END OF THE WAR AND THE TREATMENT OF JAPAN

Turning to the future and its unknown factors, we tread without too much certainty. The Allied Nations through their leaders at Cairo have given a blueprint of war aims. They are listed with terseness and objectivity and they purport to confine themselves to a disposition of a defeated Japan. Actually they, however, involve complexities and choices which may change the course of our life as Americans. Let us glance at these implications.

The war is to be carried to the unconditional surrender of Japan. Remembering that war is totalitarian and that unconditional surrender must be that, too, we ask ourselves what this termination of the war will do to Japan and to us. The surrender of an army or the annihilation of a navy is a compassable goal. Formerly wars ended with this. But now war is directed at every man, woman and child, every agency and institution, every industry, every city and every social unit of the enemy. It has to be, so we are told, because they are all engaged in the war effort.

If it means what it says, the unconditional surrender of Japan must imply the bringing of seventy million people to the surrender of their wills to that of the victors in war. It involves complexities of enforcement that are so vast that in order to attempt them adequately we should have to give them priority in the organization of our life for years to come. Yet nothing short of this can be called unconditional surrender. For that is not an event but a condition which will have to be maintained. A vanquished people, desperate and rebellious, can become so resourceful in sabotage and resistance that they become utterly unmanageable. Even with but a slight knowledge of both the Japanese and the Americans we would venture the conjecture that Japan's surrender will not be unconditional, and that we would be unwilling to make the enforcement of such terms of victory the major preoccupation of our national life for the next years.

This does not mean that Japan cannot be defeated. Of course she can and will be. But in defeat the terms of peace must be made so intelligible and so *just* that they will commend themselves to the people whose consent must be gained if resistance is to stop. What is essential is that the victory should be defined in terms of principles applicable alike to the victors and the vanquished; principles so broad and impelling in justice that they will command the assent of the peoples of Asia. Let us apply this idea to the various aspects of the proposed treatment of Japan.

Trial of Japanese war criminals must come. Our sense of revulsion at things that have been perpetrated makes it natural for us to burn with a desire to see punishment inflicted. But how is justice to be done? In total war who are the criminals? War itself is an atrocity and we all engage in war. What are the categories of guilt? We must have law in these matters, but there is no law as yet. The trial, too, to be a genuine one must be conducted entirely by third parties. Otherwise it is revenge. Can conditions favorable to even-handed justice be obtained: unprejudiced judges and a jury of the peers of the accused—the basic prerequisites of any court of justice? If not, a rough drumhead verdict may be found for some, but it will never be known whether real justice was done or not. If we, ourselves, will help set up and will submit to the verdicts of a fair court of justice for trying any individuals participating in war outrages anywhere, then we may hope for a satisfactory outcome of the attempt to punish Japanese war criminals.

The Japanese empire is to be dismembered. And it should be. But how is it to be done, and what will be our share in it? First, the islands taken from Germany and mandated to Japan by the League of Nations are to be taken from her. It is commonly said that they are to come to the United States. The reason given for taking them from Japan is that she used them for bases in preparing for war. But we are told that the reason America must have them is that they will be valuable as bases for our ships and planes. At this level of logic or morals will anything really be settled, except the shifting of weights for another war? If an international organ for managing these explosive dots in the Pacific is first created and if we all bind ourselves to its authority before taking them from Japan we shall know that real progress is being made.

Korea must be freed. Why and how? Peoples ought to be masters in their own homes. Every American must feel the pull of this basic right. But how can Korea be dealt with permanently unless as a part

of a larger adjustment? Japan's administration in Korea has not been particularly bad. As colonial administrations go it has been good. It has been a blend of improvement, security and exploitation. Its real crime, like other empires, is that it has robbed the Korean people of their freedom. In the name of a new day for all dependent peoples the freedom of Korea would be a salutary and creative event. On the level of a reshuffling after war it may be merely the beginning of another one.

Manchuria must be dealt with. It has many ties with China, but it is not China. It is a new country rapidly achieving a life of its own. With the withdrawal of Japanese control it will undergo profound changes. Only in some larger context of political and economic structure can its separation from Japan be anything but a temptation to exploitation and expansion by powerful bordering states.

Reparations and indemnities will come up for a decision. In seeking a formula for restitution, concern for the health of the Far East should take precedence over desire to punish Japan. The dreadful crime of aggression against another nation, a decade of pillage and rapine and oppression, cannot be amended through any amount of money indemnities. In waging war Japan has already paid a heavy price of suffering, and in defeat her people are doomed to pay still more. Neither as retribution nor as restitution can money indemnities count for very much. If China feels that there are resources left in Japan's hands which she could use for her restoration to life, it would seem that she should have consideration. But the danger is twofold. If the account is deliberately made heavy in order to bankrupt the offender and render her helpless as a future contender for the markets of the East it will bring unintended repercussions by way of new economic combinations and political alignments. If the amount is beyond the capacity of the defeated to pay or if there is no motive for performance, the debt will drag and finally lapse, as did Germany's after the last war.

Disarmament of Japan is anticipated. Japan should be disarmed. But it will avail little if it is done in the case of Japan alone. What is important is whether the other powers in Asia are to remain armed or not. If they are, the removal of one contestant will not make very much difference in the long run. The challenge of the problem of Japanese disarmament lies in the opportunity it will give us to set up an over-all plan for disarmament. This will call for a court and laws, and flexible instruments of arbitration for the settlements of disputes. In

such a context a disarmed Japan would be a thing to envy, for it would have security without the cost of trying to maintain it single-handed and at the expense of the life of its neighbors.

The economic life of Japan is to be brought under controls and regulations. This, too, will be a matter of great complexity. There is no clear line between peacetime and wartime industry. Any harmless manufacture may become a potent defense instrument overnight. Conversely, not only light industry but heavy industry even is harmless, provided the nation has no motive for using it in preparation for war. So the question of Japan's industries at once widens out into the question whether there is to be regulation of all the industry and trade of the Pacific in the interest of all. This extension of the problem is not arbitrary; it is inescapable. Without a reasonable degree of acquiescence and co-operation from the Japanese themselves it will be impossible to enforce any plan which will permit her enough industries to live without incurring the danger of her secret rearming. For this an over-all plan is needed.

Japan is almost entirely without the natural resources essential to industry, and is even partially dependent upon a foreign food supply. It would be easy to cut off these materials and let the country perish. But nothing would be gained by annihilating Japan, and no voices are raised seriously in its favor. To do this would be to create a vacuum in the very essential place she has held and still should hold in the development of the Pacific. Yet if there had been full access to the natural resources, as is promised to all nations in the Atlantic Charter, one of the major causes of this war would have been removed.

The military occupation of Japan is taken for granted. As a negative measure it will probably be necessary. That is, it will be a kind of policing and official inspection to see that restraints are enforced. But for positive reconstruction it is not likely to be effective.

Great changes must and will come in the inner life of Japan. But the assumption that these changes which really mean reconstruction of the life of a people, in politics, in business, in attitudes and education, in opinion and in loyalties, can be induced and directed and brought to fulfillment under guard of the victorious enemy seems strangely fatuous. Is there one among us who could imagine that under such circumstances *we* would co-operate with an occupying enemy in the destruction of old and precious patterns of life and in their reshaping to his order?

The period of occupation must not be expected to be a time of reconstruction. That will have to come after sufficient freedom has been restored for the currents of life to flow again *from within*. Sooner or later we shall have to remove the restraints and take the risks with the Japan that is to come back to life. If by that time we have risen to the challenge and have launched an ordered life for the Pacific we shall be safe from her and she from us.

OUR COUNTRY IN THE LONG-TIME POSTWAR WORLD OF ASIA

There is to be a new order in Asia. Nothing can stop it. It is already well on the way, and the present war is accelerating its advent. We do not mean Japan's order. That is doomed to failure. Whether it would have been more or less palatable than the rule of the West is a matter of not much concern. No alien rule will long be endured. Asia is to be free.

Our chief concern, however, is our own place in this freed Asia. Our lot has been cast with the Western powers. We have a stake in the old order. We are on the spiral thrust to empire. We are not yet out of the Philippines, nor are our commitments being lessened by this war. The way of power is alluring, and it has fallen to our lot to be the bearers of power at this juncture in history. Our responsibility is immense, because it is we who have had the initiative in dealing with Japan. It is we who must take the lead in bringing in the new era in the Pacific—an era in which all nations ready for it may enjoy autonomy of political life and all other peoples shall have security under the protection of international authority. This will be a new and revolutionary step for us; but dare we do less than take it?

The common man of Asia has been from time immemorial a hewer of wood and a carrier of water; he has been a beast of burden. It was because he was no more than this to his own leaders that he has furnished so rich a mine of wealth for exploitation from abroad. But now he is learning to read, his children are healthier and keen for the new learning and skills. The man with the hoe is now standing erect and ready to take his place in the modern world. Here is the true revolution in Asia.

Will we in victory learn to accept the common man of Asia into our world as we move into his? This is the supreme touchstone of our destiny. We talk about the West meeting the East, but actually doing it is another matter. We have had bitter experiences of difficulty in

the first mass contact of Occident and Orient on our Pacific Coast, tragically underscored by our failure to maintain the American tradition in our war-time dealing with our Japanese-American citizens. This is to be a crucial test of our fitness for a place in the postwar world of Asia, and no one may pass lightly over its gravity or over our failure up to now adequately to meet it. And yet we shall meet it.

All the changes we have sketched will call for organization. In every field there are competent specialists and technicians who can do this task of blueprinting and construction. But no such work will be undertaken unless a mandate is first given by the people of America and of the other countries which now have the initiative in Asia—the nations now allied in war.

This means a new attitude, a new opening of the mind and heart to the peoples of the East. For no organization of life is possible without having beneath it a community of interest and good will. It is this community with Asia that we must seek and find. Until now most of our contact has been in material things, without much sense of common weal. In the postwar world we shall have our supreme opportunity to start afresh on the plain basis of human beings, and with humility and a sense of equality to tackle together the task of finding a community of life strong enough to bear all the tensions and to carry all the traffic of tomorrow in Asia and the world.

One strong element of hope in the creating of a sense of community with Asia lies in the Christian churches. In numberless communities throughout our nation there are persons who through their interest in the overseas missions have attained an outreach of sympathy and understanding which extends across the Pacific and includes the peoples of all Asia. Across the world, too, in every country of Asia there is a younger Christian community looking to American Christians with friendship and loyalty. Even Japan is not outside this creative circle of common understanding and interest. Japanese Christians right up to the outbreak of war strove to avert it. We dare believe that in the postwar world they will co-operate in trying to establish a common basis of reconstruction and renewal of broken ties. Our dealing with them, too, may prove to be the touchstone of our relations with the East in the years that lie ahead.

Isaiah: Prophet of Faith

JOHN PATERSON

TRADITION has it that Isaiah was of royal blood but there is no exact evidence for this tradition. Probably too much has been made of it. That he was "a man of quality" may be inferred not so much from the nobility of his style or from his easy relations with the great, as from his aristocratic horror of any upheaval in the existing order of society; that "the base" should attack the honorable (3:6) seems to him the last word in political indecency. Isaiah was a born aristocrat and could visualize no society without aristocrats in the seats of the mighty.

But whatever may have been his lineage according to the flesh there is no doubt as to his rank in the spiritual order. In some respects he is excelled by others who overshadow him in this or in that, for "one star differs from another in glory," but for all-round excellence and distinction Isaiah is outstanding. "Himself his own parallel" he stands without a peer and overtops all by the force of his personality, the wisdom of his statesmanship, the power of his oratory, and the far-reaching results of his ministry.

"In the year that king Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and His train filled the temple." The prophets rarely use the first personal pronoun in their writings. This is the more remarkable inasmuch as extant Babylonian and Egyptian documents reveal the fact that such reserve and self-effacement were not usual. In Egypt it was customary for individuals to have their record written and inscribed upon the walls of their tomb. There may have been as much—or as little—truth in those tomb inscriptions as in modern epitaphs, but the itch for fame seems to haunt men of every time and clime.

All this makes it the more remarkable that the prophetic writings should be marked by this personal reserve. This self-effacement is without parallel in contemporary documents or later literary forms. These prophets bravely did their deed, and scorned to blot it with a name. The subject falls into the background, and the experience is set forth to the glory of God and the good of men. They see no man, not even themselves; they see only God, and they write what they have seen and heard

with His eye upon them. Thus the stamp of a noble authenticity and intrinsic genuineness adheres to the record.

The prophets, moreover, seldom deal with external matters such as wars and conquests and tribute. They deal with spiritual experience. This is the mark and token of the great writing prophets, though it is not true of the earlier records which know nothing of psychological investigation and deal mainly with outward action and its results. This later style is a new creation in literature: it comes in with the writing prophets and finds its consummation in Jeremiah.

"In the year that king Uzziah died I saw the Lord" (6:1). That year is not simply a date in history; it is the birthday of a prophetic soul, and it marks the end of a spiritual pilgrimage. It may well be, as Julian Morgenstern has suggested, that we can date this event very precisely:

In a very interesting passage the Talmud (Jer. Erubin V. 22c) records the surprising fact that the Temple at Jerusalem was so located and built that on the two equinoctial days the first rays of the rising sun would shine directly through the Eastern Gate.¹

The Temple was so constructed that on those two days the sun, as it rose, shone right through the four doors, set in ascending order, right into the inmost shrine. The origin of such a structural plan does not concern us here, but from later abuses (Ezekiel 8:16) we might infer that it had some relation to an earlier worship of the sun. Now if this day were the fall equinox Isaiah will have received his vision on their New Year's day 740 B. C.

There is much to commend this suggestion, and it would explain much in the attendant circumstances of the vision. The blaze of morning glory flooding the shrine with unearthly brilliance, and the fullness of light that dazzles the eyes of the prophet would afford rare opportunity to the mystic soul and conduce to spiritual elevation. The brazen serpent beside the altar gleaming in that blaze might well suggest the titanic forms of the seraphim. On that day and in that place the prophet received his vision. We need not try to be wise above what is written, and when all is said and done the prophetic experience is something that defies analysis. But it will reward us to consider some of the details of this most "numinous" chapter of the Old Testament.

It may have been that the prophet's heart was sorrowful and pained,

¹ Hebrew Union College, *Annual*. Cincinnati, 1926, Vol V. p. 45.

and like another inquirer he had gone to the house of God (Psalm 73). It may have been sheer regret and grief at the passing of the great king Uzziah, for, as he marked the royal obsequies, he felt as if the sun would never shine again. The nation had basked so long under the sunshine of Uzziah's glory that it seemed as if it would have no end—and now the king is gone, the great Uzziah is dead.

Isaiah had known no other king; here was the end of an epoch, and clouds were lowering dark upon the horizon. The brilliant past had faded, and the future—could there be any future?

The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like an insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on; and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.²

It may have been a mood like this that drove Isaiah to the sanctuary. Or, because the workings of the human mind are generally complex, there may have been a mingling of moods. Was he already, like Saul, feeling an inward discontent? Was he questioning the validity of the religious ceremonial and wondering whether the ritual was but a vain pomp and show? Could it be that in God's house "wickedness and worship" could abide? Faint stirrings and restless questionings filled the mind of the young son of Amoz in the year that king Uzziah died. Here is

An infant crying in the night,
An infant crying for the light
And with no language but a cry.

On that day and in that place Isaiah saw the Lord. Perhaps the crowd had gone, and he is left alone wondering what it all means, if it means anything. Suddenly the walls seem to fall away and everything assumes giant proportions: the throne is elevated, and beside it stands those gigantic figures full of worship and ready for service. Every detail is impressed on the prophet's wondering gaze.

Each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly.

The old commentators make the remark here:

² Shakespeare, *The Tempest*.

with twain he covers his face, lest he might see, and with twain he covers his feet lest his uncomely parts should be seen.

Four wings were used for reverence and adoration; two were used for service, which seems to imply that the strength and adequacy of our service depends upon the measure of our reverence and adoration. Men become mighty in service as they are deep in devotion.

Moreover, devotion is expressed vocally, and at the mighty music of the seraphim singing the Trisagion the foundations tremble and the house is filled with smoke. Smoke is the usual accompaniment of a theophany, but it means more in this instance. Smoke is that which arises when God's holiness and man's sin collide. For He is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity and cannot look on uncleanness. This is the evidence of the divine reaction against human wickedness.

This chapter, as already indicated, is the most "numinous" in the Old Testament. Nowhere do we find the "otherness" of God so clearly set forth, and nowhere else do we feel so strongly the pressure and presence of the holy God. His train filled the Temple.

No face: only the sight
Of a sweepy Garment, vast and white,
With a hem that I could recognise.^a

The ample folds of the divine skirts falling around filled the Temple space, and no nook or cranny was left unfilled with the divine holiness. Sight and sound combined to emphasize the ineffable, all-embracing holiness. The ideal is before the prophet's eyes, though soon enough the vision and sight of the all too sordid real will mar its splendor. We must continually pray, "Hallowed be Thy name," and the process of hallowing is so slow, but in the vision of Isaiah that prayer is no longer necessary. For everything is "holy, holy, holy"; all is hallowed and the ideal has become real. When John glimpsed the new Jerusalem he says, "I saw no Temple therein." The holy city needs no temple, for it is all temple: church and community are completely identical forms and the holiness of God informs and quickens all. But Isaiah knows, as we know, that there is much yet to be done ere the unredeemed tracts of life and experience are brought under "the sole sovereign sway and masterdom" of God.

In the vision of the exalted Lord and in the blaze of unutterable

^a Browning, Robert, *Christmas Eve*.

holiness Isaiah sees himself as he really is. His glance is turned inward, and in that fierce light that beats upon the throne he can only say:

Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean lips,
And I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips:
For the King, Jehovah Sabaoth, my eyes have seen.

It is worth recalling that when Amos received his vision he looked out upon an unrighteous world: Hosea looked on a faithless spouse, but Isaiah looked within upon his own uncleanness. Social regeneration must begin with individual cleansing and inward quickening.

It is in accord with Isaiah's attitude to the cult that following his confession one of the seraphs takes a glowing stone from off the altar and touches his lips. Grace here specializes:

Lo, this hath touched thy lips:
Thy guilt is gone, thy sin forgiven.

The prophet here is referring to a common usage both of the sanctuary and of domestic life. Stones were made red hot at the central fire and lifted with tongs and applied to any object it was required to heat. The method is similar to that employed by the workman who heats a bolt in the fire.

There may be a further meaning here. It would seem to have been the custom that when a man desired to present a gift to God, which, though of costly material, might be ritually unclean, he brought his gift to the priest who made it "to pass through the fire" (Numbers 31:22ff). Not that he would burn the costly vessel, but in a symbolic fashion the priest would touch it with a hot stone from off the altar, and it would then be rendered ritually clean and dedicated to the service of God. No priest would willingly destroy a gold chalice or silver paten that might be rendered fit for service in the sanctuary. The original rite was later modified by symbolism in the same manner as we employ sprinkling in infant baptism where total immersion might endanger life.

Fire burns and purifies. Fire expands and transforms. The old capacities are sublimated, and life receives a new orientation. The lively imagination of John Bunyan that found outlet in cursing and swearing is not destroyed at his conversion; it is turned into a new channel and that same colorful imagination, that expanded itself in swearing, now expends itself in the glorious allegory of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. No man can see God and live. That is the expression of primitive super-

stition but it represents a real spiritual fact. Isaiah saw God and he died: he died and rose again. He put off the old man, and became a new creation of divine grace. Isaiah belongs to the class of twice-born men.

Thus the prophet was ready for the vision of duty. There is strange compression in the recital here. Eleven words in the Hebrew represent the challenge and its acceptance:

And I heard the voice of Jehovah say
Whom shall I send?
And who will go for us?
And I said, Here am I: send me.

Truly "Esaias is very bold." Yea, he is bolder than we appreciate. For if this was New Year's day, then according to Jewish ideas it was judgment day, and Jehovah has come to His temple to judge His people and announce their destiny. Who shall be God's agent in this high affair? There is no shrinking on the part of Isaiah: Unlike Moses and Jeremiah, Isaiah is bold and resolute to undertake the task. God's call has come, and God's man is ready. Eyes that have seen the King will not quiver before aught human. But what a task!

And he said, Go, speak to this people,
Hear on—but perceive not!
See on—but understand not!
Coarsen this people's heart
Make their ears dull, their eyes heavy;
Lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears.
And their heart understand, and health be restored to them.

This may, indeed, have been the commission given to Isaiah at the beginning, and the prophet may have been summoned to be God's doomster to Israel. On this interpretation Isaiah would be Amos *redivivus* and this may have been so, for in the earlier part of his ministry Isaiah seems to be largely re-echoing the shepherd of Tekoa. But it may be—and the present writer thinks so with many others—that this story was written long after the event, and that Isaiah is "reading back" his later experiences. The Hebrew, by his overwhelming thought of the sovereignty of God, tended to express as purpose that which we would call consequence. Isaiah is reading into the original call all that eventuated in his later ministry. Would Isaiah have undertaken a ministry that was to end in total futility? Would Hosea have made his fateful marriage had he known at the beginning what tragedy was involved? Isaiah was to find in course of time that it is one of life's deepest tragedies

that the gospel may be a savor of death unto death. The human soul becomes calloused, and people become gospel-hardened, and a moral obfuscation creeps over the soul, and the last state of that man is worse than the first. Let Savonarola testify here, for Savonarola stands in the prophetic succession:

"Preach to those," he says, "as one may, they have the habit of listening well and yet acting ill; the habit hath become a second nature and they continue to listen without obeying."

Or yet again listen to the Florentine as he renews the experience of our prophet:

Thou wilt be as a rook on a steeple that at the first stroke of the church bell takes alarm and hath fear, but then, when accustomed to the sound, percheth quietly on the bell, however loudly it rings.

The sin of the people is against light, clear and full. But the thought of the end—or is there an end?—overpowers the prophet, and the inhibitions of affection and patriotism plead somewhat tremblingly in the spirit of Hosea, "How long, O Lord, how long?" And he said:

Until there be laid waste
And the land be left desolate,
Cities without dwellers, and houses without men,
And Jehovah have exiled men afar,
And desert places spread throughout the land:
And if a tenth be still in it
This again must be consumed,
Like the terebinth and oak
Of which, after felling, a stump remains.

Destruction complete and final.

Is there then no hope? A later writer felt the poignancy of all this and added a word that might soften the oracle, just as was done at the close of the Book of Amos: A "holy seed" is the stock thereof. But that word is not in the Greek version and it must be presumed that it was absent from the text when the translation was made sometime in the second century B. C. But the hope was certainly in the prophet's heart, and very soon he will set it before men's eyes in the strange symbolic figure of his son Shear-jashub (a remnant will return, *i. e.*, to God). For though there is throughout the Old Testament a continual tension between Righteousness and Grace, the prophet is sure that Grace reigns and will triumph ultimately. Isaiah is the prophet of faith.

The New Pilgrim

JOSEPH R. SIZOO

I RECALL well my first visit to Plymouth, Massachusetts. It was one of those all-glorious days in early summer when the sky seemed bluer and the grass seemed greener and the countryside had about it an indescribable loveliness. All that day I spent visiting those ancient shrines which are in and about Plymouth—the museum with its replica of the “Mayflower,” the rock upon which the landing was made, the winding street over which the Pilgrims tramped, the spring which was found when drought dried up all the streams. All these and more are familiar to us. It is holy ground. I was back again with the first Pilgrims who landed upon New England’s broken coasts. Late that afternoon, exactly at five, driving out of Plymouth we passed the gate of a large factory just as the whistle was blowing. Untold thousands of working people were rushing out of the gate at the end of the day’s work. They were shouting and singing and what pulled me up, they were talking all kinds of languages—Italian, Swedish, Polish, German. They were all in a happy frame of mind. The occasional native American in the group seemed to be the most cheerless of all. As they filed out of the gate on their way to their homes I said, “This is the new Pilgrim who has come to possess the land.” It is this new Pilgrim of whom I am thinking in this article.

There is a word coming back into current use; one hears it a great deal. Because of its ugly implications it has not been given a front-door entrance, but is creeping in over the back fence. In itself it is a good word, but it is given disturbing connotations which may well give us pause. It is the word alien, alien citizen, or alien American. That word is doing something to us today. It is often linked to subversive influences, fifth columnists and quislings. We want to keep America American. We are fearful of wolves in sheep’s clothing, biting the hand that is feeding them, burning the bridge that is carrying them over. So we are viewing with alarm the foreign-born, even though they are citizens, creating tension, suspicion and strain. There is a growing anxiety about this alien citizen for another reason. He is apt to have large families, while the so-called native Americans have very small families, with few

children, if any. There was a time when we used to wonder what we could do for these foreign-born, but now we are beginning to wonder what they will do to us. All these factors have profound implications for the Church and we cannot run away from them.

President Roosevelt said not long ago that we are all aliens and foreign-born except the Indian whom we have not treated very well. That is quite true, but with this exception: the first Pilgrim was quite a different person from the new Pilgrim. Technically, immigration began after the declaration of American independence. Those who came to our shores before that time and for some two hundred years after that time were largely people with the same language, at least with the same cultural appreciations, the same values and the same religious expression. They were, for the most part, cultured people; they were educated and they lived with reasonable comfort. There were about two million white population in 1776. It is generally estimated that two fifths of our white population today is descended from that original two million people. The cultural complex, therefore, of our country during and after the colonial period was based directly on the cultural organization of north-western Europe. The immigrants who came after the founding of the nation did not find the social adjustments so difficult. They came largely from a life of agricultural pursuits and settled in the rural life of our country. They followed the Puritan pattern of life with its observance of the Sabbath, the reading of the Scriptures, reverence of God, love of freedom and personal initiative. They strengthened such social institutions as the home and the church: the bulwarks of Puritanism. Their leaders were men of high intelligence. They valued learning and founded Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Rutgers and the frontier colleges beyond the Alleghenies. They include poets and statesmen. They were held together by a common pattern, inspired by a common political purpose, worshiped one God, but in different approaches, and complied with mandates of one common law. They made the nation. Those who followed the Protestant pattern of worship were about equally divided between Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Baptist and the Quaker groups.

But the new Pilgrims are far different people. They come from many lands, representing many races, many nations and many religions. They have differing and varying historic backgrounds. They come with different cultures. Often they are not highly intellectual, but come from the peasant class. They are a strange mixture of blood and tradition.

These so-called new Pilgrims, of course, had been coming all through the years of our national life, even before our government was established. But by and large, that noticeable influx of this new kind of immigration began slowly about 1840 and continuously increased until in 1890 it assumed staggering proportions. We have here now twelve million immigrants and between thirty and thirty-five million American-born children of immigrants and in addition, about fifteen million grandchildren of these immigrants. That means about half the total of our white population. Half of this number is non-Anglo-Saxon and non-Protestant. In 1880 one-half million came from the Balkans, one-half million came from Italy and one-half million from Russia. In 1900 there came two million each from Italy, Russia and the Balkans.

It almost staggers one's imagination to realize that thirty-eight million have come in the last eighty years. These new Pilgrims came from countries ever deeper into Europe. They were for the most part peasant people living in the open country in the Old World, in poverty and oppression. Here they settled in our great centers with their amazing populations and seething social and economic problems. When you think that in ten years ten million of such immigrants came to our country, a number almost three times the total population of the United States when the Constitution was adopted, you begin to see the problem. No other migration in human history can compare to it. This new migration stands revealed in different customs, different political concepts, different ethnic affinities and different personal standards.

Why have these new Pilgrims come in the last eight decades? In some respects they came for the same reason that the first Pilgrim came. They were tired of Europe, tired of class consciousness, tired of regimentation. They lived in economic want and in political frustration. They wanted to be free. I asked my own father years ago why he came to this country. He was a man of culture. Professionally he was an architect and had considerable standing in the Netherlands. He had a reasonable security and for those in his strata of society reasonable comfort. He said, "I wanted to breathe the air of free men and I wanted you children to have a chance and opportunity which could never come in the Old World."

It must have taken a tremendous amount of courage to uproot their lives and re-establish their homes in a land of strangers. But for a deep, abiding faith they never would have made the venture. I think of my

father bringing all seven of us here when he was a man in his early forties. He could not speak the language and he did not have a single relative or friend in the whole New World. He had no work to which to go. All he had was an immigrant ticket for his family from Rotterdam to Chicago. He had nothing beyond that, nothing except faith in God and faith in this new country. I wonder how many of us would have such courage. They wanted freedom from political oppression. They wanted to be delivered from the crushing force of social caste system.

In many cases these new Pilgrims came because American industry pleaded for workers. Industry actually had agents in European centers to corral these peasants until the practice was stopped by courts. They were assured it was a land flowing with milk and honey. All manner of alluring, fantastic offers and assurances were held out to them. If the wrong kind of aliens came or if they came for unworthy ends we have only ourselves to blame. The machine age had come with mass production and the assembly line. Amazing opportunities for work and wages were offered. The same men who once begged them to come, realizing what has happened, now brand them undesirable. Those who had a rural social heritage settled in urban centers with their steel mills and textile plants and factories of all kinds. They had been oppressed economically and politically and they brought with them their oppression psychoses.

Let it never be forgotten that this new immigrant has made his contribution to the economic life and structure of our nation. He was part of the industrial revolution and the passion to develop the country, to get rich. He made an amazing contribution to hard, manual labor. The textile, mining and steel industries are more efficient because of him. The "hunky" worker in mine and mill has built our railroads, dug our subways, mined our coal, tilled our fields, manufactured our steel, woven our cloth. He has been the hard laborer whose blood, sweat and tears have entered into the bloodstream of our economic life. He has helped to build the nation and make it powerful and strong.

But this new immigrant has done more than that. He has had a profound effect, not only upon our economic, but upon our cultural structure. He brought with him the wisdom and folkways and traditions of his homeland. The foundation stones of our government rest on English law; the first free school for boys was opened by the Dutch; the first

girls' seminary was established by the Czechs; our system of physical education was brought from Sweden and the kindergarten from Germany. In the mines and mills of the Atlantic seaboard they contributed, not only amazing man power, but also genuine cultural values.

But that very contribution has created problems which sooner or later will have to be resolved. The lot of the foreign-born has not always been easy. They have come here in high hope and great expectancy. America was to them literally the land of promise, and the last, best hope of earth. But oftentimes there came to them a sense of dreadful disillusionment. They were exploited by all manner of economic and political charlatans. They were forced to live in foreign neighborhoods. Their homes were invariably on the other side of the tracks. No particular welcome was given to them and no great effort was made to integrate them into our national structure. Many felt themselves apart. They did not belong and felt they were not wanted. They lived in areas which were always the last to have rent restrictions, because they had no political power. I know, because I have lived among them. Nobody cared much about the schools they attended. Forced to live in restricted areas without improvements, we branded them as a lesser breed. They were called by nicknames. They were held responsible for all manner of discontent and unrest. If anything went wrong we had a strange way of blaming them.

All that could have but one consequence. Self-preservation is the first law of life. Soon after these aliens arrived they began to dig in and entrench themselves in sheer self-defense. Feeling that they did not belong, they built walls around themselves for their own protection and security. No other course was open to them. For that reason we have in so many cities, as here in New York, neighborhoods as Italian as Naples, as German as Berlin, as Polish as Warsaw. Such people have kept alive in sheer self-defense their language, their newspapers, their customs and their traditions. They are just little islands in a sea of loneliness. They have maintained steadfastly their behavior patterns and elaborate kit of attitudes and values with which they came. They were in this country, but they did not feel themselves part of it. Hendrick van Loon in his book on American history has made a telling observation. He said: "We have always been a great country, rich in unbelievable resources. Our fields are rich, our mountains are crowded with minerals and our natural possessions are limitless. We have always been a great

country, but we have not yet become a great people." Sensitiveness and self-consciousness has led to suspicion. These very aliens have often unwittingly created the social and economic jungle of city slums. They are grimly aware of racial feeling and nationalistic antipathy. They are conscious of a conflict with American culture. They live with a kind of grim self-consciousness and an exaggerated awareness of group identity. Their cultural gifts have often been submerged and smothered. The first Pilgrim, mainly of Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic stock, has been alarmed at the tremendous influx of these other groups. He is disconcerted by the fact that the new immigrant holds different values and different patterns of life which may overrun him.

The tension and stress in the minds and hearts of these first generations of foreign-born no one can possibly understand until he has lived with them. They are a bewildered and uncertain people. Untold millions of these foreign-born are citizens of our land and yet they live with a feeling of inferiority which leads in turn to a demanding of rights far beyond what they would normally seek. Untold numbers of them are already hopelessly beyond making a potential, constructive contribution to any sort of vital progressive culture. The children of the immigrants live with a sense of oppression which is but an extension of their parents' feeling. When they feel that they do not belong culturally or spiritually explosions are bound to come. It can only lead to frustration, discomfort and restlessness. It is bad for those who feel themselves superior and even worse for those who feel themselves inferior. It decreases the effectiveness of their lives as citizens, lessens their creative power and postpones the goal of a better and more satisfying life for every citizen.

It must be quite clear, therefore, that we in this country continue to face a very challenging problem. If we assume the proper attitude there can come out of this a better nation, but if the oppression psychoses continue we have nothing to look forward to but dismay and disaster. If the old-stock American insists on a unity which finds its basis only in the past and not in a common future, we will never be a great people. It is not essentially an alien problem at all. It is not even an immigration problem. It is distinctly a problem of national unity. Actually today we are waging a kind of psychological civil war. We are in conflict with ourselves. It is time we see these two great forces at work in our common life. The mighty power of the nation which comes out of the past and also the available and unused resources of these latter-day citizens should

not be in conflict with one another. They should link arms to a finer American culture. Unless we cease this anti-alienism we shall lose much that might enrich. We desperately need a kind of America which will reach, not only the immigrant, but everyone, immigrant and old-stock people. Americanism is not the monopoly of any group. Our future is in a unity within a diversity. It is our business to make our American civilization safe for differences.

American culture is more than anything else a combination of European tradition and American environment. We can build here a nation drawn from many lands. The heritage each brings with him should not be permitted to perish, but should flow into and enrich our way of life. Our whole social, political and economic structure is in flux. The first Pilgrim has a great deal to learn from the new Pilgrim, though this last comes from the ends of the earth. We need to take stock of our resources and embark upon the road of self-discovery and self-criticism and come to a new and richer pattern of American life. Into no other country has so much of the best of human longing been poured. We can yet achieve a unity, rich in appreciation, sane in values, firm in morality, just and generous in freedom. The foreign-born have an opportunity of becoming constructive citizens and with their diverse racial and cultural background they will enrich the civilization and deepen the culture of the New World. By so doing we will be doing what is best, not only for ourselves, but for the future of all humanity.

All this is bound to have a profound effect upon our religious structure, especially the Protestant church. This new Pilgrim comes with at least a formal acceptance of the Roman Catholic pattern or with no religious pattern. Those with the Catholic pattern are raising larger and larger families, while those of the Protestant pattern have fewer and fewer children. You do not have to be a crystal gazer to know what the consequence will be. There is perhaps little which can be done with the foreign-born, but our great opportunity and challenge is with the children of the first and second generations. The Protestant church should do much more than it is doing in making this new Pilgrim welcome. The first generation of the foreign-born do not always adhere to the ritual nor accept the dogma in which they were born. They are seeking a new way of religious life, a kind of religious pattern which fits into their new freedom. If the Protestant church can see that fact and open its doors to them, then we will help to resolve the conflict

between the Old World and the New and make the nation strong. The Protestant church must make an increasing contribution to that wistfulness and to this process of assimilation. The immigrant represents both good and bad cultural material. Some of it is cement and some of it is just rubble. We must learn to use what is good rather than discard both because some of it has no value. We must learn to winnow the chaff from the wheat. Protestantism has always synchronized with democracy. Protestantism, therefore, should become the rallying point for all immigrants. It is an inspiring and challenging responsibility which faces us in the building of a better nationalism.

Protestantism must see to it that democracy is made to work and must begin by setting a better example. Too often it has been too smug and cynical. It must be recalled that in Jesus Christ there is no east nor west. God has made of one blood all nations to dwell upon the face of the earth and we have no right to call common or unclean what God has made. It is still true that the only hope is in the word spoken long ago, "And I, when I be lifted up from the earth will draw all men unto me." That is our gospel. We did not make it, neither can we change it.

I have not attempted to resolve all the tensions and conflicts which the new Pilgrim had brought to our shores. I have only tried to point out the obvious adjustments which we shall have to make. We must become not only a great country but a great people. If we can accomplish that end, we shall have set the world an example in the fine art of living together for the common good. For this I make a plea. So:

"God shed His grace on thee,
And crown thy good with brotherhood
From sea to shining sea!"

What Is the Crux of Christian Ethics?

A Reply to Professor Widgery

CHARLES W. KEGLEY

WITH timeliness Professor Widgery asks, in the Winter Number of RELIGION IN LIFE, whether we have any justification for continuing to use the term "Christian" ethics. In answering this question in the affirmative he attempts to point out what he considers to be the crux of Christian ethics. His article is of considerable interest, but it appears to the present writer that his answer is unsatisfactory. Because of the importance of the question I propose in what follows (1) briefly to state what he thinks is and is not the crux of Christian ethics, (2) make certain passing criticisms, and (3) suggest what appears to be a more defensible answer to the original question.

I

In the first five pages of his article Professor Widgery says, in substance, that the distinctive mark of Christian ethics is *not* in (1) its emphasis upon "the abundant life," (2) its doctrine that "man needs divine aid," (3) its doctrine of immortality, (4) its ideal of love, nor finally in (5) its emphasis upon "personal character, with its enduring worth." In distinction from all these, and presumably from other possible characteristics save one, Professor Widgery asserts that ". . . the distinctive in Christian ethics is in *the manner in which it regards suffering and the part it insists that suffering has in the moral life.*" (*Op. cit.*, p. 116. Italics mine.) He adds that he is inclined to think that "no non-Christian ethics, whether secularly or religiously conceived, has given the same kind of consideration to suffering." (*Ibid.*) Now, if non-Christian ethics has not given the same *kind* of consideration to the role of suffering in the moral life, what is distinctive about the way in which "Christian" ethics views this role? His answer is that, according to the Christian view, suffering serves (1) to refine and strengthen personality, and (2) to promote "profound social feeling," though it is never to be chosen as a means to these ends. Shortly after asserting this, however, Widgery says that "the distinctive for Christian ethics is the *attitude toward it [suffering]*" (*Ibid.*, p. 120, italics mine), an attitude which is

characterized by submission to God in suffering. Probably because this view is strongly reminiscent of the life of Jesus, he is led to say, in conclusion, that "the crux of Christian ethics is the cross" (*Ibid.*, p. 121). In the same paragraph (if we may suggest prematurely one of our criticisms), he adds that the cross "does not stand for its [Christian ethics] central or dominant idea. . . . Suffering is subordinate to the aim of abundant life in the pursuit of which it appears to be an inescapable necessity. Central for Christian ethics is the ideal of a triumphant love (*Ibid.*, p. 121).

II

We have called attention to the different ways in which Professor Widgery expressed his answer to the question, "what is the crux of Christian ethics?" One is bothered by the suspicion that this is not merely a superficial difference of expression, but a more basic confusion as to what, precisely, *is* the distinctive mark. Is it the role it gives to suffering? Is it the cross of Christ? Is it the pursuit of abundant life? For one thing, the centrality of suffering is apparently denied in the quoted conclusion of his article. Furthermore, the Christian view of suffering, he explicitly says, must be "divorced from the theological doctrines that have been developed with reference to the sufferings of Jesus." (*Ibid.*, p. 117.) And the notion that the Christian ethics is the ethics of abundant life is the first notion that is rejected. (*Ibid.*, p. 112.)

In addition, one is disturbed by the somewhat arbitrary way in which Widgery rejects certain so-called distinguishing marks of Christian ethics. His procedure leaves the impression that another writer may, with equal validity and within another frame of reference, assert that something quite different from the role of suffering, for instance, is the crucial mark of Christian ethics. On what basis, for example, does he assert that in seeking the distinctive mark of Christian ethics "resort cannot be appropriately [!] made to the aspects of Christianity as religion, particularly its traditional dogmas?" (*Ibid.*, p. 113.) Is this based merely on one's revulsion to the "dogmas" of Christianity? But perhaps the connection between Christian ethics and the Christian view of the nature of religious life *is* the distinctive mark of Christian ethics. Simply to dismiss this view is to beg the whole question. The same rather high-handed dealing with crucial questions occurs in Professor Widgery's discussion of the doctrine, sometimes cited as the distinctive feature in Christian ethics, of the "total depravity" of man. Widgery makes it quite apparent that

he is personally very much opposed to this doctrine, and accordingly says that "Fortunately, it is probable that most of the uneducated within and outside the Church rarely or never think about it. . . . It is crucial for a modern [?] Christian ethics that the description of human nature as 'totally depraved' . . . shall be abandoned." (*Ibid.*, p. 114.) But this is confusing as a serious answer to the question. To write as he has done on this particular topic is to prejudge the nature and content of Christian ethics. The question Widgery set for himself was "what is the crux of Christian ethics?" It is not quite to the point, in commenting on its doctrine of sinfulness of man, to turn loose criticisms of certain allegedly peculiar doctrines and express the hope that "modern" Christian ethics will drop such doctrines. The unprejudiced reader, as a matter of fact, is led to suspect that precisely this and similar doctrines are the distinctive marks of Christian ethics. Furthermore, why does Professor Widgery suddenly introduce the qualifying adjective "modern"? Does this not confirm the suspicion that he really is not wrestling with the announced question, but prefers to state what he thinks *should be* the distinctive mark of some sort of "modern" Christian ethics, which he devoutly wishes teachers and preachers would proclaim?

This line of thought leads to the further comment that, in any fruitful discussion of the present question, we must be at pains to indicate at the outset what we intend to mean by "Christian ethics." Manifestly there are many views and interpretations of Christian ethics, and a Roman Catholic and a humanist might with equal fervor claim to be setting forth the "real" meaning of Christian ethics. But unless there is some clear statement of what one means by Christian ethics, there is little hope that its distinctive feature will be exhibited with clarity.

In spite of the seeming confusion and relativism in stating what one means by "Christian ethics" there is, after all, for practically all non-Romans one source book for all so-called Christian ethical views; namely, the writings of the New Testament. That this body of literature may reasonably be considered the standard by which one should judge what is or is not "Christian" ethics would seem to be apparent for two reasons. First, it *claims* this role for itself. In other words, both the Gospels and the Epistles claim to contain that which is the "Christian" teaching concerning the truth about God and the ethically Christian way of life. This literature admittedly may be and is interpreted differently by various individuals and institutions, but the fact remains that there are certain

major ideas clearly set forth therein which even he that runneth may read and which he can compare and contrast with pre-Christian or non-Christian ethical thought. Second, the teacher or scholar, who faces the task of treating of "Christian ethics" in any fashion at all, uses the New Testament doctrines as a basis of interpretation. Thus Baldwin, for example, in facing the task of defining Christian ethics for a *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, does so in terms of an "articulation of the *doctrines of Christianity* in their bearing upon individual conduct . . ." (p. 347, italics mine). If it is the case, then, that the New Testament is the basis for deciding what is Christian ethics, what can we discover in this ethic that makes it distinctively "Christian"?

We are prepared to suggest that this question should be answered on two scores. The first, which can be very briefly stated, sets forth the distinction in terms of *method*; the second, which can best be exhibited in telescopic fashion—i. e., from general to more detailed bases of comparison—sets forth the distinction in terms of *content*.

III

As concerns method, the basic distinction between philosophic ethics and Christian ethics turns upon the different use which each makes of reason. Philosophical ethics uses reason as the sole standard of judgment in answering any and all ethical questions. By this it is not meant, of course, that every philosophical ethic is "rationalistic." But what is meant is that for the author of most philosophical ethics, the final authority is reason, operating according to strict canons of procedure. To be distinguished from this use of reason by philosophical ethics, the Christian ethics of the New Testament assigns to reason a quite different and more subsidiary role. While Christian ethics speaks of the conscience of the "natural" man, and concedes that certain general laws may be known by human reason, it adds its conviction that as regards the most important and refined ethical issues, not reason but *faith* is the instrument of insight. According to most interpreters of this particular issue, Christian ethics asserts that that which is delivered by faith is not contrary to reason but transcends the deliverances of reason. Stated differently, faith is reason grown adventurous. But it is *faith*, discerning that which reason could not by itself fathom, which affords distinctively Christian ethical insight.

As concerns *content*, we suggested above that the mark of Christian ethics can be elucidated in telescopic fashion; i. e., by showing, first, what

it is that distinguishes any religious from a nonreligious ethic; second, what distinguishes Christian ethics from non-Christian religious ethics, and third, what are some of the still more specific features of the Christian ethic.

With reference to the largest or most general distinction, one may say that a religious ethic is distinguished from a nonreligious ethic by this fact: that a religious ethic involves by definition that the religiously ethical life includes religious *belief* and *feeling* as well as action. Any and all ethics are concerned with moral conduct, but, as Josiah Royce emphasized, every genuine religion involves the three aspects of belief, feeling and action. That which is distinctive of a *religious ethic* is precisely this fact that life is lived in the light of the individual's belief in and feeling toward the Power or Powers which he takes in a serious and social way to be the Determiner of Destiny.

What is thus generally true of a religious ethic is especially characteristic and further specified in the case of Christian ethics. This is so because of the Christian emphasis upon the fact that Christian ethical life has its source and sustenance in the relation which finite human beings sustain to God. This general characteristic of Christian ethics has probably best been expressed by Augustine as follows:

"For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably, and the reason the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God, as God has commanded them to serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices. For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that mind be which is ignorant of the true God, and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the corrupting influences of the most vicious demons? It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long as there is no reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only to themselves, and are desired only on their own account, are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride, and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues. For as that which gives life to the flesh is not derived from flesh, but is above it, so that which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man, but is something above him; and what I say of man is true of every celestial power and virtue whatsoever."¹

Finally, the Christian ethic is still further specifiable by virtue of its distinctive view of the *nature* and *goal* of human beings. The contrast at this point can best be seen in recalling the characteristic of pre-Christian

¹ Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIX, Sec. 25. We are indebted at this point to a brief but excellent statement by Wheelwright, P., *A Critical Introduction to Ethics*, pp. 152-4.

Greek philosophy. Generally speaking most pre-Christian Western ethical thought set forth the chief aim of man as being the full and harmonious development of his natural powers, and this development, it was always assumed, *man is capable of initiating*. A position illustrative of this attitude is that of the Stoics who held that Nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations; "The starting points of nature are never perverse," wrote Zeno.² Another illustration is afforded by Epictetus who says: "You are a Being of primary importance; you are a fragment of God; you have within you a part of Him."³

In clear contrast with this view of the nature and goal of man, the Christian ethic of the New Testament teaches that man *qua* "natural" must die in order that the religious and ethical man may be called into being, sustained and developed by God. The death of the old nature is necessary, on the one hand, because of its corruption; the action of God is necessary, on the other hand, because without it man is impotent to begin the Christian ethical life. The objective dynamic of Christian ethics is God the Spirit exerting creative moral power. This is what the older theologies meant by redemption and sanctification in the Christian life.

Now, Professor Widgery and countless others, upon reading such statements, may recoil saying, "Let's have no more of that moribund theological ethics." But the reply is: This is the ethics of the New Testament. One may say, "Jesus and Paul, you were mistaken!" But no service is rendered to ethics of any sort by denying or perverting the New Testament standpoint. If one considers the position of the New Testament incorrect, one should honestly say so and proceed to show how he proposes to correct it. But we submit that these are the crucial features of Christian ethics on the side of content—finite, corrupt human beings called into life and guided by God's Spirit, and all other differences (of which there are a considerable number) appear subsidiary compared with these basic differences between non-Christian and Christian ethics.

It is of more than passing interest that in recent literature almost no effort has been made to set forth the distinctive features of Christian ethics. This problem has not received the careful treatment which it deserves, either by writers in philosophical and theological journals of the past two decades, or by authors of textbooks in the field. If it be said that a helpful answer has been furnished by earlier scholarship,

² Zeno, *Diogenes Laertius*, Hick's translation in the Loeb Library, p. 197.

³ Epictetus, *Discourse*, Book II, Chap. 8, Vol. I, p. 263.

then that answer should be reviewed and reinterpreted. If no satisfactory answer has been furnished, then the very fact that this important question was answered in such a debatable way should be evidence enough that much more critical thought is required. This discussion simply aims at stimulating such thought and pointing out some of the directions in which we need to look for an answer to the question, "What are the marks of Christian ethics?" A more definitive answer still needs to be given.

* * * * *

DR. WIDGERY'S REJOINER

I believe that Doctor Kegley has not properly represented my views in the foregoing article. I assumed that readers would think systematically enough to see how the parts of my article fit together. As Doctor Kegley did not, I give a brief general statement of my position: Christian ethics is an ethics of abundant life. Its central and dominant idea is that of triumphant love. Within the whole there are different emphases on different values. It includes the love of God in its central idea, acknowledges the need of divine aid, and accepts faith in immortality with its implications for personal character. One of its features, near the center, is an acknowledgment of the moral significance of suffering, but this in a particular manner of its acceptance. As all these features, even including some acknowledgment of suffering, may be found in non-Christian systems of ethics, except the particular manner of the acceptance of suffering, it was suggested that the distinctiveness of Christian ethics is to be seen in this. Readers may judge for themselves whether this position is confused, or incorrect in anything here included in Christian ethics.

The author gives many wrong impressions as to my position: (1) That my method is a purely rationalistic one. I know no such "philosophical ethics" as he refers to. (2) He insists on "faith" as though I do not acknowledge it. Though definitely implied in my view (e. g., God, immortality, etc.), it did not come for consideration as something distinctive of Christian ethics, for non-Christians theistic, Jewish, Islamic and other ethics also involve it. (3) He refers to the New Testament as though I do not rest my view on it. Yet every aspect of Christian ethics mentioned in my article is found in the New Testament and my book (chapters I and II) starts from the New Testament. (4) It seems suggested that in rejecting the dogma of "total depravity" and, pre-

sumably otherwise, I adopt a derogatory attitude toward Jesus and Paul. I accord them the supreme places for Christian ethics partly because I believe that they did not hold that dogma, which, hinted at by Tertullian and Cyprian, appears to have been formulated by Augustine. (5) My reference is not to the cross "of Christ" but as a symbol in the sense of Mark 8:24. (6) The author is involved in a misrepresentation with reference to the principle of "dying to live," as though I do not include it. Yet it is involved in (a) the relative emphasis on different values, taken together with (b) *some aspects of* the acceptance of suffering. As that principle is found in some forms of Hegelian philosophical ethics and of Hindu ethics, it did not call for explicit reference in a treatment of the distinctive in Christian ethics. (7) My use of the term "modern" involves no rejection (as appears suggested) of what is valuable from the past. It indicates that *my* attitude and *my* use of the New Testament is not that of Biblical Fundamentalism.

"Anything Can Happen"

A Study in Novel Contrasts

L. WENDELL FIFIELD

THERE is a certain sameness about war books. This is inevitable for war is the same in its ruthlessness and terror everywhere. But when we move to the realm of general fiction, we find no such sameness. This fact is indicative of the widely varied experiences which make up life itself.

Even the writing of a single author may possess this wide variety. The most recent book by Franz Werfel, not fiction by the way, entitled *Between Heaven and Earth*, is in complete contrast to his best-selling novel, *The Song of Bernadette*. *Between Heaven and Earth* is a careful, scholarly, sometimes heavy and involved presentation of the author's philosophy of life. It is obviously written for the serious reader. It is anything but easy reading. But for the one who is willing to make the effort, it contains many rich and rewarding insights into truth.

I have chosen for consideration in this review six books which illustrate wide contrasts in the novels of today. A recent religious novel is worthy of consideration. It is *The Emperor's Physician*, written by J. R. Perkins. The dedication of this novel is intriguing. It reads: "To my wife Stella Beaman Perkins, whose constancy is a lasting commentary on Saint Paul's avowal that love suffers long and is kind."

This novel is a story of the life and influence of Christ after the fashion of *The Robe*. It tells of an expedition shared by Luke Galen and Septimus Cumanas, the emperor's physician, who were ordered by Emperor Tiberius Caesar to make an investigation of health conditions in Palestine. This basic theme makes it possible for the author to discuss the story of Jesus and His impact upon the people from the point of view of the physician and his interest in healing. The author utilizes in the main the material contained in the New Testament. At the same time he does not feel limited by it and introduces many incidents which are obviously the product of his own imagination. He also takes full liberty in readjusting the biblical material in order to make it fit his story. He does not seek for the accuracy of detail which is to be expected from an

historical novel, but at all points is true to the essential spirit of Christ. This story with its freshness of viewpoint and its depth of insight is a fitting representative of the religious novel so popular at present.

In direct contrast to *The Emperor's Physician* with its serious purpose and its deep and abiding message, is *How Dear to My Heart*, by Emily Kimbrough. This is escapist literature. The author has no desire to delve deeply into the problems of life, nor to present any vital philosophy. As she looks back to her youth in Muncie, Indiana, she finds much that was entertaining and amusing. She writes the story with no special effort to stick to the facts, but with the desire to pass on the amusement and entertainment to others, a motive which is certainly highly commendable in these difficult days. Emily Kimbrough well summarizes the book in a foreword. She writes in part: "In these pages I shall not write an autobiography, I shall try only to write something about a happy childhood in America. A childhood that was happy in great part, I think, because it was spent in a little town where I was not a stranger to anyone and so I am setting down these things, partly out of a debt of affection to the town and partly because I would like to say over, for those of us who remember them, some of the things which we shall never see nor hear again. The lamp on the newel post, lighted with a waxed paper held high in the winter dusk, the gas fire which burned against an asbestos shield in my grandfather's den, the used carbon from the street corner lamps, that made good chalk for marking hopscotch squares, the street cry of fresh lye hominy, horse-radish and the squeak of wagon wheels on the snow."

The book lives up to this intriguing introduction. Grandfather had the first automobile in town. Then there was the skyrocket which concluded the Fourth of July celebration by shooting down the neighbor's front hall. There were the neighbors, kept in a condition of constant suspense by the activities of the youngsters of the Kimbrough family. These and many other "scenes of her childhood" race across the pages of this fascinating book. As one reads it, visions of his own youth are conjured up as in thought he becomes a child again.

The central character in *How Dear to My Heart* was grandfather's automobile, but there were exciting times before the days of automobiles. Back in the days of the hunt, horses and hounds took central place. Now and again they come to us through books which are in the great romantic tradition of storytelling. Such a book is *The Bolinvars*, by Marguerite

F. Bayliss. This story has had an interesting history. It was originally published in an edition of 750 copies. Each copy was sold at \$15.00 which made it a collector's item. So much interest was expressed in this limited edition that it has recently been published in a regular trade edition, and is bringing delight to many readers.

In direct contrast with *How Dear to My Heart*, which serves to remind those who read it of their own experiences, *The Bolinvars* takes us into a realm which is foreign to the experiences of almost all who read. Possibly you have seen a calendar upon which is the picture of a hunt. One hung in our kitchen when I was a small boy. The vivid brightness of the hunter's clothes, the dashing splendor of the fine thoroughbred horses, the eager activeness of the hounds in full cry—all were caught by the painter. The fox was portrayed out ahead of the dogs. *The Bolinvars* takes such a picture off the calendar and out of its frame and presents it in the form of literature. The author loses none of the brightness and vividness, none of the thrill and excitement of the hunt.

It is a strange story, steeped in mystery, charming in its romance, fear-inspiring in its villainy. It tells of two cousins, Deveureaux Bolinvar of New Jersey and Bois Hugo Bolinvar of Virginia. It is also the story of Nellie Farleigh, who loves Bois Hugo and whom he loves but would not marry. It seeks to point no moral. Talk is at a minimum, action at a maximum.

The culmination of the story is the hunt to kill the Colfax Fox. This story of the pursuit of the fox who had devastated and terrorized the Virginia countryside is one of intense excitement. The depredations of the Colfax Fox have been such that there is no sympathy toward the fox. He is not a cute little animal, seeking to escape from the overwhelming odds of hounds and hunters, but a vicious beast who had torn to pieces one of the children on the Virginia plantation. Just as the mystery of the relationship between the two cousins holds the reader in suspense during the earlier part of the book, so does the pursuit of the Colfax Fox hold him in suspense during the last few chapters. The prose of the author is an adequate medium to catch the movement, the suspense, the culminating excitement of the story.

The historic period of *The Bolinvars* is about the same as that of *Anna and the King of Siam*, by Margaret Landon. But there could be no greater contrast in the two books. Margaret Landon has done a superb job in the search for, and the assembling of, the material which tells the

story of Anna Leonowens, the English governess who had such remarkable experiences at the Siamese court many years ago.

This book illustrates the very close line which sometimes divides fact and fiction. As a rule the book itself is classified under the heading of nonfiction. (Such a classification might also be true of *How Dear to My Heart* and *Anything Can Happen*.) In *Anna and the King of Siam* the story is basically fact. At the same time the author has so skillfully woven the materials at her disposal into a continuous story, undoubtedly supplementing the facts with her own rich, vivid imagination, together with the knowledge acquired from her ten years of life in Siam, as to create a tale of absorbing interest and fascination. Here we have in all its splendor, its evil and its comedy, the strange, weird story of an Oriental court.

The story begins with Anna as a teacher in the harem of King Mongkut of Siam. The King was a strange combination of cruelty, cunning and culture. He possessed absolute power of life and death over the large numbers of women, both royalty and slave, who thronged his spacious palace. What Anna lacked in physical stature, she made up in moral courage and spiritual determination. She took her stand, squarely against the injustices which the caprice of the King inflicted upon the women within his palace. This stand of her part brought her into frequent conflict with the King himself. Frequently she risked her life, as in obedience to the humanitarian instincts of her heart she flew to the rescue of those who had incurred his majesty's displeasure. Yet always the need of her services as teacher and as secretary were so great that the King eventually re-established her in his favor.

The author depicts with relentless realism the cruelty, the injustice and the suffering which the King inflicted. There are scenes in the book which makes one shudder. At the same time, the main emphasis of the story is upon the gradual readjustments which Anna was able to make. The reforms in which she believed and for which she strove were not realized under the King himself, though many specific injustices were righted. As the book closes, however, the son of the King has ascended to the throne. He was Anna's pupil and in the humanitarian program which he introduced is to be found the triumph of Anna's battle for better things.

Aside from the interest which the reader inevitably develops in the struggle between Anna and the King, the book is of interest because it

reveals a type of life which is in dramatic contrast with the kind of life which we know. With its rich pageantry of Oriental splendor and the clashes of its characters, it is a very hard book to put down. One inevitably is wondering what is going to happen next, and is held engrossed by the strange habits and customs which the story unfolds. As one contrasts life today, even in its least idealistic form, with the life which existed in the palace of the King of Siam during Anna's residence there, he realizes that there is some progress being made in the world, that in many ways life is becoming better and finer.

Before one has completed the reading of *Anna and the King of Siam* he has been in the presence of so many startling and unexpected, so many strange and weird things that he is likely to feel that anything can happen in the court of the King of Siam. The experiences of George Papashvily who came from Russia to America convinced George that almost anything can happen in America. Subsequently he told some of his early experiences to his wife Helen. The result is an entertaining little book entitled *Anything Can Happen*, by George and Helen Papashvily. This is a story which combines entertainment and inspiration. The very phraseology of it is entertaining, for Helen Papashvily has set down the story as her husband told it to her. George's experiences were of the type in which humor and pathos blend. The incidents narrated keep the reader, therefore, "between tears and laughter" to use Lin Yutang's phrase. This is the deepest kind of humor, the kind of humor which as it brings a smile at the same time tugs at the heart.

The book is inspirational as well as entertaining. The character of George is an inspiration for personal living. His philosophy was a radiant one. The problems of adjustment to a new land and a new life were many. He was frequently victimized by circumstances and sometimes by people. But he never lost his faith in himself or his faith in the America which he had chosen as his future home. He never lost his deep, radiant philosophy, nor did he ever lose his sense of humor. He was able, therefore, to change every knock into a boost, to convert every defeat into a victory, to change adversity into opportunity. Because he found that this land permitted this constructive accomplishing progress for one who had entered it with little in material possessions and with a very limited knowledge of its language and customs, George was convinced that here "anything can happen."

The book becomes an interpretation of the possibilities of democracy.

One has a better understanding of, and sympathy for, the hundreds of new Americans who come with their hopes and their trials to merge themselves into the stream of our American life. One has a deeper appreciation of America itself. It is the kind of a book that leads us to say: "This is my America, too. Possibly I haven't appreciated it as much as I should. I'm going to find out whether I am giving all that I should to my country and so gaining all that my country should give to me. I'm going to give America a better chance to do for me what it did for George Papashvily." In these days when we need to renew and refresh our ideas as to just what democracy is and means, this little book *Anything Can Happen* has a real mission to perform. It does so with humor, with insight and good cheer.

The problem of the interpretation of American democracy is not confined to the re-establishment of its essential factors in our American life. There is a great need for the interpretation of its meaning to people everywhere in the world. It is with the way in which democracy can receive this practical interpretation that Elliott Arnold deals in his recent novel, *Tomorrow Will Sing*. This is a story dealing with Occupied Italy. In many ways it is reminiscent of *A Bell for Adano*. In spite of occasional profane and vulgar phrases, which seem to be characteristic of most of the war novels, this is a beautiful and moving story. Its central theme is that democracy is best interpreted in the lives of people rather than in abstract statements and explanations.

It tells the story of Lieutenant Eddie Amato, a Long Island farm boy of Italian extraction, who finds himself stationed with a bomber group near the farm of his uncle Gennaro, owner of one of the largest farms in southern Italy. Many of Eddie's relatives, as well as the loved ones of the other farmers in this area, fought and died on the side of the Axis in the African campaign. The minds of these simple folks had been filled with Axis propaganda. Their attitude toward the Americans was anything but friendly. They accepted Eddie because he was a relative, but there were many barriers that needed to be broken down. This is the story of the breaking down of those barriers. Woven into it is a beautiful love story in which Nina and Eddie are the central figures. The story comes to a tense and dramatic climax, one that the reader will long remember.

The most helpful way in which Eddie made clear the meaning of democracy was by applying the methods of farming which he had learned

in his little farm on Long Island to the agricultural problems of the area in which his bomber squadron was located.

The story, moving and exciting, is in direct contrast with *Anything Can Happen*, but it produces the same appreciation of the meaning of America and a deep understanding of the contribution that is embodied in men and women with the sympathy, the patience, the courage and the understanding of Eddie Amato.

Between Heaven and Earth. By FRANZ V. WERFEL. New York: Philosophical Library, 1944. pp. 252. \$3.00.

The Emperor's Physician. By JACOB RANDOLPH PERKINS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1944. pp. 245. \$2.50.

How Dear to My Heart. By EMILY KIMRBOUGH. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1944. pp. 267. \$2.50.

The Bolinvars. By MARGUERITE F. BAYLISS. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1944. pp. 384. \$3.00.

Anna and the King of Siam. By MRS. MARGARET D. LONDON. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1944. pp. 391. \$3.75.

Anything Can Happen. By GEORGE and HELEN PAPASHVILY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. pp. 202. \$2.00.

Tomorrow Will Sing. By ELLIOTT ARNOLD. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945. pp. 308. \$2.50.

Book Reviews

According to Paul. By HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. pp. xv-272. \$2.75.

In his presentation of the "gospel of Jesus Christ according to Paul," Professor Rall sets himself the double task of presenting the thought of Paul historically, and of determining theologically the validity of Paul's thought "for our day."

Those who have tried to comprehend the many books written with this purpose in recent times approach this latest attempt with sober skepticism. However, their skepticism will yield to admiration as they follow Rall's exposition. He keeps the two tasks clearly in mind and clearly separate throughout the book, avoiding both boredom and confusion. It is not the smallest of his achievements that he thus distinguishes between the descriptive and the interpretative task of the historian. An even greater achievement would be the insight that these two tasks are in reality only one. If an historian thinks that only the purely descriptive writing of history is scientific, this thought itself represents his interpretative standpoint. It is a poor standpoint, indeed, if he claims that this limited task constitutes the whole of the science of history.

In the case of Rall's book on Paul, one has the feeling that it almost errs on the other side. The interpretative, theological interest not only dominates the descriptive part of the task, it also determines it in large part. This is no wonder, since Rall is a systematic theologian rather than an historian. However, he is a competent student of the modern historical studies on Paul, and brings to their understanding a theological competence which their authors rarely possess. For every major judgment he has the backing of some good "authorities."

Very strongly, and almost consistently, he takes the view that Paul had no complete, logically coherent system of theology. He was a man of deep insight; his thought is suggestive rather than systematic. This is roughly the view of such historians as Deissmann, A. D. Nock, and D. W. Riddle, against the view of F. C. Baur, Schweitzer, Bultmann, and Lohmeyer. Even these statistics make one wonder whether this distinction of long standing is really helpful for the understanding of Paul.

The outline of Rall's book, in spite of its conventional, theological aspects, is superior to many others. On the whole it takes proper account of every major aspect of Paul's thought. The chapters run as follows: The Nature of Man, Salvation, Christ, The Spirit, The Church, History and Eschatology, Ethics, and God.

Conservative sanity and open-minded impartiality characterize Rall's estimate of the historical Paul as well as Rall's own theology. Whether these are the virtues most necessary for the understanding of Paul and for an adequate contemporary theology may be an open question. Certainly they are high virtues in a book which presents to the reader the issues on which he may base his conclusions.

The author wrote especially for the Christian minister. For him it is a most rewarding "must" book. Historians and theologians may ponder it with real profit, and so may any reader who is interested in the historical roots of vital, present-day issues.

PAUL SCHUBERT

Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Connecticut.

Great Interviews of Jesus. By CLARENCE EDWARD MACARTNEY. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944. pp. 190. \$1.50.

It has been said many times of late that the Christian faith is not merely concerned with ideas, but is deeply concerned with events. In our beneficent reaction against the notion of Jesus as mere teacher, we rightly show that the gospel is almost meaningless apart from what actually occurred. Not all of our popular religious songs have a defensible theological framework, but "Tell Me the Old, Old Story" does have such a framework. Men were and are glad to hear the teaching of Jesus, but in most cases they have listened gladly because of the story and the stories which have been antecedently known.

Clarence Macartney is a contemporary Christian interpreter who not only appreciates the truth of what has just been said above, but who acts upon it in his practical ministry. The present volume is a cross section of his work which demonstrates this thesis in action. The gospel narrative includes, as Clarence Macartney sees it, an impressive list of stories of how Jesus dealt directly with men and women, often one at a time. The author's method is simplicity itself. He tells these stories and the result is distinguished preaching.

Many ministers are advised, in their student days, that the essence of great preaching, which can attract and inspire, is excellent narrative, but it is hard to keep this in mind later. Many who do keep it in mind seem to suppose that they are following this excellent advice if they buy a book of anecdotes, most of which are ancient chestnuts, and sprinkle their disquisitions with these. They have a theme and, having stated it, they seek a story to "illustrate" it.

Doctor Macartney's method, as shown in the present volume, is far different from this. Instead of finding a story to support a theme, he tells the story from the gospel and lets it present its own theme. An excellent illustration is that of Jesus and the man born blind. Jesus did not, so far as we know, say to the class, "Today we shall consider the problem of evil," and then proceed to argue the question with appropriate incidents recounted. It was a concrete human situation that inspired the discussion in the first place, and it was the disciples who brought up the matter. The reasoning was from the concrete human situation to the general principles concerning the divine governance of the world.

The present volume shows how great matters, such as those arising from any serious contemplation of the blind man's plight, can be dealt with quite simply and yet quite accurately in a sermon. A sermon is no place for finespun theological reasoning, but a sermon, though largely narrative, can carry to men and women the profounder aspects of the Christian view of life. See how Doctor Macartney does it in the conclusion of the discussion just mentioned:

"When we look at the world with all its woes and suffering and then think about God, we might feel that we are forced into one of two positions or convictions: One, that God is omnipotent and therefore not all good, since he permits evil. The other, that God is good and would like to prevent evil but cannot; therefore he is not omnipotent. But here Jesus gives us the Christian view, the Christian doctrine of evil and its solution, that God will bring good out of evil, and that all things work together for good."

Now this is said quite simply, it is true, but what more is there to say? It is characteristic of the Christian answers to the deepest questions that they can be understood by anybody and yet they are so profound that they avoid the difficulties

of competing theories. Thus we believe in the life everlasting because we believe we are God's children and that, in His care, all is well. There is nothing more to say. It is this kind of faith in which the present volume abounds.

Much as the present writer likes the book and certain as he is that Doctor Macartney's method of presentation of the gospel stories is the effective one for our day or for any day, he cannot believe that the basic figure of speech on which the title is based is an appropriate one. Jesus met a great many individuals, but did He *interview* them? In the language of the average man the word "interview" refers to a journalistic enterprise, and this popular opinion is supported by the dictionaries. An interview is a conference, "especially, a meeting between a representative of the press and another person to enable the former to get information for publication." There is no suggestion that the occasions when Jesus met individuals had any of this flavor.

The interviewer is often dangerously near the position in which he *uses* people. He draws them out, he poses leading questions, he watches for what will make his story brilliant and striking and readable. But Jesus gives the impression that He dealt with each man for the sake of that man and that man alone. Each was precious. No man was journal fodder.

To call Jesus' contacts with various people interviews is to use language that may catch the popular attention now, but it is to distort the basic element in the stories told. It ought to be said, however, that nothing of the journalistic flavor comes into the actual treatment of the stories in Doctor Macartney's book. He knows perfectly that Jesus was not trying to get something to use. The ordinary interview draws the *interviewed* out, but the glorious feature of these stories is that they draw the *interviewer* out. The result is that we have memorable sayings of Jesus which otherwise we might never have known.

"The great statement about regeneration and new birth, 'ye must be born again,' came out of His nocturnal interview with Nicodemus. The great statement about the water of life, of which if a man drink he shall never thirst, came out of His memorable interview with the woman at the well of Samaria. And out of His interview with Zacchaeus came that immortal saying which sums up the whole mission and work of the Son of God upon the earth through the ages, 'The Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost.'"

Here are fifteen sermons which will give any interpreter of Christian truth a new understanding of how the gospel stories can be used today in public utterance, letting the events emphasize the teaching which is implicit in them. But it will be very hard to be original in these matters after reading Doctor Macartney's book.

D. ELTON TRUEBLOOD

Stanford University, Stanford University, California.

The Church of the Brethren and War. By RUFUS D. BOWMAN. Elgin, Illinois: Brethren Publishing House, 1944. pp. 352. \$2.50.

The Church of the Brethren is one of the historic peace churches now administering the Civilian Public Service camps. The other two are the Mennonites and the Friends. Rufus Bowman, President of the Bethany Biblical Seminary in Chicago, records the history of the attitude and fortunes of the Brethren in and toward war from 1708 to 1941. A second volume will contain the history.

The Brethren began their migration to Pennsylvania in 1719, and there found

themselves in close association with the Quakers and the Mennonites. All three were pacifist churches, disowning from their fellowship any who took part in military service. The three differed in their attitude to the world and the state. The Mennonites were the most aloof, living in segregated communities and, except among themselves, declining public office and voting. The Quakers sat in the Colonial legislature until 1756, when the French and Indian wars rendered their continuance untenable. The Brethren at first took the Mennonite view, but on becoming aware that Quaker seats in the legislature were dependent upon their votes, consented to go to the polls. In the Colonial wars all three suffered. Thirty of the Brethren were massacred by the Indians. During the Revolution the goods and printing press of Christopher Sower, the most learned man among the Brethren, were confiscated. Educational work among them in consequence suffered a setback for seventy-five years, and the entire body adopted greater non-conformity to the world. A number migrated from Pennsylvania to the West and to the South.

The War of 1812 and the Mexican War brought no acute problems because the former was largely naval and the latter was remote. The Civil War occasioned serious difficulties, more particularly in the South. The Brethren who had gone to Virginia found themselves in opposition not only to war as such, but also to the purpose for which the Confederacy was fighting. Despite professions of loyalty, their known opposition to slavery brought them into such disrepute that Elder John Kline was murdered. Suffering in the North, where Brethren had been pioneers in opposition to slavery, was less acute. The most distressing problem arose with regard to the propriety of paying for substitutes in the army. Consciences were greatly relieved when the government abolished the fee for substitutes in favor of a fine to be expended on the care of the wounded. Lincoln favored the total exemption of the Brethren on grounds which are highly instructive. When urged to force their compliance, he answered: "These people do not believe in war. People who do not believe in war make poor soldiers. Besides, the attitude of these people has always been against slavery. If all our people had held the same views about slavery as these people hold there would be no war. These people are largely a rural people, sturdy and honest. They are excellent farmers. The country needs good farmers fully as much as it needs good soldiers. We will leave them on their farms where they are at home and where they will make their contribution better than they would with a gun."

After the Civil War the church relaxed its vigilance on peace education within its own membership. Attention was directed, rather, to missions, Sunday schools, and colleges. Nonconformity to the world was abandoned. Members in general went to the polls and voted for Wilson on the assumption that he would keep the country out of war.

When World War I came, the situation of the Brethren was chaotic because the government was utterly at sea as to its policy with regard to objectors, and the church had not foreseen the problems nor instructed its youth. Objectors in general registered and then found themselves regarded as disobedient soldiers, subject to court-martial. The church at length distributed a printed circular to its sons in the army, urging them to refuse to put on the uniform. The government was on the point of prosecuting the church leaders for sedition when the publication was withdrawn. The largest number of the drafted Brethren accepted noncom-

batant service. The smaller group refused work under military auspices and were held in detention camps until furloughed to farms or sent to prison. A few became combatants and were not disowned when, after the war, they returned to the churches. The documents printed in this book prove conclusively that Newton D. Baker did not display the understanding attitude toward objectors ascribed to him, but on the contrary sought to break their resolution and rejoiced over his success: ". . . we do know that in America out of many tens of thousands who claimed upon one ground or another an irreconcilable objection to bearing arms or serving in military enterprises, there remained at the end a very few hundred who persisted, and so found themselves in prison and protesting. To a very large number who presented themselves in this attitude, mere contact with their fellows was enough to enlarge their view and bring them into harmony with the thought of their generation."

The latter part of the book is devoted to the introduction of conscription prior to the entry of the United States into the second World War. A description is given of the setting up of Civilian Public Service camps, and of the hopes entertained by the peace churches that work of national importance, under civilian direction, without pay, and administered by the churches, would solve the problem of the objector and provide an effective witness for conscience and for peace.

ROLAND H. BAINTON

Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Connecticut.

Samuel Johnson. By JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH. New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1944. pp. xxiv-599. \$3.75.

There is no doubt that every person who is interested either in Samuel Johnson or eighteenth-century English literature generally should read this book. It may fairly be said that there is not an uninteresting page in it. The story of Johnson's life is well told and it is only occasionally, especially toward the last, that one can complain of an ill balance due to overemphasis on matter of secondary interest. It would be hard to find among the many volumes that have been written on Johnson and his work as adequate a statement of the immense contribution which he made to English literature as critic and as man of letters.

In the matter of the estimate of Johnson's character, one feels less confidence, though much that is here written is evidently quite sound. The opening sentences of the book about which, by this time everyone has heard, should probably, in the interests of accuracy, be reconsidered. The trait of Johnson's mind which is here described was not pessimism, but melancholy. Special high marks should be given for the unusually intelligent description of the relationship subsisting between Dr. Johnson and the members of his queer household.

It seems a pity that Dr. Krutch has not done a better job in dealing with Johnson's religion. His treatment leads one to the unwilling and unflattering decision that when he writes about religion, he is evidently most imperfectly acquainted with the matter about which he writes. Yet, though it is clearly enough a case of imperfect sympathies, still Dr. Krutch has a mind which—call it tough, clear, flexible, brilliant even—has ability enough to treat with imagination and scholarly fairness a type of mind for which he himself does not greatly care. A decent amount of sympathy, even compassion, would seem to be the normal response of a careful biographer to the various materials which, in such great abundance,

make up the substance of our knowledge of Johnson's religion. And here Dr. Krutch has refused to exercise his imaginative sympathy and has chosen instead to be so rationally detached as to become, in effect, no better than hostile to that element in Johnson's thought and behavior which, since Boswell's *Life* first appeared, has so properly evoked the admiration and stirred the hearts of thousands of readers. The man who "writes down," who in any manner misunderstands the character of Johnson's religion or minimizes the bulk of it in Johnson's massive character and achievement, is surely reducing, by so much, the verisimilitude of his own portrait of Johnson.

Perhaps he could not have done much better even if he had tried harder than he has tried. But the appraisal of Johnson (as the eighteenth century found him) as a profoundly interesting and typical man of religion, was worth more pains than Professor Krutch has given to it.

JULIUS V. MOLDENHAWER

First Presbyterian Church, New York, New York.

Walkin' Preacher of the Ozarks. By GUY HOWARD. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. pp. ix-274. \$2.50.

Guy Howard's story begins in his country home in Iowa and ends in his modern bungalow in Gainesville, Missouri, from which he continues his "walkin'" ministry to the people of the Ozarks.

As an Iowa lad, he had the usual experiences of the mid-western farm boy of his generation. As a young man, he taught a country school, and tilled the soil of an Iowa farm. Falling in love with one of his pupils, he married, established a farm home, and became the head of a family of three children. Tragedy crossed his path, however, in the death of his young wife through an epidemic of diphtheria.

In earlier years he had been invited, as the schoolteacher of his district, to deliver the annual Decoration Day oration in his home church. In the preparation and delivery of his address he had felt that his calling might eventually be that of the Christian ministry. Now, in his bereavement, he left his three children with relatives and set out on foot for the Ozark country of Missouri and Arkansas believing, as he confided in his two sons, that he might there find the opportunity to begin work as a minister of the gospel. He began as a teacher, but was soon preaching in every schoolhouse or church within walking distance of his new home in Hickory County, Missouri.

His story is full of dramatic incidents such as his first contract to teach a school for \$400 state equalization money, in a district whose patrons had just voted down a local school tax, the mysterious burning of the school building, his contribution of his entire salary of \$400 to erect a new schoolhouse, his refusal as a minister to testify against a bootlegger lest he lose the confidence of the hill people, his baptism of a ninety-year-old blind mother of twelve children who had confided in him a hitherto unrevealed secret of her life.

When Howard began his ministry under the Dunkard and Quaker influence of his boyhood, he insisted that all denominations co-operate without reference to church affiliation. After his second marriage, to an attractive teacher in one of the communities in which he was preaching, he united with and was ordained a minister of her denomination, the Disciples of Christ. Following this, he served

several village churches but found his own parishioners somewhat sophisticated—so much so that he returned to his itinerant preaching for mountain people.

Guy Howard's book is an intriguing narrative, full of human interest stories and told in a way to fascinate those who seek insight into human relations. Those who read it, however, should not be led to believe that the incidents related are universally characteristic of the Ozark people. They should remember that Radio City is only a few blocks from New York slums. Recalling this, they may easily understand that within an hour or two, one can ride from almost any of the Walkin' Preacher's hill communities to picturesque towns with modern schools, churches, and residences—some of which are the equal of those found anywhere in the United States.

A sympathetic reader will notice, also, that the language of certain characters as quoted, while it appears to be the spoken word of illiterates, bears a striking resemblance to the language of the early settlers who came to the United States from the hill country of the British Isles. We must not forget that students of the subject maintain that there remain only two seed beds of pure Anglo-Saxonism, one in the highlands of Scotland, and one in the "Ozark Uplift." Those who read this book should note that while Howard's story portrays realistically one side of Ozark life, it leaves untold the fact that this region has furnished its share of capable national leaders. Among these are a railroad executive who was the advisor on transportation problems to two Presidents of the United States; college presidents; deans; professors; public school superintendents; physicians; surgeons; ministers of great distinction; business executives; congressmen; United States senators; federal judges; and leaders in all professions.

Some may criticize the Walkin' Preacher for breaking faith with some of his parishioners in telling the intimate experiences which were confided in him as a trusted spiritual advisor. A few of his Ozark friends may feel that he has betrayed them. Most readers, however, will give Guy Howard credit for attempting to tell a true story of the work to which he has given himself without stint. He has told of the people whom he really loves and for whom he has earnestly tried to interpret, by deed as well as by word, the gospel of Jesus Christ. *The Walkin' Preacher of the Ozarks* is written in simple, fascinating language, and will hold the attention of every reader who is interested in American folklore.

WILEY LIN HURIE

President, The College of the Ozarks, Clarksville, Arkansas.

The Constant Fire. By ALLAN KNIGHT CHALMERS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. pp. viii-172. \$2.00.

Here is a book that is both challenging and inspiring. It should be read by every pastor of the modern-day church. It deals with situations that are in the fore and offers lines of help and thought. It strikes out on unused paths. It does not follow always the worn tracks that others have made. In his general division, the author deals with the Flame that is Jesus; second, the human situation; third, the marks of a Christian. These are subdivided into various short chapters which are filled with meaty illustrations and inspiration drawn from many sources. "The Constant Flame" of faith is the person and teaching of Jesus and the relationship one sustains to the human situation because of the burning flame within his own heart or life. The treatment of this general subject is one that will cause the flame

in the reader's heart to glow a bit brighter. The frank dealing with some of the mooted questions gives one the conviction that here is a man who is thinking straight on some very difficult problems.

In the midst of all this chaos and war and bloodshed, a man, who was in the other World War, dares to speak out frankly and boldly about the significance of the light which comes from the flame of faith in the Eternal God and in Christ in the heart of each of us. One of the most challenging questions he asks is under the second division of this book, "What Do We Expect God to Do?" This question is dealt with in such a way that the usual expectation of the followers of Christ are put out of court, and we stand on a new approach to just exactly what it is possible that God may do for us.

Throughout the entire treatment of this subject, Doctor Chalmers has made it obligatory that those who would follow Christ have some virile approach of their own to every situation. God has not come into this scene just to take over and to lull his followers to sleep with a sort of antidote for the evils around them. He places us, according to the author, in the midst of a serious situation and then expects us to use every bit of ingenuity we possess to work out some solution.

This is a grand book. It is worth the time it takes to read and re-read it, because of what it will do to the individual living and thinking.

C. O. JOHNSON

Saint Louis, Missouri.

Paul for Everyone. By CHESTER WARREN QUIMBY. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. xv-176. \$2.00.

This is the little book we have been waiting for, a readable and dependable interpretation of the Apostle to the Gentiles. The style of the writing is delightful, the choice of material for emphasis is admirable, and the scholarship is both mature and unpretentious. We have long needed an American to do just what Dr. Quimby has done. His training, his experience as teacher and pastor, and his journalistic expertness combine to create this clear and most interesting account of the beginnings of the Christian movement.

There is perspective here. After dealing amply enough with critical matters, the author sets himself to the real task of interpretation, as he says, "This chapter has attempted to peel the orange ready for eating." Without overdoing introductory considerations, Dr. Quimby has made the reader at home in the Pauline world before essaying the difficult task of expounding the thought of this first century Greek-Roman-Jew.

The format of the book is attractive. Perhaps, due to wartime requirements, the little book carries material sometimes found in books twice the weight and size. The maps within front and back covers make it easy for the serious student to keep pace with the movements of this "Roman Traveller." Especially helpful is the map in which Paul's travels are superimposed on the eastern half of the United States.

Since a reviewer must exhibit his own independence, I will set down the following criticisms of a book about which I am really enthusiastic in admiration. In his devotion to Paul the author seems to disregard the superior place and contribution of Jesus, even though he states in the preface (p. x) that the Apostle stands "next to our Lord." The more serious effect of this over-appreciation is to

throw one into the lap of the Barthians, who build Christian theology on the Pauline letters to a thoroughgoing disregard for the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. Less significant are the other items. On page 87 we read, "Romans 1-15 is the only letter Paul wrote to a church he did not found." Scholars are generally agreed that Colossians is another. I question whether it is quite proper to refer to Christ's *Second Coming* on page 75. Paul, rather, says "Coming," or "Presence." It would seem somewhat of an anachronism to say that before his conversion Paul was so fully dissatisfied with Judaism, feeling the irksome load of the Law, "A terrible taskmaster, it held him its impotent slave." A convert usually depreciates his former associations beyond the factual situation.

When he returns to Romans for the Pauline gospel Dr. Quimby is right, and his technique is sound. Instead of confusing the reader with too much attention to the many writings, he passes rather quickly over the other letters that he may give fair and full consideration to Romans. It is a wholly pleasing and clear statement of this great New Testament book.

I take pleasure in recommending *Paul for Everyone* to all serious students of the New Testament. It is simple enough for the average lay reader, while its genuine scholarship merits the respect of the finished scholar. It deserves a wide dissemination throughout the land, among all Christian denominations.

JAMES T. CARLYON

Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.

Behold the Man: An Anthology of Jesus Christ. Edited by RALPH L. WOODS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. xx-565. \$3.00.

Behold the Man, an anthology, brings a miniature library about Jesus to the home library shelves of the average man. It contains impressions of almost four hundred interpreters who are as different as Fulton J. Sheen and Harry Elmer Barnes, Kirby Page and Pope Leo XIII, Napoleon and Augustine, Martin Luther and John Haynes Holmes, Tolstoy and Oscar Wilde. The interpretations are from the writings of theologians, churchmen, statesmen, novelists, playwrights, New Testament critics. The topics discussed are related to Jesus as Man, God, Teacher, Redeemer, Leader, Messiah, Reformer, and Prophet.

Most of the excerpts are short, varying in size from five lines to six pages; the average selection is about one page in length. The purpose of the editor is not to let each writer develop a thesis; rather it is to allow him to express an appreciation of Jesus. Each contributor is allowed to speak because (1) he is an outstanding person; (2) what he has said about Jesus Christ is interesting; (3) his comments are in readable prose. The editor expresses care that none of the contributors offend anyone by his creedal or critical appreciation of Jesus: Protestant and Catholic, layman and theologian will enjoy the anthology.

This book will have several purposes: (1) It is excellent for a book of daily devotions, in which at least one excerpt a day is read, and then thought about during the day. As Christians we need to think more devotedly about Jesus. (2) It is a ready source for quotations about Jesus, especially for ministers in their preparation of homilies. (However, it should not be a substitute for their reading of thoughtful books on Jesus!) (3) It is a good book to take on a trip for the kind of casual perusing a person enjoys in travel.

For a person who wishes to obtain theses or interpretations about Jesus, this

book's selections are too short. However, if a reader wishes to explore further the view points of the people who write in this anthology, he will find their writings mentioned in "Acknowledgments." Should he follow this latter desire the reader will find that the contributors are more divergent in their viewpoints than they appear in the short excerpts of this book. Personally I feel that the book would have been more stimulating if the editor had allowed some contributors to speak their *tangent* views, not to offend the readers, but to make them think more acutely about Jesus.

Behold the Man accomplishes the editor's purpose very well. Many will treasure its contents.

THOMAS S. KEPLER

Lawrence College, Appleton, Wisconsin.

Meet Amos and Hosea. By ROLLAND EMERSON WOLFE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945. pp. xxx-180. \$2.00.

The book is an attempt—on the whole successful as it seems to me—to use the present-day scientific methods of biblical study to make the messages of Amos and Hosea as vital to us as to those who first heard them. It is only to be expected that one who has used the modern methods so long and so closely as has the author will be more confident of his results than will be the non-expert reader. One who accepts whole-heartedly the main results of current study of the prophets of Israel may be a little slow to agree that in detail such study can be as exact as that of the expert in chemical and physical investigation, though it must be said that the author's readjustment of Hosea 1-2 and 9-14 yields an intelligible clue to the prophetic message.

I am not sure but that the book over-simplifies some problems. Take the insistence of some scholars like the late Prof. J. M. P. Smith, of the University of Chicago, that Hosea deliberately married a prostitute for the sake of what might be called an acted parable teaching the attitude of Israel's Yahweh to Israel. Professor Wolfe shows cogently how absurd and worse than futile this would have been. Of course it would, judged by any of our standards, but the prophets did absurd and futile things. In some respects they were strange beyond our power of historic imagination. While I think the author has made out his case here, I have a feeling that his treatment is too facile and deft in passing over the element of the unpredictable and unclassifiable in the conduct of the Old Testament prophets.

All criticism to one side, however, this book has great merit in setting forth the significance of Amos and Hosea in times much worse than any in which they lived—even our own times. We are grateful, too, for the exposition of the needs of Amos in deepening the conception of the ethical nature of Yahweh and for Hosea's emphasis in the emotional qualities of Israel's God, as well as for the larger world field of the divine activities as set forth by both prophets. Both prophets believed in a deity whose chief concern was Israel, but their messages pointed by inexorable spiritual logic to a justice and righteousness and love which must be finally seen as universal.

I cannot help wondering at Professor Wolfe's repeated references to the possibility that Amos died a martyr's death. At first we have the suggestion that preaching like that of Amos might easily have led him to death. Then the possibility becomes a probability and at last all but a certainty. Peculiarities like this, however,

show how entirely the author has become absorbed in study of and meditation upon his heroes, and are in a measure part of the attractiveness of the book. As to attractiveness, there are touches here and there which bring the scenes on which Amos looked quite close to us, one of them the reference to the debtors who had left their robes as security with their creditors, walking robeless through the streets, thus revealing their indebtedness to the world. The book has a good title. It does help us to "meet" Amos and Hosea and to see them, I imagine, just about as they were.

FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL

Bishop, The Methodist Church, New York, New York.

Tales From the Inns of Healing. Edited by B. CHONÉ OLIVER. Nagpur, India: Christian Medical Association of India, Burma, and Ceylon, 1942. Canadian Edition: Toronto: The United Church of Canada, 1944. pp. xiii-162. \$1.25.

Wanless of India—Lancet of the Lord. By LILLIAN EMERY WANLESS. Boston: W. A. Wilde Company, 1944. pp. 366. \$3.00.

Dr. B. Choné Oliver, for many years the secretary of the Christian Medical Association of India, rendered great service before she retired from her post at Nagpur in editing this fascinating collection of pictures and tales.

Starting her story "along the northern frontiers" she tells of the chain of Church Missionary Society hospitals, a thousand miles long, extending from Quetta in Baluchistan, to Srinagar in Kashmir. Sir Henry Holland was head of the hospital in Quetta on May 31, 1935, when a catastrophic earthquake occurred which destroyed the building and killed a hundred. He made an appeal through the *Times* in London, over the signatures of Lord Halifax and other distinguished officers; before long £30,000 was contributed, and a new hospital built.

The book continues with a chapter on "Healing Men." Here we find records of remarkable lives, starting with the story of Dr. T. Howard Somervell, a London Mission surgeon at Neyyoor. Author of two books—*After Everest* and *Knife and Life*—Doctor Somervell's public work and scientific papers have done, perhaps, more to commend medical missions to the Western professional than the work of any other surgeon in India.

The Miraj Medical Centre, established by Sir William Wanless, is described, as it continued under Doctor Vail, and then under Dr. R. H. H. Goheen. There is a vivid story of the work done at Allahabad, where Dr. Douglas N. Forman developed the finest outdoor clinic in India. To this Christian center, known as the Jumna Dispensaries, Doctor Forman brought in the help of other physicians of Allahabad as volunteers.

There are stories of women's hospitals, and work for children, followed by significant descriptions of the influence of ignorance, superstition, and fear. The record of many changed lives is notable.

No record like this would be complete without its reference to the ministry to those with leprosy and tuberculosis. The most important tuberculosis center in India is the Union Mission Tuberculosis Sanatorium at Arogyavaram in South India, founded by the late Dr. C. Frimodt-Møller of the Danish Missionary Society, and now headed by Dr. P. V. Benjamin, one of the Indian-Christian physicians.

Other Indian physicians include Dr. Hilda Lazarus, who has been head of the Government Woman's Medical Service, and who will return after the war to

become principal of the Union Christian Medical College at Vellore. One is grateful for the record of Indian-Christian physicians and nurses that is set down in this volume. No more important medical work has been done in India than the establishment of the three medical schools—that for women, by Dame Edith M. Brown in Ludhiana; for men, by Sir William Wanless at Miraj; and for women, by Dr. Ida Scudder at Vellore.

Everyone interested in the ministry of healing overseas should read and enjoy this book.

The account of Sir William Wanless is the record of an intrepid, devoted surgeon, who gave his life to Miraj in Western India. Full of faith and resourcefulness, untiring in work, he became "Wanless, the miracle-worker." Not only did Wanless build up a hospital and medical school, but he established outposts in the countryside round about, so that the whole area was covered with health units.

The best writing in the book is in two central chapters. One is the story of the epidemic of bubonic plague, and the fight Wanless had to introduce preventive measures and vaccination after he accepted the post of Sanitary Inspector and Medical Officer for the State of Miraj. His success in fighting plague brought government aid in erecting a modern hospital on a twelve-acre site.

The other is the story of famine. They prayed "for strength to endure the sight of child starvation. That grotesque, bulging stomach which loomed and leered like a mocking taunt; yet was starkly empty as a drum. The tiny, protruding rib bones; skinny, knobbed legs with shamelessly revealed bone structure; and above all, the eyes . . . blameless, innocent, suffering, not understanding—yet not condemning . . . the awful, conscience-stabbing eyes of a starving child."

Those of us who had the privilege of working with Wanless are grateful for this stirring story.

EDWARD H. HUME

Christian Medical Council for Overseas Work, New York, New York.

The Bible and the Common Reader. By MARY ELLEN CHASE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. pp. xl-316. \$2.50.

When a top-flight novelist, who happens also to be a professor of English literature in Smith College, kindles the enthusiasm of modern girls for a course in the Bible as English literature—that is a boon to the girls in Smith. When she combines her writing ability and her teaching skill in a book to tell the general public what treasures of story and song, poetry and biography, she has found in the Bible, with the aid of the assured results of scholarship—that is a boon to common readers everywhere. Miss Chase has written with a delight in her subject and a freshness seldom found in books about the Bible.

It is not the freshness of new knowledge. There is little here that has not already been said in such books as Charles A. Dinsmore's *The English Bible as Literature*, Julius Bewer's *The Literature of the Old Testament*, Ernest Scott's *The Literature of the New Testament*, and Harry Emerson Fosdick's *A Guide to Understanding the Bible*.

Nor is it a freshness in approach. Her outline follows the usual pattern of most introductions to the literature of the Bible. The first part deals with the composite nature of the book, the various translations of it, and a short sketch of the history of the Hebrew people and their racial and literary characteristics.

The second part takes the reader on a personally conducted tour of the Old Testament—through its folk tales, biographies, stories, its prophets and their sufferings, its anthologies of poetry and wisdom literature, its drama of Job and narrative of Daniel. The third part concentrates on certain sections of the New Testament—Luke's Gospel, the Acts, the Letters of Paul, and the Vision on Patmos. She devotes 258 pages to the first two parts and only fifty-four to the third part—about the usual proportion among writers who concern themselves with the Bible as literature, and the reverse of the proportion among theologians.

If not from new knowledge or new approach, whence comes the peculiar freshness of this volume that has skyrocketed its sales in the first few weeks after publication? It comes from the deep wellsprings of Miss Chase's own affection for the greatest of books. Yet that is not sufficient explanation—for countless others have had the same affection. What sets Miss Chase apart from the scholars and the other lovers of the Bible is that she is an artist, an artist in words. She has an artist's sensitivity and an artist's disciplined powers of expression. She communicates what she sees and feels in language so simple and pictorial that the plain man sees and feels it too. No mean achievement, that.

Yet this review would be less than objective and candid if it failed to note one reservation. It is that Miss Chase's enthusiasm sometimes carries her into the treacherous realm of superlatives, as when she speaks of "the *perfection*" of the King James Version, and will not grant significant value to any other translation.

This reservation is trivial compared with the reviewer's appreciation of the sweep and power of the book as a whole. While it is written primarily for laymen, ministers and teachers will find its swift-moving pages revitalizing to their own joy in Bible reading. Leaders of Bible classes will discover here a source of sustained enthusiasm. Miss Chase would be the last to suggest that any class should ever substitute her work for the Bible itself. She has studded her pages with short extracts from the various books. These extracts invariably tease the reader to look up their context. That, too, is an achievement of an artist—one who is humble enough to point to a greater work than her own.

FRED EASTMAN

Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

s,
f
e
e
r
er
n
ss
rs
e
-
e
te
e
e
n.
e
n,
n
d
h
er
is